Plaintiffs opposed, arguing that the statute of limitations was inapplicable to the action, and therefore amending the pleadings would be futile. The Court disagreed, concluding that the defendant established good cause for modifying the scheduling order under FRCP 16(b) and therefore should be given leave to amend the pleadings under FRCP 15(a). The Court also addressed Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel responses to discovery requests.
Some claims, though, were facially time-barred, such as less-desirable assignments alleged to have been made in 1999, several years before filing of charge and civil action. Court also erred in not exercising discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 to allow filing of amended complaint after expiration on deadline in pre-trial order (Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)), when it held that complaint amendment was futile. Case remanded to consider whether there was prejudice to defendant.
Most courts followed a middle ground, in which a waiver might be limited to the information actually disclosed unless particular circumstances dictated either broader or narrower consequences. In December 2006, amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16 & 26 gave parties and courts some procedures to regulate the consequences of disclosure in federal civil litigation.Unlike rules of civil procedure, Evidence Rule 502 declares substantive law that is binding upon both federal and state courts (including bankruptcy courts, through bankruptcy Rule 9017).
Under Rule 16(b), the issuance of a scheduling order is, unlike under the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, mandatory. Specifically, Rule 16(b) states that the district court "must issue a scheduling order" after receiving the Rule 26(f) report or after consulting with the parties' attorneys. The rule continues:The judge must issue the scheduling order as soon as practicable, but in any event within the earlier of 120 days after any defendant has been served with the complaint or 90 days after any defendant has appeared.Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2).There are required and permissible contents of the scheduling order as well. The scheduling order must include deadlines for the following:To join other parties;To amend the pleadings;To file motions; andTo complete discovery.Fed.
Some claims, though, were facially time-barred, such as less-desirable assignments alleged to have been made in 1999, several years before filing of charge and civil action. Court also erred in not exercising discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 to allow filing of amended complaint after expiration on deadline in pre-trial order (Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)), when it held that complaint amendment was futile. Case remanded to consider whether there was prejudice to defendant.
Complaint fails to allege (1) facts that testing caused relevant and statistically significant disparity between black and white applicants for promotion; (2) which parts of the promotion policy plaintiffs are attacking; (3) racial composition of applicant pool or relevant workforce. District court did not abuse discretion in denying leave to amend complaint for a second time where FRCP16 schedule for filing amendments expired six months earlier and there was no good cause for lifting; alternatively, amendment would be futile because proposed amendments did not remedy deficiencies in disparate impact claim. 2. Plaintiff presented no evidence that city was aware of the disparate impact and continued to use test. 3.
Over a year later — less than two months before trial — plaintiff moved for sanctions for spoliation of the emails.When addressing the issue of spoliation, the Court cited Goodman v. Praxair Services, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494 (D. Md. 2009), which provides a useful summary of the factors courts should consider in determining the timeliness of spoliation motions:The “[k]ey to the discretionary timeliness assessment of lower courts is how long after the close of discovery the relevant spoliation motion has been made . . . “;A court should examine the temporal proximity between a spoliation motion and motions for summary judgment;Courts should be wary of any spoliation motion made on the eve of trial; Courts should consider whether there was any governing deadline for filing spoliation motions in the scheduling order issued pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) or by local rule; andFinally, the explanation of the moving party as to why the motion was not filed earlier should be considered.In light of these factors, the Court concluded that the plaintiff’s motion should be denied as untimely.
As a general rule, courts require parties to participate in mediation in good faith, and judges have the authority to sanction parties that fail to do so. The judge’s authority to impose sanctions for mediation conduct is grounded in the court’s inherent authority to regulate proceedings before it, and is further supported by local rules, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f) (requiring good faith participation) and statutes such as 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (prohibiting unreasonable or vexatious litigation). As in other areas of the law, however, “good faith” is not well defined.This article examines some recent decisions by federal courts in New York and California enforcing the requirement of “good faith” participation in mediation.
In light of sprawling, complex and costly toxic tort claims, courts are turning to case management mechanisms to expedite the resolution of these claims. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(12) provides the courts with the authority to adopt special procedures for managing difficult or protracted actions that involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions or unusual problems of proof. Accordingly, federal district courts are afforded broad discretion in crafting case management orders, particularly in large, complex cases.
Participants alleged that the trustee deposited $2,896,100 from a phantom stock plan into an account held solely by his spouse and that the spouse gave no consideration in exchange for the deposit. The court concluded that participants demonstrated “good cause” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 for deviating from the deadline for amending the complaint. Participants sought production of information relating to the payment, which the trustee refused to produce.