Davidson Pipe Co., 125 F.R.D. at 371. Instead, WMC engaged in “excusable” if “erroneous reliance” on the Joint Proposed Scheduling Order, which, as discussed above, appeared to meet Rule 38(b)’s requirements, id. (collecting authority and distinguishing between these scenarios), as well as Judge Forrest’s entry of a Scheduling Order that not only embraced but appeared to adopt that jury demand. WMC’s reliance was particularly reasonable here: for nearly a year and a half following the entry of the Scheduling Order, neither BoNY nor the Court suggested that trial would not be before a jury to the extent permitted by the MLPA.

See Gold & Rosenblatt, LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65192 (court granted Plaintiffs’ request to serve late jury demand because there was little delay, no suggestion of prejudice to the other party, no suggestion of bad faith, and plaintiff proffered a reason for his failure to meet the Rule 38 deadline); Raymond, 148 F.3d at 66 (district court did not abuse its discretion in granting plaintiffs’ Rule 6(b)(2) motion where there was no evidence of bad faith and little indication of any prejudice to defendant). POINT II: FEDERAL POLICY FAVORES TRIAL BY JURY This Court should grant Plaintiff’s relief in accordance with the federal policy favoring jury trials. “The jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost care.”

See, e.g., Zivkovic v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding plaintiff waived right to jury trial by failing to make timely demand even though he initially brought complaint pro se; “[plaintiff's] good faith mistake as to the deadline for demanding a jury trial establishes no more than inadvertence, which is not a sufficient basis to grant relief from an untimely jury demand”); Kulas v. Flores, 255 F.3d 780, 784 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a pro se plaintiff waived any right to a jury trial by failing to file a timely demand as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b)); Chandler Supply Co v. GAF Corp., 650 F.2d 983, 987-88 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming district court’s striking an untimely jury demand where counsel attributed the delay to being “swamped with other work” and delegated the task to an associate); Ward v. Sunrise Assisted Living Investments, No. 05-3165, 2006 WL 37030, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2006) (granting motion to strike untimely jury demand where plaintiff’s and served on June 28, 2010. Case3:10-cv-01268-SC Document24 Filed07/06/10 Page8 of 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 OHS West:260939771.4 - 9 - NOTICE OF MOTION & MOTION TO STRIKE JURY DEMAND CASE NO. 3:10-CV-01268-SC counsel alleged that he was unfamiliar with practice in federal courts and misunderstood the requirements of Rule 81); Wave Hours Belmont Park, LLC v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America, 244 F.R.D. 608, 609, 613 (S.D. Cal.

Stantex recovers such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), Stantex Group Ltd, hereby demands a jury trial on all issues so triable. DATED: December 16, 2016 RUSS, AUGUST & KABAT Larry C. Russ Nathan D. Meyer By: /s/ Nathan D. Meyer_____________ Nathan D. Meyer Attorneys for Third Party Defendant Stantex Group LTD.

I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this declaration and, if sworn and a witness, could and would testify competently thereto. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED (Fed.R.Civ.P.38[b]) Case 5:16-cv-00387-HE Document 37-2 Filed 07/08/16 Page 2 of 4 2 2. I am the president and sole stockholder of the defendant Dolphin Marine Services Inc. (“Dolphin Marine”).

See also Rosen v. Dick, 639 F.2d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that Rule 38 “embodies the equitable principles of reasonable reliance . . . and adequate notice . . .” ); Berisford Capital Corp. v. Syncom Corp., 650 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that the purpose of the rule is to “provide adequate notice to the parties of whether they will appear before a court or a jury” and that “[t]he parties may then rely on the Rule's explicit terms in presuming that the fact-finder will not thereafter change for the claims raised in the complaint” ).

, on April 3, 2014, Judge Furman held that the plaintiffs in the Ojeda matter had waived their right to demand a jury trial. The Memorandum Opinion reads in part: Put simply, as Plaintiffs themselves implicitly concede in their memorandum of law, they failed to make a timely request for a jury, as they did not make a jury demand within fourteen days of the answer, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b), and affirmatively stipulated in the Case Management Plan and Scheduling Order, which was So Ordered by the Court, that the case would be tried without a jury. No. 13-5658, Docket # 41 (Zuckerman Dec. ¶ 7).

This Honorable Court should retain jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 1333 and strike the Plaintiffs’ claim for jury trial. WHEREFORE, the Defendants pray that this Honorable Court strike the jury claim and that the trial proceed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(e). Respectfully submitted, By their attorneys, _”/S/Robert E. Collins” Thomas J. Muzyka Pro Hac Vice Robert E. Collins (#2951) Clinton & Muzyka, P.C.

a proposal to ensure the establishment of effective oversight of ARCP’s compliance with applicable laws, rules, and regulations; E. Determining and awarding to ARCP exemplary damages in an amount necessary to punish defendants and to make an example of defendants to the community according to proof at trial; F. Awarding ARCP restitution from defendants, and each of them; G. Awarding plaintiff the costs and disbursements of this action, including reasonable attorneys’ and experts’ fees, costs, and expenses; and H. Granting such other and further equitable relief as this Court may deem just and proper. JURY DEMAND Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b), Plaintiff demands a trial by jury. Dated: June 30, 2016 s/ Robert I. Harwood Robert I. Harwood Samuel K. Rosen Benjamin I. Sachs-Michaels HARWOOD FEFFER LLP 488 Madison Avenue New York, NY 10022 (212) 935-7400 Liaison Counsel for Plaintiffs Case 1:15-cv-06043-AKH Document 87 Filed 06/30/16 Page 73 of 75 Case 1:16-cv-03366-ELH Document 80-6 Filed 03/24/17 Page 73 of 106 74 Robert C. Schubert Willem F. Jonckheer SCHUBERT JONCKHEER & KOLBE LLP Three Embarcadero Center, Suite 1650 San Francisco, CA 94111 (415) 788-4220 Curtis V. Trinko Jennifer E. Traystman LAW OFFICES OF CURTIS V. TRINKO, LLP 16 West 46th Street, 7th Floor New York, NY 10036 (212) 490-9550 Jeffrey M. Norton NEWMAN FERRARA LLP 1250 Broadway, 27th Floor New York, New York 10001 (212) 619-540 Alfred G. Yates, Jr.

DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury in this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38 and the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution.