It Case 1:16-cv-01823-JEJ Document 25-3 iled 06/22/17 Page 9 of 10 Pinebrook Minerals, LLC v. Anadarko E & P Co., LP, Not Reported in F.Supp.2d (2011) 2011 WL 3584783 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10 appears that the court could “accord complete relief” among existing parties under Rule 19(a) (1)(A). However, the issue remains whether non-joinder will result in a “substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations” as argued by defendant.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, advisory committee note, 1966 amendments (emphasis added). Thus, Fluxo-Cane’s delay in bringing this motion presents an additional basis upon which it should be denied.

but the party’s joinder is not feasible for jurisdictional or other reasons, the Court must decide whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed in the party’s absence or whether the party should be deemed “indispensable” and the action dismissed. Viacom, 212 F.3d at 725. Rule 19(b) identifies four factors to guide the court’s analysis in determining whether the absent party is indispensable: (1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the party’s absence might prejudice the absent party or the existing parties; (2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by protective provisions in the judgment, shaping the relief, or other measures; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the party’s absence would be adequate; and (4) whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b). In Mattera, the court held that non-party Capstar qualified as an indispensable party under Rule 19(b) because “Capstar would undoubtedly be prejudiced if a judgment is rendered in this action in its absence, given that the complaint is directed toward Capstar’s own compensation structure and policies.” The court further held that to allow the action to proceed without Capstar would “result in prejudice to Defendants, who risk double liability or, at a minimum, duplicative litigation with respect to the same charge back policy at issue.” The same is true here. First, a finding in favor of Plaintiffs would fundamentally affect every aspect of the way the distributors do business on a going forward basis, resulting in substantial prejudice to the distributors.

But without the patent owner as a party to the case, Max Sound lacks standing to sue as a licensee, and the entire case must be dismissed. See, e.g., Propat Int’l Corp., 473 F.3d at 1189, 1194 (affirming dismissal of case where patent owner was not a party to suit); Ortho Pharm. Corp., 52 F.3d at 1028 (same); Star Navigation Sys. Grp. Ltd., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79444, at *5-7 (dismissing complaint where licensee plaintiff had improperly joined patent owner as an “involuntary plaintiff” under Rule 19). Accordingly, this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(7).

usually, the absence of federal jurisdiction over the permissive counterclaim or party brought in under Rule 19 or 20 will result only in the dismissal of that claim or party”); (Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline, L.L.C. v. 16.66 Acres of Case 1:08-cv-00356-WDQ Document 63 Filed 05/04/09 Page 12 of 16 13 Land, 190 F.R.D. 15, 21 (D. Me. 1999) (permissive counterclaims dismissed for failure to join indispensable parties); Stafford Trading, Inc. v. Lovely, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37140 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2007) (counterclaims dismissed for failure to join indispensable parties, subject to amendment of counterclaim); Church & Dwight Co. v. Abbott Labs., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76464 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2006) (counterclaim dismissed for failure to join indispensable party under Rule 19); Electro Med. Equip. Ltd. v. Hamilton Med. AG, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3830 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2000) (noting that a court may dismiss a counterclaim if unable to join a necessary party, pursuant to Rule 19(b)). The complaint in this matter is a simple one—Man Sugar failed to pay for a cargo of sugar, then failed to return the cargo upon demand that it do so. None of the facts relevant to the complaint are in dispute.

See, e.g., DM II, Ltd. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 130 F.R.D. 469, 474-75 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (dismissing action under Rule 19 because judgment “would have no legally preclusive effect,” court could not “fashion complete relief in the absence of all partners,” and the “possibility of re-litigation render[ed] any judgment entered in [the] action inadequate”).12 In addition, whatever precedential value a judgment in this case would have, whether preclusive or simply persuasive, any adverse judgment by this Court against Zeromax LLC in Zeromax GmbH’s absence would be highly prejudicial to Zeromax GmbH. See Johnson & Johnson, 720 F. Supp. at 1125 (citations omitted) (holding that even though an absent party is not legally bound by an adverse ruling, such a ruling would be “persuasive precedent in a

The fourth factor is “whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)(4). This factor also weighs in favor of dismissal, as Plaintiff already has instituted an action against the Robinson estate in New Jersey state court, which pre-dated this action.

While we understand the District Court's frustration with Plaintiffs' failure to provide additional information, it appears that, even if joined, Remar's presence would not destroy diversity. Therefore, we need not address the Rule 19 ruling to satisfy ourselves we have subject matter jurisdiction. Moreover, because we affirm the District Court's dismissal based on the gist of the action doctrine, we need not address whether the dismissal under Rule 1 9 was proper.

These issues should be decided now, not when the Commission decides to launch its next infringement assault on a small, ill-funded farmer. Accordingly, this Court should exercise its equitable discretion under Rule 19(b) and allow this matter to proceed without the United States. II.

Finally, Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy if the case is dismissed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)(4). In the event of dismissal, Plaintiffs could go to the soccer clubs and associations of which they are members and seek to change the rules using the dispute resolution mechanisms of their clubs.