Burrell v. Crown Cent. Petroleum, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 284, 291 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (issues common to the class as a whole were “subordinate to the specific circumstances surrounding each individual plaintiff’s claim for compensatory and punitive damages” because the court would have to engage in a highly individualized inquiry into the specific circumstances of each plaintiff’s claims); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), Advisory Comm. Notes to 1966 Amendments (no predominance where a Rule 23(b)(3) class would eventually “degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried”). Discrimination claims challenging decentralized, locally autonomous decisionmaking practices at various locations present predominantly individual issues that preclude Rule 23(b)(3) certification. See Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1006 (11th Cir. 1997) (no predominance where the “common” issue of whether employer had a practice or policy of discrimination broke down into “an unmanageable variety of individual legal and factual issues”); Ramirez v. DeCoster, 194 F.R.D. 348, 353 (D. Me. 2000)

” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 396 F.3d at 113-14. Neither Rule 23 nor due process requires actual notice to each possible class member. See Buxbaum v. Deutsche Bank AG, 216 F.R.D. 72, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“It is ‘widely recognized that for the due process standard to be met it is not necessary that every class member receive actual notice, so long as class counsel acted reasonably in selecting means likely to inform persons affected.’

; Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., Case3:12-cv-02907-SC Document65 Filed07/02/13 Page29 of 32 23 Case No. CV 12-2907 SC Notice of Motion and Motion for Class Certification; Memorandum and Points and Authorities in Support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 503 F.2d 1161, 1165 (7th Cir. 1974) (in deciding the “best” method, court may consider “inability of the poor or uninformed to enforce their rights, and the improbability that large numbers of class members would possess the initiative to litigate individually.”); Jordan v. Paul Financial, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 435, 467 (N.D.Cal. 2012) (noting failure to certify due to unmanageability is disfavored). Accordingly, prosecuting the case at bar as a class action does not present any difficulties within the meaning of Rule 23(b)(3)(D), and the class mechanism is clearly the superior vehicle by which to adjudicate this controversy. V. CONCLUSION

. 80392 Brenda K. Baumgart, OSB No. 99216 Telephone: (503) 228-0500 Attorneys for Defendants Dell Inc., and Dell Marketing USA, L.P. and Jeffrey C. Londa, Pro Hac Vice Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 500 Dallas Street, Suite 3000 Houston, TX 77002-4709 Phone: 713-655-5750 Facsimile: 713-655-0020 E-mail: Jeff.Londa@ogletreedeakins.com Of Counsel for Defendants Michael W. Fox, Pro Hac Vice Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. 301 Congress Avenue, Suite 1250 Austin, TX 78701 Phone: 512-344-4700 Facsimile: 512-344-4701 E-mail: Mike.Fox@ogletreedeakins.com Of Counsel for Defendants Case 6:07-cv-06028-TC Document 224 Filed 02/29/2008 Page 56 of 57 00119869.DOC / CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on the 29th day of February, 2008, I served the foregoing DEFENDANTS DELL INC. AND DELL MARKETING USA, L.P.’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION UNDER 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) AND FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23 on the following parties at the following addresses: Derek C. Johnson Douglas G. Schaller Johnson, Clifton, Larson & Schaller, P.C. 975 Oak Street Citizen’s Building, Suite 1050 Eugene, Oregon 97401 George A. Hanson Matthew L. Dameron Stueve Siegel Hanson Woody LLP 330 West 47th Street, Suite 250 Kansas City, MO 64112 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS Craig J. Capon Christine Nesbit Harrang Long Gary Rudnick P.C. 360 East 10th Ave., Suite 300 Eugene, OR 97401-3248 Samuel T. McAdam Alfred L. Sanderson, Jr. Joel Van Parys Seyfarth Shaw LLP 400 Capitol Mall, Suite 2350 Sacramento, CA 95814-4428 ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT SPHERION CORPORATION By causing the same to be: x e-mailed o mailed o hand delivered o faxed to them a true and correct copy thereof.

