SCOTUSBlog's analysis hereCutter v. Wilkinson, No. 03-9877 (5/31/2005) Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (affectionately known as RLUIPA) does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court's holding unanimously rejects the Sixth Circuit's sweeping and fairly radical holding.SCOTUSBlog's analysis here.FROM THE LEADING CASESKansas v. Marsh, No. 04-01170 (5/31/2005) Cert granted on the following questions:Does a statute violate the Eighth Amendment if it provides for the death penalty to be imposed when the sentencing jury finds the aggravating and mitigating factors to be equal?Does this Court have jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1257, as construed by Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)?”Was the Kansas Supreme Court's judgment adequately supported by a ground independent of federal law?Around the WebDPICnotes:India Moves Closer to Abandoning the Death PenaltyIn a proposed amendment to its penal code, Indian leaders are seeking to implement a change that would end the nation's death penalty even "in the rarest of rare" cases.

d the case has had several iterations, most recently in light of the legislature’s having gained a Republican majority. So, besides the issue of whether it is the court, rather than the legislature, that has the final word on what the law is, there was a substantial question as to whether the case was moot. The Court held that if the judgment in the first iteration of the case were reversed, which the North Carolina Supreme Court did not do, a 2021 redistricting plan enacted by the legislature would again take effect. Accordingly, the Supreme Court holds that the parties continueto have a “personal stake in the ultimate disposition of the lawsuit.” A North Carolina statute with specific application to the instant case confirms that the controversy remains live, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that such “trigger provisions” are sufficient to avoid mootness under Article III. The Supreme Court also has jurisdiction to review the judgment as to the initial iteration of the case under 28 U. S. C. §1257(a), which provides for the Supreme Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.”The Chief Justice notes further that the Court has “recurringly encountered situations in which the highest court of a State has finally determined the federal issue present in a particular case, but in which there are further proceedings in the lower state courts to come.”The dissenters, as one might expect, take issue with the finding of no mootness.Finally, because the issue wasn’t presented to the Supreme Court, the Court did not deal with the hypothetical claim that in interpreting state law in the election realm, the state courts might have impermissibly exceeded the bounds of ordinary judicial review as to unconstitutionally intrude upon the role specifically reserved to state legislatures by Article I, Section 4, of the Federal Constitution. That will be an issue for the future, if ever. For today, the ju

Dep’t’s Waiver (May 27, 2022), Ooma, Inc., No. 21-1488. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257, 1341.U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 10.Id.See, e.g., Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2477-78 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2100-01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U. S. 564, 610-20 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution would seem to provide an express check on the States’ power to levy certain discriminatory taxes on the commerce of other States — not in the judicially created negative Commerce Clause, but in the Article I, § 10 Import-Export Clause, our decision in Woodruff v. Parham notwithstanding.” (citing 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1869))).Tenn.

efore, the district court had jurisdiction on the claim. The Court supported its conclusion for five reasons: (1) “the doctrine does not apply here because the district court here was not called upon to exercise appellate jurisdiction over a final judgment from ‘the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had’”; (2) “Thai Palace’s action was, and is, challenging the action of a state administrative agency, rather than alleging injury caused by a state court judgment”; (3) “because Thai Palace challenges state administrative actions, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply as a categorical matter”; (4) “the differences between the two proceedings demonstrate that this federal action must be seen as an independent, concurrent action that does not undermine the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over any state court judgment”; and (5) “while pursuing this independent, concurrent action, Thai Palace in fact never sought to bypass the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) over any relevant state court judgment.” Therefore, the Court held Thai Palace had asserted an independent, concurrent action and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply.Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s Rooker-Feldman ruling and remanded for further proceedings.

granted June 28, 2004; Question presented:Can a state court, consistent with the 8th and 14th amendments, refuse to instruct a jury in a death penalty case on at least one lesser included offense that is recognized in state law and supported by the evidence? (The Supreme Court added a second question: Was petitioner’s federal constitutional claim properly raised before the Mississippi Supreme Court for purposes of this Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1257?)Case below: 860 So. 2d 704 (Miss. 2003)Rhines v. Weber, No. 03-9046Cert.

SeeDuquesne Light Co.v.Barasch,488 U.S. 299, 306. Title 28 U.S.C. 1257(a) authorizes this Court to review [f]inal judgments by the highest court of a State where any right is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution. In a criminal prosecution, finality generally is defined by a judgment of conviction and the imposition of a sentence.Fort Wayne Books, Inc.v.Indiana,489 U.S. 46, 54.

SeeDuquesne Light Co.v.Barasch,488 U.S. 299, 306. Title 28 U.S.C. 1257(a) authorizes this Court to review [f]inal judgments by the highest court of a State where any right is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution. In a criminal prosecution, finality generally is defined by a judgment of conviction and the imposition of a sentence.Fort Wayne Books, Inc.v.Indiana,489 U.S. 46, 54.