The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant on all claims. Twenty-nine days after the district court entered judgment, the plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The district court denied this motion six days later.

After a federal court enters a judgment, a litigant has 28 days to file a motion to amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). This rule allows a district court to correct its own errors and spare the parties and appellate courts the burden of unnecessary appeal.

Decision below: Banister v. Davis, unpublished order dismissing appeal (5th Cir. May 8, 2018)USSC DocketScotusblog pageBanister, who is serving 30 years in a Texas prison for aggravated assault, sought federal habeas relief after exhausting his state court appeals. After the district court issued an order denying his habeas petition, he filed a timely motion “to alter or amend the judgment” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). A Rule 59(e) motion is designed to give a judge the opportunity to correct its own mistakes immediately after judgment is entered, as it permits “reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits.”

Inventive Features Repeatedly Emphasized in a Patent Cannot Be Overlooked in Claim Construction 12-1227 January 16, 2013 Decision Last Month at the Federal Circuit - February 2013Judges: Prost, Bryson (author), Wallach [Appealed from: E.D. Tex., Chief Judge Davis] In Parallel Networks, LLC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., No. 12-1227 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 16, 2013), the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s claim constructions and SJ of noninfringement, and also affirmed the district court’s denial of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion seeking leave to amend infringement contentions. Parallel Networks, LLC (“Parallel”) owns U.S. Patent No. 6,446,111 (“the ’111 patent”), which is directed to the use of individualized applets in handheld devices to speed up data transfer.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b).If a FRCP 50(a) motion has been made and denied, a party can renew the motion for judgment as a matter of law under FRCP 50(b). If the FRCP 50(b) motion is timely made, the district court has three options: (1) let the jury verdict stand; (2) order a new trial, or (3) enter the judgment on the increased damage amount.3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).A party can file a Rule 59(e) motion for a new trial even if the party has not filed a Rule 50(a) and (b) motion.4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.If there is an alleged inconsistency in the jury’s findings and an earlier ruling of the trial court, such as a summary judgment ruling, a party can request a “separate document” for the judgment under Rule 58. In the words of one court, a Rule 58 motion “ensures that a district court ‘specif[ies] what matters: the consequence of the judicial ruling.’”5.

The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on a later-amended public-disclosure bar, which had previously been interpreted as depriving federal courts of jurisdiction when the alleged fraud had been publically disclosed, unless the relator was an “original source.” The relators then filed a post-judgment motion captioned “Relators' Motion, Pursuant to FRCP Rule 59(e), to Stay the Order Dismissing and Final Judgment, Pending Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision” in a separate, but related qui tam appeal (United States ex rel. Lee v. Corinthian Colleges). The relators did not appeal the original dismissal order within 30 days of its entry.

The Washington Supreme Court denied his claim on the grounds that he validly waived his right to counsel before his original trial and that he was “more than ready to proceed pro se” on remand. The court construed Rishor’s motion as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) as the rule does not include motions for reconsideration. The question “presented, therefore, is whether Rishor’s Rule 59(e) motion is subject to the additional restrictions that apply to ‘second or successive’ habeas corpus petitions under the provisions of the AEDPA.”

Here, petitioner Gregory Banister sought federal habeas relief for his Texas conviction. When the District Court denied his application for habeas relief and entered judgment, Banister filed a motion to alter the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to fix claimed “manifest errors of law and fact.” After the District Court denied the motion, Banister appealed, consistent with the rule that the time period to file a notice of appeal generally does not begin to run until after a timely-filed Rule 59(e) motion is decided.

Braitberg filed his notice of appeal thirty-seven days after the district court dismissed the suit without prejudice and filed his “Motion to Modify Dismissal Order into an Order of Dismissal with Prejudice” twenty-nine days after that dismissal.Charter asserts that the notice of appeal was untimely because Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) requires the notice to be filed “within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from,” while Braitberg filed his notice thirtyseven days after the district court issued the dismissal without prejudice. Charter also contends that Braitberg’s motion to modify the dismissal should be construed as an untimely motion to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure59(e) that did not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. The company points out that Appellate Rule 4(a)(4) specifies that only “timely” filed motions restart the appeal clock.

s for affirmance urged by respondent will remain open on remand if properly presented and preserved in the Ninth Circuit.Capital CasesChandler v. United States (11th Cir) Opinion granting relief on ineffective assistance of counsel vacated, rehearing en banc ordered.McDowell v. Calderon (9th Cir)(en banc) The government's arguments fail because although "raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a habeas petition [may] waive[ ] the attorney-client privilege . . . [the state's right to access at retrial] is debatable, . . . the district court ['s order] limit[ing] the Attorney General's use of the documents from McDowell's trial counsel's file" is not clear error. Whether the court would reach the same conclusions if this were an appeal of the order itself and not a motion for reconsideration under rule 59(e) is not reached.The only order that is the subject of this appeal is the district court's order of November 2, 1998, denying the warden's motion for reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). See Notice of Appeal, filed Nov. 9, 1998 ("[R]espondent . . . hereby appeals . . . from the November 2, 1998, denial of respondent's motion to alter or amend the judgment .. . ."); Appellant's Opening Brief at 5 (stating the issue as "[w]hether the district court erred in denying respondent's motion to amend the order . . . ."). The warden did not appeal either the protective order of February 25, 1994, or the order of September 15, 1998, which reaffirmed the protective order. Those prior orders are therefore not before us.[2] A motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) "should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law." 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) (citing School Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)). In moving for reconsideration, the