to appeal under Section 1453(c)(1). In last year’s Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles decision, a unanimous Supreme Court considered the merits of a case in precisely that procedural posture: the Eighth Circuit had denied a defendant’s request for leave to appeal a remand order under Section 1453(c)(1). Unlike in Knowles, an amicus brief in this case argued that because Section 1453(c)(1) provides for discretionary appellate review, the only issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Tenth Circuit abused its discretion in denying Dart Cherokee’s leave-to-appeal application. The dissenting justices agreed with this argument and concluded that, because they could not determine the reasons why the Tenth Circuit denied Dart Cherokee’s request, the case should have been dismissed as improvidently granted. Failing that, most of the dissenting justices would have affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s ruling. Justice Thomas, however, would have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254. According to Justice Thomas, because the Tenth Circuit denied Dart Cherokee’s application for leave to appeal, “no ‘case’ ever arrived ‘in the court of appeals’” for the Supreme Court to review. Dart Cherokee, slip op. at 2 (Thomas, J., dissenting). By contrast, the majority concluded that jurisdiction was proper under Section 1254, explaining, “The case was ‘in’ the Court of Appeals because of Dart’s leave-to-appeal application, and we have jurisdiction to review what the Court of Appeals did with that application.” Id. at 8 (majority opinion). The majority further concluded that, “[f]rom all signals one can discern…, the Tenth Circuit’s denial of Dart ’s request for review of the remand order was infected by legal error.” Id. at 11. In the majority’s opinion, whether the Tenth Circuit erred in denying review and whether the district court erred in remanding the case “depends on the answer to the very same question: What must the removal notice contain?” Id. at 13.Given this divisio

As to Knowles, Justice Scalia concluded he made a mistake in overlooking the potential jurisdictional issue. Justice Thomas concluded that the Court had no jurisdiction whatsoever because an application for permission to appeal in the court of appeals is not a “case” in the court of appeals, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1254. As I noted before in discussing the oral argument in this case, it seems unlikely that Congress intended, when it allowed courts of appeals to accept these types of appeals under CAFA, in their discretion, to restrict the Supreme Court’s ability to hear such cases if the court of appeals declined review.

II”).[2] In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2015 WL 5613150 (S.D.N.Y. Sep 24, 2015).[3] See, e.g., SEC Press Release 2010-123, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010),available athttps://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm.[4] ATRS III at *4-5.[5] Id. at *5.[6] Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Arkansas Tchr. Ret. Sys., — U.S. —, 141 S. Ct. 1951, 210 L. Ed. 2d 347 (2021) (“Goldman”).[7] ATRS III at *6 (citing in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 at 246 (1988)).[8] 485 U.S. 224 at 250 (1988).[9] Goldman, 141 S. Ct. at 1959.[10] In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 579 F. Supp. 3d 520, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), rev'd sub nom. Arkansas Tchr. Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 22-484, 2023 WL 5112157 (2d Cir. Aug. 10, 2023).[11] Goldman, 141 S. Ct. at 1961.[12] ATRS III at *11.[13] ATRS III at *13.[14] ATRS III at *16.[15] ATRS III at *24.[16] Id.[17] Id. at *7.[18] Id.[19] Id. at *24.[20] Id.[21] 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 2101(c).

The Office of the Solicitor for the PTO responded to Mr. Tam on March 11, 2016:The Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Tam remains subject to potential Supreme Court review. 28 U.S.C. §1254. … Consistent with USPTO practice following a Federal Circuit decision in an appeal of a Board decision, there will be no “further proceedings” at the Board regarding [the Tam Application] until the last of the following occurs: 1) the period to petition for a writ of certiorari (including any extensions) in In re Tam expires without a petition being filed; (2) a petition for certiorari is denied; or (3) certiorari is granted and the U.S. Supreme Court issues a decision. Unofficial translation: “Nothing is happening anytime soon on your application, Mr. Tam.”

