Daniels–Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) permits judicial notice of a fact when it is “not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court'sterritorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” The court may take notice of such facts on its own, and “must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.”

Daniels–Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) permits judicial notice of a fact when it is “not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court'sterritorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” The court may take notice of such facts on its own, and “must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.”

226. See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1216 (2012); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, Official Notice, 62 HARV. L.REV. 537, 549 (1949); see also FED.R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s notes (discussing Davis’s distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts). 227.

Specifically, plaintiff argued that the screenshots were authenticated under Fed. R. Evid. 901 based on the declaration and deposition of an employee of the Wayback Machine, who gave testimony that the screenshots were “true and accurate electronic copies” of webpages archived by the Wayback Machine, and that he had a “very, very high level of trust” in the accuracy of the screenshots. Plaintiff also argued the court should take judicial notice of the webpage screenshots under Fed. R. Evid. 201. The court ruled that the employee’s testimony was sufficient to lay a proper foundation under Rule 901.

This type of attention is usually not given to judicial notice, but the difference between state and federal law can be similarly determinative. For example, the Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, which provides for judicial notice of adjudicative facts, explicitly state that the rule only applies to “the facts of the particular case.” It does not apply to “legislative facts,” which are matters that “have relevance to the legal reasoning and the lawmaking process.”

’ Mot., 2. Courts may take judicial notice of facts that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Nonetheless, courts should do so “sparingly at the pleadings stage.”

Introduction In the Ninth Circuit, defendants typically have two tools available to ask a court to consider in connection with a motion to dismiss information outside the four corners of a complaint. First, a defendant may file a request for judicial notice under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to ask the court to consider material outside of the complaint, so long as the material meets the definition set forth in Federal Rule Evidence 201 as "not subject to reasonable dispute because it (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).

November 2015. Id. at ¶ 39. Not divulged, however, are the quantities, varieties, sizes, or prices of the beer she purchased. She submits the beer she obtained was of a lesser value than the imported Japanese beer she believed she was purchasing. Id. After learning “the truth about Defendant’s mislabeling of Sapporo Beer,” Ms. Bowring stopped purchasing it. Id. In the future, she would continue purchasing Sapporo if the products were “accurately labeled.” Id.I. Facts outside the ComplaintDefendant seeks the Court’s notice of the following: (1) complete labels for each variety of Sapporo beer; (2) Certificates of Label Approval (“COLA”) issued by the United States Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (“TTB”) for each label; (3) TTB webpages describing the Bureau’s responsibilities; (4) United States Patent and Trademark Office registrations of Sapporo’s North Star trademark; and (5) Sapporo Inc.’s federal and state wholesaler and importer permits. See Kratenstein Decl. Exs. 1 – 25. Rule 201(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a court may take judicial notice of a fact “that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” A court must take judicial notice “if a party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2). The documents are suitable for judicial notice, and the parties do not dispute their accuracy or authenticity. The Defendant’s motion for judicial notice is therefore GRANTED.LEGAL STANDARDA complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true” to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). A claim has facial plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads factual con

Chippendales argued that it was unfair for the TTAB to raise the issue of the Playboy bunny costume sua sponte, preventing Chippendales from having the opportunity to respond, but the Court disagreed based on the fact that it was Chippendales’ own expert who provided an article attached to his affidavit stating that the Cuffs & Collar trade dress was inspired by the bunny suit. Further, the Court found that it could take judicial notice of trademark registrations covering the Playboy bunny, under Fed. R. Evid. 201(c), as it determined that the registration documents were “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Slip op. at 17-18 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2)).

ry dismissed the case for the plaintiffs’ failure to allege demand futility under Rule 23.1.On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the Court of Chancery erred by taking judicial notice of the West Virginia Decision under Delaware Rule of Evidence (D.R.E) 202. The Supreme Court pointed out that D.R.E. 202 can be invoked for judicial notice “of case law” in other courts, such as recognizing rules or principles of law, but not for judicial notice of facts. The Court of Chancery thus improperly relied on the West Virginia Decision’s factual findings as the “sole basis” for the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court further analyzed whether D.R.E. 201 could support taking “adjudicative notice” of the factual findings in the West Virginia Decision. The Supreme Court acknowledged that it “has not addressed whether a court can take adjudicative notice of the factual findings of another court.” As a result, it analyzed federal court decisions regarding Federal Rule of Evidence 201 and concluded that it would be improper to take adjudicative notice of other courts’ factual findings “when the underlying fact is reasonably disputed.” Here, the Supreme Court concluded that a defendant’s liability was “reasonably disputed” and taking adjudicative notice under D.R.E. 201 would “unfairly deprive[] the plaintiffs of the opportunity to prove the truth of their well-pleaded allegations.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Chancery improperly gave the West Virginia Decision “preclusive effect.” The Delaware Supreme Court also took issue with the timing of Vice Chancellor Laster’s demand futility analysis. Here, the West Virginia Decision was released while briefing on the motion to dismiss in the Court of Chancery was already underway. The Supreme Court emphasized that demand futility should be considered as of the date the complaint is filed.A rare reversal, this decision provides important guidance for both the plaintiffs and the defendants litigatin