nsider whether a district court abused its discretion in denying a recusal motion before it denied habeas relief, despite the fact that the issue was unrelated to the applicant's underlying state-court conviction, because "federal procedural law governing recusal entitles [the petitioner] to have his habeas corpus petition heard by a[n unbiased] judge"); Taylor v. Campbell, 831 F.2d 297, No. 87-5678, 1987 WL 38693, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 13, 1987) (unpublished opinion) (vacating a district court's denial of habeas petition based on violation of recusal statute without granting a certificate of probable cause, the pre-AEDPA equivalent of a COA); Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114, 1118 (4th Cir. 1978) (vacating a district court's denial of a habeas petition brought by a state prisoner because district court abused its discretion in denying recusal motion). We therefore proceed to evaluate Trevino's claim that Judge McBryde should have recused himself.Trevino brought his recusal motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which states that "[a]ny . . . judge . . . shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." This recusal standard is objective; the relevant inquiry is whether a "reasonable man, were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality."

nsider whether a district court abused its discretion in denying a recusal motion before it denied habeas relief, despite the fact that the issue was unrelated to the applicant's underlying state-court conviction, because "federal procedural law governing recusal entitles [the petitioner] to have his habeas corpus petition heard by a[n unbiased] judge"); Taylor v. Campbell, 831 F.2d 297, No. 87-5678, 1987 WL 38693, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 13, 1987) (unpublished opinion) (vacating a district court's denial of habeas petition based on violation of recusal statute without granting a certificate of probable cause, the pre-AEDPA equivalent of a COA); Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114, 1118 (4th Cir. 1978) (vacating a district court's denial of a habeas petition brought by a state prisoner because district court abused its discretion in denying recusal motion). We therefore proceed to evaluate Trevino's claim that Judge McBryde should have recused himself.Trevino brought his recusal motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which states that "[a]ny . . . judge . . . shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." This recusal standard is objective; the relevant inquiry is whether a "reasonable man, were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality."

And he is lying because he told me he could." The 10th vacates the defendant's jury trial conviction, ruling the court should have recused itself from presiding over the case under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), because a reasonable person would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality. The 10th raves about how great it was that the government conceded error.

The court’s discussion rehearses the discrete areas in which due process requires recusal:The judge’s “direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in a case”;A conflict arising from the judge’s participation in an earlier proceeding;Any instance where “the probability of actual bias is high enough.”The court also stresses the distinction between statutorily and constitutionally mandated recusal:Without any controlling case law in his arsenal, Suh relies on Supreme Court decisions involving the federal recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, which requires a judge to disqualify himself whenever “his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Indeed, language from those decisions bolsters Suh’s argument.

This animus led them to ignore even so striking and sensational an item of proof as the testimony of Secretary Mineta — a perennial Democrat member of the House of Representatives, and winner of the Medal of Freedom, then serving in the Republican Cabinet, a man so eminent that a major international airport is named after him — about Cheney‘s standdown orders, for example.They even go so far as to eschew completely any reference whatsoever to the evidence — including defendants‘ own fishy and contradictory statements — concerning where the defendants were and what they were doing at the time of the crime. It is as if, in reviewing the case of a liquor store robbery, you ignored a report that the suspect was seen entering the store with a mask on and a gun in his hand.And Judge Walker, as we urged, clearly was separately disqualified under 28 U.S.C. 455(b)(5)(iii) by virtue of his family connection to then-President Bush, and to his cousin Wirt Walker, then a principal in the firm providing security at the Twin Towers, each of whom surely has ― an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome‖ of this case, as the statute provides.

The BIA affirmed.On review the Sixth Circuit turned to the recusal guidelines imposed on federal judges. This statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), provides: “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Shewchun, No. 09-3894, slip op. at 20.

Both decisions contain useful (and, unsurprisingly, largely similar) discussions of the criteria for when the Court of Appeals will direct reassignment to a different judge on remand.As both opinions note, there are two different statutory bases for a Court of Appeals to order reassignment. First, 28 U.S.C. §455(a) forbids a judge from presiding over a case when “a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” This normally “involve[s] apparent bias deriving from an extrajudicial source,” rather than from judicial rulings in the case alone.

'” The motion adds that "the District Judge’s choice to grant such interviews during the trial would likely cause a reasonable person to question her impartiality. Such comments, during a highly publicized case involving a matter of great national concern, as well as recent public statements in response to the Corrected Mandate, are not so different from those which have resulted in the removal of judges in other cases of violations of 28 U.S.C §455(a)." (They cite the Microsoft case in support of this proposition, though that case involved only the removal of the judge, not vacatur of his ruling).

The complication comes in the definition of "financial interest." The proposed legislation refers to 28 U.S.C § 455(d), which is the section of the U.S. Code that addresses the disqualification of federal judges. "Financial interest" is defined as "ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small, or a relationship as director, advisor, or other active participant in the affairs of a party," providing any of the enumerated exceptions do not apply, such as passive ownership through a mutual or common investment fund.

Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994)28 U.S.C. §455(a) requires recusal of a judge in any proceeding in which his impartiality may be questioned. The Supreme Court holds that matters arising out of the course of judicial proceedings – either in this case, or in a prior case – are not a proper basis for recusal.