As noted above, the orders at issue were entered on November 25, 2013, and because less than 180 days have passed (and because AT&T did not receive notice at any time), AT&T’s motion is timely under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)(B). Finally, no party would be prejudiced by reopening AT&T’s time to file its notice of appeal, and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)(C) is satisfied.

The correct rule governing Plaintiff’s motion is Rule 60, since Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are seeking “Relief from a Judgment Or Order.” While it is normally true that a docketed appeal would deprive this Court of jurisdiction to alter or amend a judgment or order from which relief is sought, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a), a motion under Rule 60 that is filed “no later than 28 days after the judgment is entered” has the reverse effect: namely, the pending motion to reconsider stays the time to appeal until “the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). Therefore, the No- tice of Appeal (ECF No. 137) and Amended Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 139) are stayed pending the Court’s decision on the motion to reconsider. 21 CONCLUSION

” Harrington Decl. ¶¶ 13-14, Exs. L-M. This description of this litigation was materially incomplete. In particular, there was no disclosure that the time to appeal this Court’s judgment had expired and that the judgment was therefore final rather than “still pending resolution.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). On December 14, 2015, an article regarding the proposed restructuring was published in Argentine newspaper that was evidently sourced from Defendants and that specifically quoted certain of Defendants’ officers. The article represented that Defendants had “closed a private agreement” with a group of creditors regarding a restructuring and that “such negotiation … [included] the IDB ….” Harrington Decl., Exs. DD-EE. The statement was false and misleading Case 1:15-cv-04063-PAE Document 56 Filed 12/28/15 Page 12 of 24 9 when made because the IDB has not reached any such agreement.

. The Bankruptcy Court below erred in concluding that the Second Circuit would apply the “excusable neglect” standard somehow differently in the situation at bar than in the context of a missed deadline to notice an appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b), incorrectly holding that Silivanch was “easily distinguishable,” because it “involved a late notice of appeal.” Order at 19 n.56 (emphasis in original).

The Fifth Circuit appears to have adopted Pioneer for all procedures utilizing the excusable neglect standard, not limited to only FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b). Cf. In Re Pettle, 410 F.3d 189, 192 (5th Cir. 2005) (FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)); Midwest Employers Casualty Co. v. Williams, 161 F.3d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1998) (civil case with FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)); United States v. Clark, 193 F.3d 845, 847 (5th Cir. 1999) (criminal case with FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)); Therefore, cases discussing excusable neglect will be referred to in this brief without distinction.

See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). The rule recognizes that the “government’s institutional decisionmaking practices require more time to Case 1:10-cv-01878-ABJ Document 54 Filed 08/09/12 Page 3 of 8 4 decide whether to appeal . . . .” U.S. ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 540 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 556 U.S. 928 (2009).