This Court, in Belcher v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, explained that “given the large number of claims, the relatively small amount of damages available, the desirability of consistently adjudicating the claims, the high probability that individual members of the proposed class and subclass would not possess a great interest in 12 See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016) (Supreme Court held that statistical evidence was admissible to prove liability and damages across a class, thereby allowing it to support class action certification). 13 For those Legacy Owners Class members who sold their Legacy Timeshare Estate, the same formula can be applied as of the date of sale. 14 While Plaintiffs submit that the Legacy Owners Class does not pose insurmountable individualized issues, regarding damages, it would be within the Court’s discretion to certify an issue class under Rule 23(c)(4). See Martin v. Behr Dayton Thermal Prod. LLC, 896 F.3d 405, 416 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Rule 23(c)(4) contemplates using issue certification to retain a case’s class character where common questions predominate within certain issues and where class treatment of those issues is the superior method of resolution.”). Case 6:16-cv-00855-CEM-TBS Document 184 Filed 10/01/18 Page 30 of 33 PageID 4675 - 25 - controlling the prosecution of the claims, and the fact that it would be uneconomical to litigate the issues individually, a class action is the superior method.

Thus, Rule 23(b)(3) Case 1:16-cv-06284-KBF Document 121 Filed 12/18/17 Page 27 of 28 22 certification would also be proper. CONCLUSION For these reasons, the Court should certify all of Plaintiffs’ claims as a class action under Rule 23(b)(1), and appoint Dr. Alan Sacerdote, Dr. Herbert Samuels, Mark Crispin Miller, Marie E. Monaco, Dr. Shulamith Lala Straussner, and James B. Brown as class representatives. Under Rule 23(g), the Court should also appoint Schlichter, Bogard & Denton LLP as class counsel. December 18, 2017 Respectfully submitted, /S/ Jerome J. Schlichter SCHLICHTER BOGARD & DENTON LLP Andrew D. Schlichter, Bar No. 4403267 Jerome J. Schlichter* Michael A. Wolff* Troy A. Doles* Heather Lea* Stephen M. Hoeplinger* James Redd, IV* 100 South Fourth Street, Suite 1200 St. Louis, Missouri 63102 (314) 621-6115, (314) 621-7151 (fax) aschlichter@uselaws.com jschlichter@uselaws.com mwolff@uselaws.com tdoles@uselaws.

See Lilly v. Jamba Juice Co., No. 13-cv-02998, 2014 WL 4652283, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2014). Thus, certification of a single-issue defendant class pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4) is appropriate here. Limiting class certification to the Section 4617(j)(3) preemption issue is also appropriate because the parties’ transaction-specific claims and defenses cannot be litigated on a class-wide basis.

Sec. Litig., 150 F.R.D. 57, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (class notice “need only describe the terms of the settlement generally”). The detailed information in the proposed notices far exceeds this bare minimum and fully complies with the requirements of Rule 23 (c)(2). Class members who are entitled to a monetary payment will be required to fill out and return a claim form verifying only their identity and agreeing to the release.

jrosenthal@therosenthallaw.com Counsel for Defendant THE ROSENTHAL LAW FIRM, P.A. 4798 New Broad Street N.E., Suite 310 Orlando, Florida 32814 Telephone: (407) 488-1220 Facsimile: (407) 488-1228 Case 6:09-cv-01293-GAP-DAB Document 86 Filed 04/19/10 Page 17 of 18 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Defendant’s Motion To Deny Rule 23 Class Certification and Strike Plaintiffs’ Class Allegations has been filed using the CM/ECF system, which will automatically send electronic notification of such filing to the following counsel of record: Wolfgang M. Florin Gregory A. Owens Christopher D. Gray FLORIN ROEBIG, P.A. 777 Alderman Road Palm Harbor, FL 34683 This 19th day of April, 2010.

Proposed Class Counsel therefore satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g) and should be appointed as Class Counsel. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth herein, an Order should be entered: (i) certifying this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); (ii) appointing Plaintiffs as Class Representatives; and (iii) appointing lead counsel KSF as Class Counsel pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g). STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULES A. Local Rule 7.