P. 7001.Intervention"Intervention" is a procedure that permits a nonparty to join ongoing litigation, either as a matter of right or at the discretion of the court, without the permission of the original litigants, generally because a judgment in the case may impact the rights of the nonparty intervenor. The ability to intervene in federal litigation is generally governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, which is made applicable in its entirety to adversary proceedings commenced in a bankruptcy case by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7024.Fed.

The court concluded that Section 1109 of the Bankruptcy Code does not grant a creditors’ committee the unconditional right to intervene in an adversary proceeding. The court also found that the committee did not have a right to intervene under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) (intervention of right) or 24(b)(1)(B) (permissive intervention).Background The debtor’s confirmed plan created a liquidating trust to which certain causes of action were transferred to benefit the debtor’s general unsecured creditors.

Intervention in adversary proceedings is governed by Rule 7024 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (FRBP), makes Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) applicable in adversary proceedings. Pursuant to FRCP 24 “the court must permit any party to intervene who … is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute.” However, relying on a footnote in an earlier First Circuit decision (Thompson) which states that section 1109(b) “does not afford a right to intervene under Rule 24(a)(1),” the District Court denied the UCC’s motion to intervene.

"Intervention" is a procedure that permits a nonparty to join ongoing litigation, either as a matter of right or at the discretion of the court, without the permission of the original litigants, generally because a judgment in the case may impact the rights of the nonparty intervenor. The ability to intervene in federal litigation is generally governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, which is made applicable in its entirety to adversary proceedings commenced in a bankruptcy case by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7024. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) provides that the court "must permit anyone to intervene who . . . is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute."

Although the FDIC acknowledged the ad hoc group’s notes as legitimate liabilities of the WaMu receivership, it urged the District Court to reject the noteholders’ motion to intervene because the noteholders did not, at the time, have a direct interest in the pools of residential mortgages or the underlying securitization documents subject to Deutsche Bank’s lawsuit.District Court’s Decision The District Court ultimately held that the ad hoc noteholder group did not have a right to intervene in the Deutsche Bank litigation as a matter of right because its members lacked a direct interest in the suit. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), a party may intervene as a matter of right in a lawsuit if (i) the application to intervene is timely, (ii) the party has an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action, (iii) the party is situated such that the disposition of the action would impair the party’s ability to protect that interest, and (iv) the party’s interest must not be adequately represented by existing parties to the action. Fed R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).

In an unusual move, the Ninth Circuit took the case en banc before a three-judge panel reached a decision. The unanimous en banc court rejected the federal defendant rule as inconsistent with the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), which allows intervention by anyone with a significant, protectable interest relating to the property or transaction at issue. In all contexts besides NEPA, the court considers the practical and equitable implications of the case to determine whether a party has a sufficient interest to intervene.

States ConstitutionKentucky also filed a Motion of Preliminary Injunction asking that EPA be enjoined from enforcing the WOTUS rule.Various industry groups and the Kentucky Chamber of Commerce also initiated a separate action seeking the same relief. The cases were consolidated.The CGs subsequently filed a Motion seeking intervention of right and by permission.The Court notes that they have argued a:. . . “significant protectable interest in the scope of the Clean Water Act and the ecological integrity of waters affected by the Rule” because they represent “hunters, anglers, conservationists, and outdoor enthusiasts who use and enjoy water resources.”The CGs also argued that their interest was sufficiently distinct from EPA’s interests in litigation to make those agencies inadequate representatives.Kentucky and the industry groups objected to intervention on either basis by the CGs. EPA opposed intervention of right but not permissive intervention.The Court cites case law interpreting Federal Rules Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) as establishing the standard for determining whether a non-party is entitled to intervention of right:. . . the proposed intervenors [must] demonstrate that the following four criteria have been met: (1) the motion to intervene is timely; (2) the proposed intervenors have a significant legal interest in the subject matter of the pending litigation; (3) the disposition of the action may impair or impede the proposed intervenors' ability to protect their legal interest; and (4) the parties to the litigation cannot adequately protect the proposed intervenors' interest.The CGs argue that EPA is only partially aligned with their interest. This is based on their belief that EPA answers to a “far broader constituency.” Cited is the CGs advocacy of a different scope for the WOTUS rule.The Court holds that the EPA and the CGs share an interest in upholding the WOTUS rule. In other words, it notes that they share the same “ultimate objective” and the Court therefore presumes adequate representa

Because in many instances, the consumer’s claim will involve an attack on some aspect of the lead generator’s business model, as was the case in Turner v. Efinancial, LLC, No. 18-cv-292-CMA-GPG, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150980 (D. Colo. Sept. 5, 2018). But Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 provides those lead generators the right to assert themselves into such litigation and defend their business interests. Setting the stage, Efinancial had called Plaintiff regarding its insurance services based on an online lead generated after Plaintiff had apparently visited a website operated by All Web Leads, Inc. (“All Web”) (www.insurancequotes.com), submitted her contact information, accepted the All Web’s TCPA consent disclosures, as well as an arbitration agreement.

The district court dismissed the action under the first-to-file rule. On appeal, the 10th Circuit determined that the “focal point” for proper analysis was the statutory term “intervene” in the first-to-file rule—that is, did it apply to any type of joinder or substitution of relator, or did it apply more specifically to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 intervention? 33The court believed that the meaning of the term should be limited to its meaning in Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 and not extended to bar, as defendants contended, any form of substitution or joinder of any party.

After the settlement was announced, Cin-Q and Medical & Chiropractic Clinic (the “movants”) moved to intervene in the case. The district court denied the movants (named plaintiffs in the first class action case) the opportunity to intervene in the second class action, but on October 26, 2017, a three judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instructions to grant the movants’ motion to intervene, holding that the movants had satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2)’s requirements for intervention.The movants originally filed a lawsuit in 2013 on behalf of a putative class against the defendant alleging violations of the TCPA.