Faile v. Upjohn Co., 988 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing denial of a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate dismissal, where the district court had failed to apply provision of Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b) that service is complete upon mailing).[4] The warden contends that, because raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a habeas petition waives the attorney-client privilege, the district court erred in prohibiting the Attorney General from disclosing the documents discovered from McDowell's trial counsel's file to "prosecutorial personnel or agencies" for use in connection with McDowell's penalty phase retrial. It is debatable whether the district court can so limit the Attorney General's use of the documents from McDowell's trial counsel's file. The question being a debatable one, the district court did not commit clear error when it limited access to the file pursuant to the terms of the protective order. District courts have very broad discretion in fashioning discovery orders under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), and the protective order did not fall clearly outside the bounds of that authority. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration. See Pasatiempo, 103 F.3d at 801 (denial of a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) may be reversed only for abuse of discretion).King v. Moore (11th Cir) "[O]nly two of the claims on appeal - the two to which counsel devoted oral argument time - merit extended discussion. The first is that the Florida Supreme Court did not engage in proper sentencing-factor reweighing or harmless-error analysis after striking aggravating factors, thus contravening the Eighth Amendment principles enunciated (for instance) in Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 540, 112 S. Ct. 2114, 2123 (1992). The second is that the prosecution exercised race-based peremptory strikes, thus entitling King to a new sentencing hearing under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-97, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1723 (1986)."A. Sochor ClaimThe Stat

¶62.Lane describes in some detail in the cited paragraphs the showing necessary to find a work product privilege. As the court notes, this privilege is codified in § 804.01(2)(c); and, because FRCivP 26(b)(3) is “the federal analogue to “this statute, “federal decisions construing the federal counterpart” are relevant.

McDowell II, 197 F.3d at 1256. In support of our holding, we emphasized that district courts have "very broad discretion in fashioning discovery orders under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), and the protective order did not fall clearly outside the bounds of that authority."Id.

Halas v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 570 (1990).19. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 26(b). In United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968), the court declined to shelter an appraiser's work product from discovery, and stated: Ordinarily, appraisers are not employed in condemnation matters to act as advisors to counsel; and the government does not contend that its appraisers were.

On her report the district court dismissed Fonner from the case. The Court found the dismissal to be within the district court's discretion.3. Did the district court properly enter a protective order under F. R. Civ. P. 26(c) prohibiting Fonner's deposition?Held: Yes. The court relied on the report of Fonner’s court-appointed guardian ad litem and the affidavit of Fonner’s treating psychologist.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure guide courts to limit discovery where “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.” FRCP 26(b)(2). Although the Federal Rules were recently revised and amended, many have argued for another update of the Rules to specifically address nuances of electronic discovery.

In short, defense counsel “knew or should have knows that communications with a testifying expert witness concerning the subject matter of the expert’s report are not privileged.”Based on Omeprazole and FRCP 26, before sharing any information or documents with testifying experts, counsel must make sure that they are comfortable with that information being disclosed to the other side. In re Natural Gas Commodity Litigation, 2005U.S.Dist.N.Y.11950(S.D.N.Y.June 21, 2005).Often times, pharmaceutical companies volunteer information and data to the FDA to comply with requests to provide such information.

In October 2003, the District Court of New Jersey adopted Local Rule 26.1(d) "Discovery of Digital Information Including Computer Based Information." The rule provides that, before a Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) conference, counsel must review with the client its information management systems to understand how information can be retrieved. Counsel also must identify a person with knowledge about the client's information systems and the ability to facilitate reasonably anticipated discovery.

[10]See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 589 (“Courts have refused to permit their files to serve . . . as sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.”); Va. Dept. of State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d at 147 (2d Cir. 1995); Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs, Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 1993); Pratt & Whitney Can, Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 268, 275 (1988); Yousaf v. UHS of De La Ronde, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7378 (E.D. La. 2001); Knoxville News, 723 F. 2d at 474; Huntsman-Christensen Corp. v. Entrada Indus., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 733, 735-36 (C.D. Utah 1986).[11] Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).[12]See Rotonbarrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chem. Co., 689 F.2d 424, 428-29 (3d Cir. 1982) (rejecting argument that the United States Supreme Court established federal common law of trade secrets in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1976)).

In habeas proceedings in the district courts, the initial disclosure rules regarding discovery do not apply. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(E)(ii). Rather, the district judge "may, for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and may limit the extent of discovery."