ement. The Court observed that the standard of “a short and plain statement” was similar to the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and that pleading the amount in controversy under that rule is not a demanding undertaking for plaintiffs. So it should not be demanding for defendants either.The actual vote was 5-4. The dissenters did not appear to disagree that removal papers need not contain evidence to prove the amount in controversy. Instead, the dissenters objected to the fact that the Court had taken up the appeal at all. In their view, since the Tenth Circuit had exercised its discretion not to review the District Court’s decision, there was simply nothing for the Supreme Court to review and the grant of certiorari should have been vacated as improvidently granted. The majority, however, concluded that the appeal was “in” the Tenth Circuit even though that court did not accept the appeal for review. Thus, the Supreme Court had the power to review that decision under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1), which authorizes the Supreme Court to grant certiorari as to “[c]ases in the Courts of Appeals.” Moreover, the ruling of the District Court was effectively unreviewable later, and that ruling would have altered, for the worse, practice in all removals of putative class actions within the Tenth Circuit. Accordingly, the majority believed that the Supreme Court had the ability to take the case up and attacked the Tenth Circuit for refusing to grant review of defendant’s appeal.The lineup of the Justices was unusual, deviating from the often-predictable grouping of the most conservative Justices, appointed by Republican Presidents, against the less conservative Justices, appointed by Democratic Presidents. Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Alito, and Sotomayor joined. Justice Scalia authored the dissent, to which Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and Kagan signed on. The position of Justice Scalia, usually an implacable foe of class

Instead, as the oral arguments in this case foreshadowed, the Court divided over whether it was proper to reach the merits at all. Specifically, under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1), the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review by certiorari only “[c]ases in the courts of appeals.” Because the Tenth Circuit did not grant permission to appeal, an amicus curiae (Public Citizen) contended either that there was no case “in” the Tenth Circuit at all, or that all that could be reviewed was the Tenth Circuit’s discretionary decision to deny permission to appeal the district court’s remand order.

court shall file in the district court of the United States . . . a notice of removal . . . containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal…” As Justice Ginsburg pointed out at oral argument, that language tracks Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which governs pleadings; under Rule 8, it is clear that a complaint must have sufficient factual allegations but need not be—and rarely is—accompanied by evidence. That said, it is possible that the Supreme Court may not answer the question at all. Why not? The potential wrinkle—one that received the most air time during today’s argument—has to do with whether the underlying merits have properly been presented to the Supreme Court at all. And the credit (or blame) for this wrinkle belongs to Public Citizen, whose amicus brief(pdf) in support of the respondent first raised this question. In that amicus brief, Public Citizen first argues that the Supreme Court lacks any jurisdiction to consider the case at all. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1254, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review only “[c]ases in the court of appeals”; Public Citizen contends that because the Tenth Circuit denied leave to appeal, the case was never “in” the court of appeals. At the argument, the Justices showed little sympathy for this position, but many Justices seemed intrigued by Public Citizen’s backup position, which is that all that was “in” the Tenth Circuit was whether leave to appeal should be granted, and that issue is one that is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In assessing that more limited question—whether the Tenth Circuit abused its discretion in denying review—the Justices seemed conflicted. On the one hand, if the Tenth Circuit had agreed with the district court on the merits, then (assuming that Dart Cherokee is right about the merits) the Tenth Circuit’s refusal to review the district court’s order rested on an error of law—which always amounts to abuse of discretion. On the other hand, if the denial rested on other factors

Like Judge Hall, dissenting in Calderon, 163 F.3d at 544-45, we find this use of Hohn inapt. The question in Hohn was whether an application for a certificate of appealability is a "case" in the court of appeals, and therefore amenable to review on writ of certiorari under 28 U.S.C. sec.1254. The answer to that question does not bear on the issue in Holman and Calderon: whether an application for counsel under 21 U.S.C. sec.848(q)(4) is a "case pending" under Chapter 153 of the Judicial Code--the critical question for application of the AEDPA.

at 1972. The question faced by the Supreme Court was whether the denial of the COA constituted a case in the court of appeals such that the Court had certiorari jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254 to review the denial. The Court examined the process utilized by the court of appeals in addressing Hohn's application for the COA as well as the adversary nature of the proceeding, and the Court determined that "[t]he dispute over Hohn's entitlement to a certificate falls within [the] definition" of a case for the purposes of § 1254.

The Massachusetts law restoring Caron's civil rights would have allowed him to possess rifles -- but not handguns. The Supreme Court ruled that because state law considered Caron unfit to possess some firearms (handguns), it is reasonable to read the federal statute to forbid Caron from possessing all firearms.Bryan v. U.S.The Court found that a conviction for dealing in firearms without a federal license does not require the jury to find that the offender knew of the federal licensing requirement because the term "willfully" in Firearms Owners' Protection Act requires proof only that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful, not that he also knew of the federal licensing requirement.Hohn v. U.S.Justices held that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1) to review denials of applications for certificates of appealability by a circuit judge or a court of appeals panel. The Court agreed with the Government that petitioner's habeas corpus claim was, in fact, constitutional in nature and thus qualified as a case "in" the Court of Appeals.