See Rosario, supra, 531 F.2d at 1232-33 (Rule 14 only permits claims which arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff’s claim against the third-party plaintiff.). B. Central’s Third-Party Complaint Fails to Allege Valid Claims Central Even if this Court is inclined to find that Central has been properly joined under Rule 14, which is denied, the Third-Party Complaint should be dismissed because BIA has failed to allege valid claims against Central for indemnification and/or contribution. 1. BIA Cannot Assert a Valid Indemnification Claim against Central In the Third-Party Complaint, without specifying the substantive basis for its claims, BIA baldly asserts that it is entitled to “indemnification” from Central.

For the reasons set forth above, SimplexGrinnell LP, n/k/a Johnson Controls Fire Protection, LP, prays that the Court grant its Motion for Summary Judgment and enter judgment in its favor as to the claims against it in North American Elite Insurance Company’s 14(a)(3) Complaint (Doc. 14), Victory Fire Protection, Inc.’s Third Party Complaint (Doc. 13), Penn Builders, Inc.’s Cross Claims (Doc. 22, 23), and Anchor Fire Protection’s Cross Claims (Doc. 26, 56). 42 See Section C, supra. 43 See, e.g., Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 77 A.2d 368, 371 (Pa. 1951) (“there is a right to indemnity where a defendant is held vicariously liable based upon “fault that is imputed or constructive only, based on some legal relationship between the parties. . .”)

2012). Based on the circumstances presented in this case with (1) a clear violation of FRCP 14, (2) the lack of a cognizable legal theory asserted against Mr. Marley, (3) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and (4) lack of personal jurisdiction in California, the Court has ample grounds to issue a stay on all discovery with respect to the Amended CC until a decision is rendered on the Motion to Dismiss. A stay on discovery is warranted in order to conserve judicial resources and avoid causing Mr. Marley to incur additional unnecessary expenses and attorneys' fees.

In explaining the application of Rule 14(a), the authors of the handbook state that “Rule 14 permits parties who are defending against claims to join other persons, not yet parties, who may be obligated to reimburse the party defending the claim for some or all of that party’s liability,” id. at 440, and that “[o]nly persons not already parties may be impleaded,” id. at 441. Thus, under the plain application of Rule 14(a) and applicable caselaw, Safrin cannot assert claims in a third-party complaint against Stern and First Republic because Stern and First Republic are already defendants to the primary action.1 Accordingly, this Court should dismiss all claims asserted against Stern and First Republic in Safrin’s amended Third Party Complaint.

H. Plaintiffs 14(a)(3) Complaint against Penn Builders, et al 8 Case 2:17-cv-03554-WB Document 101 Filed 11/09/18 Page 8 of 9 V. CONCLUSION: Victory Fire Protection exercised its rights under Rule 14 to implead Penn Builders. Plaintiff then chose to file a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a)(3) Complaint which incorporates by reference Victory Fire Protection's Third-Party Complaint. Insofar as Penn Builders seeks to support its Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds of any deficiency in Plaintiffs pleading, or evidence proffered by Plaintiff, Penn Builders fails to recognize the incorporation by reference of Victory Fire Protection's causes of action into Plaintiffs 14(a)(3) Complaint, and Penn Builders also fails to recognize the disputed issues of fact.

, the Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review was applied to a motion to dismiss a third-party complaint for failure to state a claim, with no mention of Rule 14. Id. at *2-3. Finally, in In re Blixseth, Bankruptcy No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL 61197 (Bankr. D. Mont. Jan. 4, 2011), the Court used the Rule 12(b)(6) standard of review to analyze a motion to dismiss a third-party complaint for failure to state a claim and did not mention Rule 14. Id. at *3. STATEMENT OF FACTS I. NORTHWESTERN ENERGY'S DENIALS OF THE ALLEGATIONS IN EXXONMOBIL'S COMPLAINT MUST BE DEEMED AS TRUE FOR THE PURPOSE OF EVALUATING NORTHWESTERN ENERGY'S FIRST AMENDED THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT The City, like GE, spends the first several pages of its Memorandum in Support (Doc. 50) discussing the allegations in the ExxonMobil's First Amended Complaint, then – like GE - treats ExxonMobil's allegations as if they were established facts in the remainder of its brief.

Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original). Whether under the more easily denied Rule 14 standard, or the stricter Rule 12(b)(6) standard, Defendants have utterly failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Relying on mere assertions and repeated incantations of “information and belief,” the putative Third-Party Complaint is so lacking in factual allegations for Defendants’ contribution and indemnification claims that it could not possibly satisfy even the Twombly “plausibility” standard for Rule 12(b)(6), let alone the looser standard for denying a Rule 14 impleader. A. Defendants’ Indemnification Claim Fails.

The pipeline company sued the United States as a third-party defendant pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(c) for failing to properly provide information for, or supervise the, dredging project.

None of these factors would be a bar to the defendant’s motion. The amendment is requested in order to clarify that the defendant Tripp seeks indemnity or contribution under F.R.C.P. 14 and, in the alternative, that the plaintiffs have a direct claim against the third-party defendant Brown pursuant to F.R.C.P. 14(c). The case was transferred to this court in early 2006 and the defendant Tripp filed his answer to plaintiffs’ amended complaint Case 1:06-cv-00053-S-LDA Document 56 Filed 11/20/2006 Page 6 of 13 and his third-party complaint in March, 2006.

Based on the foregoing, GBC’s claims against Jackson Taylor are proper under Federal Rule 14, as GBC has stated a plausible claim for indemnity or contribution against Jackson Taylor under Pennsylvania law. For these reasons, Third-Party Plaintiff GBC Design, Inc., respectfully requests that Jackson Taylor’s Motion to Dismiss be denied.