That model continues to this day, but Teva challenges it with a venerable source of law: the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).The Issue of FRCP 52Remorselessly, FRCP 52(a)(6) states: “[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .”The Federal Circuit in Cybor deemed claim interpretation to be “a purely legal question, [reviewed] de novo on appeal including any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim construction.” FRCP 52 was not considered by the Federal Circuit in the Cybor opinion.

The Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit’s standard of review was improper and vacated and remanded.Why Teva Prevailed: The Court first addressed Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 and the standard that it sets forth for a court of appeals to review claim-construction decisions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) states thata court of appeals “must not…set aside” a district court’s “[f ]indings of fact” unless they are “clearly erroneous.”

The Supreme Court took the case to decide whether the Federal Circuit applied the correct legal standard in reviewing the decision of the district court. The Supreme Court relied heavily on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6), which states that a court of appeals “must not … set aside” a district court’s “[f]indings of fact” unless they are “clearly erroneous” and distinguished the ultimate construction by the district court (based on the intrinsic legal evidence) from the subsidiary factual findings and held that the subsidiary fact finding must be reviewed for clear error. The Court’s decision upheld the underpinnings of the Markman decision -- allowing judges to perform claim construction -- by clarifying that the ultimate issue of proper construction within the context of an asserted patent remains a question of law to be reviewed de novo, while at the same time providing greater deference to the findings of district court judges by ruling that pre-requisite questions relating to the customary meaning of claim terms are to be reviewed under the “clearly erroneous” standard.

While claim construction ultimately remains subject to de novo review (especially when the construction is based solely on intrinsic evidence), any underlying findings of fact (i.e., findings about what the extrinsic evidence shows) will be subject to the more deferential “clear error” standard of review. The Court in Teva v. Sandoz questioned the proper interplay between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6) and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Rule 52(a)(6) states that “[f]indings of fact . . . must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.”

Based on this rejection, the Federal Circuit reversed the District Court’s ruling and held that a number of the asserted patent claims are indefinite. Teva appealed, arguing that the Federal Circuit erred in failing to review the District Court’s findings of fact only for clear error as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The majority of the Supreme Court sided with Teva, applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6), which instructs that a court of appeals must not set aside a district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.

In a 7-2 decision issued on January 20, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., held that the Federal Circuit must review factual findings underlying claim construction for clear error, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6). In so ruling, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s en banc holdings in Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir.

As we reported yesterday, the Supreme Court held in a 7-2 decision authored by Justice Breyer that an "appellate court must apply a 'clear error,' not de novo, standard of review" to the evidentiary underpinnings of a district court's claim construction determination. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., No. 13-854, slip op. at 1-2 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2015). The Court grounded its decision in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)(6), which provides that in matters tried to district court, the court's "[f]indings of fact . . . must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." But if the answer was that straightforward, why had the Federal Circuit been applying de novo review to all claim construction determinations since the Cybor Corp decision in 1998?

Seeherefor a prior report on the Court’s grant of certiorari. The issue presented in the case is “Whether a district court’s factual finding in support of its construction of a patent claim term may be reviewed de novo, as the Federal Circuit requires (and as the panel explicitly did in this case), or only for clear error, as Federal rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires.” The case arises in the context of the Court’s landmark ruling in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. (1996) 517 U.S. 370, in which the Court held that claim construction (the meaning of particular words and phrases describing the claims within a patent) is a question of law for the court to decide, not a jury.

The sole question presented on appeal to the Supreme Court was: Whether a district court’s factual finding in support of its construction of a patent claim term may be reviewed de novo, as the Federal Circuit requires (and as the panel explicitly did in this case), or only for clear error, as Rule 52(a) requires. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil procedure requires that district court “[f]indings of fact…must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous.” Yet, the Federal Circuit in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) held that it would treat every aspect of claim construction, even the determination of historical facts, as a purely legal inquiry to be reviewed de novo.

The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded a district court ruling, finding that the district court failed to properly apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) in granting injunctive relief. Wudi Industrial (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. v. Wong et al., Case Nos. 22-1495; -1662 (4th Cir. June 5, 2023) (Gregory, King, JJ.) (Rushing, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the district court simply entered a permissible order enforcing a settlement agreement between the parties.The FRCP outlines the necessary criteria and steps for courts to grant injunctive relief. FRCP 52(a)(2) requires courts to state the findings and conclusions that support their actions. FRCP 65(d) requires courts to state the reasons why the injunction was issued, state the injunction’s terms specifically or describe the restrained/required act(s) in detail. Per the Supreme Court’s Ebay test, a party seeking injunctive relief must demonstrate the following:It has suffered an irreparable injury.Remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury.Considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted.The public interest would not be disserved by an injunction.Wudi Industrial competes with Wai L. Wong and his business entity GT Omega Racing (collectively, GTOR) in marketing video gaming chairs and other products. GTOR challenged Wudi’s GTRACING trademark registration in a cancellation proceeding at the Trademark Trial & Appeal Board, alleging that the mark encroached on GTOR’s earlier use of GT