Centripetal had no objections. Cisco, however, filed a motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and (b)(4). The judge ordered Centripetal to file a response.

The Federal Circuit held that the district court judge was disqualified from hearing the case once he became aware of his wife’s ownership of Cisco stock. As a result, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Cisco’s motion for recusal, vacated all orders and opinions entered after the judge had learned of the stock ownership (including the final judgment), and remanded for further proceedings before a different judge.According to the Federal Circuit, the judge was required to recuse under 28 U.S.C. §455(b) absent divestiture under §455(f). Here, the requirements of §455(f) were not satisfied.

For that reason, we would also expect Judge Kavanaugh to face a request for him to recuse himself from the litigants who are defending the CFPB’s constitutionality. In making such a request, the litigants are likely to rely on 28 U.S.C. Section 455 which provides: (a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: [(1)-(2) omitted] (3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy; [(4)-(5) omitted].

The federal district judge who heard and denied his habeas petition sentenced Fowler during her tenure as a state trial court judge. She shouldn’t have handled Fowler’s habeas case:We held in Weddington v. Zatecky, 721 F.3d 456, 461–63 (7th Cir.2013), that reasonable observers would doubt the impartiality of a former state judge who is asked to assess the validity of her own decision after coming to the federal bench, and that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) therefore requires the case to be heard by a different federal judge.Indiana asks us to distinguish Weddington on the ground that Fowler contests the performance of his appellate counsel rather than the decision by Judge Magnus-Stinson, who sentenced him before Mills was released. But Fowler’s challenge remains one to his 30-year sentence, and if he prevails he will be entitled to a new appeal in the state system in which Indiana’s appellate judiciary will have to decide whether the sentence was properly imposed, given the terms of state law and Fowler’s plea bargain.

The Federal Circuit vacated the judgment. It noted that 28 U.S.C. §455 governs recusals for federal judges. Under Section 455(b) a judge “shall ... disqualify himself” for having (or for a spouse or minor child having) a financial interest in the case.

By Jason WrubleskiALSO THIS WEEKCentripetal Networks, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., Appeal No. 2021-1888 (Fed. Cir. June 23, 2022)In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found a judge disqualified from a dispute between Centripetal Networks, Inc. and Cisco Systems, Inc. After the judge realized his wife owned $4,687.99 in Cisco stock, he deposited the stock in a blind trust. First, the Federal Circuit found that although placing stock in a blind trust deprived the judge’s wife of control, it did not deprive her of ownership, and therefore was not “divestiture”under 28 U.S.C. § 455(f), as would be needed to cure a § 455(b)(4) impermissible financial interest. Second, turning to the appropriate remedy, the Federal Circuit found vacatur appropriate.

dismissed the second suit under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) holding that all of the claims of the ’449 Patent were invalid as directed to an “abstract idea” and unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101. This Petition arises in the appeal of the district court decision in the second suit.During the first suit Circuit Judges Lourie and Reyna sat on the panel which decided the invalidity of claim 49 of the ’449 Patent adversely to the Petitioner, supporting their decision with a fiction expressed by Judges Lourie and Reyna, a clear departure from the evidence regarding the status as prior art of a reference which was asserted to support an obviousness invalidation under 35 U.S.C. § 103. This circumstance was presented to this Court in a Petition for Certiorari in the first suit that was denied. Such conduct on the part of Judges Lourie and Reyna was raised as a reason to question their impartiality in this the second suit, thus requiring their recusal from any panel hearing of this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). A motion thus questioning under § 455(a) was made to the Federal Circuit, but was denied by the motions Panel, comprising Judges Lourie and Reyna joined by Judge Newman. This Petition for extraordinary writ has been filed to prevent and nullify the very actions that have been taken now by all three judges to defeat the rights of the Petitioner in the ’449 Patent in their Opinion of April 20, 2018. The question therefore presented is: Whether the recusal of the currently constituted merits Panel is required by 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) upon the presentation of Petitioner’s motion reasonably questioning the impartiality of the Circuit Judges who comprise the current merits Panel.Petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition filed 5/3/18 (full docket here). Petition denied 10/1/18.Integrated Technological Systems, Inc. v. First Internet Bank of Indiana, No. 17-1590Questions Presented:Does 35 U.S.C. § 282 allow for challenges to a patent’s validity based on patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C.

Both decisions contain useful (and, unsurprisingly, largely similar) discussions of the criteria for when the Court of Appeals will direct reassignment to a different judge on remand.As both opinions note, there are two different statutory bases for a Court of Appeals to order reassignment. First, 28 U.S.C. §455(a) forbids a judge from presiding over a case when “a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” This normally “involve[s] apparent bias deriving from an extrajudicial source,” rather than from judicial rulings in the case alone.

Rather than selling the stock, the judge placed the stock in a blind trust. The Court held that “placing assets in a blind trust is not divestment under [28 U.S.C.] §455(f).” That the stock was in the losing party did not remove the risk of prejudice. “Where a judge becomes aware of a possible appearance of impropriety, there is a substantial risk that he or she might bend over backwards to rule against that party to try to prove that there is no bias. [citation omitted].

Though this principle had been expressed in concurrences and unpublished opinions, see, e.g., United States v. Fofanah, 765 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2014) (Leval, J., concurring); United States v. Dambelly, 714 F. App’x 87, 88 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order), the decision in Wedd marks the most explicit articulation of it in a precedential opinion.The Second Circuit Finds Disqualification UnwarrantedFinally, the Second Circuit rejected Wedd’s argument that the district court erred in failing to recuse itself from Wedd’s third trial.Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a federal judge “shall disqualify” himself or herself “in any proceeding in which [his or her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Wedd proffered five reasons the district court should have disqualified itself under this standard: the court (a)sua sponte raised the prospect of reassignment; (b) made statements about the comparative culpability of Wedd and a co-defendant; (c) spoke with the second trial jury following the declaration of a mistrial, and later received a note from a juror complaining about a holdout juror; (d) made statements suggesting a high recidivism rate is associated with fraud; and (e) made various evidentiary rulings unfavorable to the defense.Reviewing for plain error after determining that counsel’s request that a new judge preside over the third trial did not sufficiently preserve Wedd’s Section 455(a) argument, the court summarily disposed of most of Wedd’s reasons for recusal.