Indeed, the summons itself states that it was issued in aid of collection.30 Moreover, RO Waterbury’s declaration explains that she issued the summons in furtherance of her efforts to collect the taxes that have been assessed against Gary Krause.31 Thus, it is quite clear that the summons that Richard Krause asks this Court to quash was issued in aid of collection efforts. Because Congress expressly declined to grant the district courts of the United States jurisdiction to entertain petitions to quash summonses that are issued in aid of collection of judgments or assessment, 26 U.S.C. § 7609(c)(2)(D); Barmes, 199 F.3d at 389-390; Oliva v. United States, 221 F.R.D. at 544; Pflum v. United States, 125 F.3d 862, 1997 WL 606909 at * 1 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Davidson v. United States, 149 F.3d 1190, 1998 WL 339541 at * 1 (10th Cir. 1998), this Court does not have jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Krause’s petition to quash. Therefore, the Court should dismiss Richard Krause’s petition to quash for lack of jurisdiction.

7 The quoted language references section 7609(c)(2)(B) which was the citation for the in-aid-of- collection exception in the version of the statute that was in effect when Jordan was decided. See 26 U.S.C. 7609(c)(2)(B) (effective July 30, 1996 to July 21, 1998). 8 All of these cases found that there was no subject matter jurisdiction even though it was the wife herself, against whom there was no assessed tax liability, who sought to challenge the petition directed to her account.

(Id. ¶ 4.) Because the summons was issued in the aid of collection of Shaw’s assessed tax liability, Revenue Officer Hughes was not required to give notice of the summons to Shaw. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(c)(2)(D). (Id. ¶ 5.) Moreover, the IRS has not made any recommendation for criminal prosecution of Shaw to the Department of Justice as defined in section 7602(d) of the Internal Revenue Code. (Id. ¶ 9.) Last, contrary to Shaw’s argument, section 7608 of the Internal Revenue Code does not apply to this case. That section applies only to the authority of internal revenue enforcement officers in criminal matters, and the collection of Shaw’s tax liabilities is a civil matter.

In the New Jersey Litigation, the District Court determined that Respondent violated § 7602(c) because it did not notify BABP or Ferrous prior to contacting CitiBank or Sovereign Bank. See Gangi, 2011 WL 1363816, *8 (“[t]he Court is not persuaded that contemporaneous notice of Ferrous Miner and BABP under IRC § 7609 suffices, because Ferrous Miner and BABP are currently ‘taxpayers’ under investigation, and the summonses sought documents from third-parties that would be relevant to an assessment of their tax liabilities.”).

If notice is not required, then a petition to quash is not authorized. See 26 U.S.C. Section 7609(b)(2)(A). The summons served on Rudy Groom fits within the exception under Section 7609(c)(2)(D) as a summons issued in aid of collection of assessments made against the taxpayer.

Yet he offers no factual evidence in support of his complaint. To the contrary, Agent Lopez explains that she fully complied with the administrative Case 3:08-cv-00077-BLW Document 26 Filed 08/08/08 Page 6 of 9 Memorandum Decision and Order – 7 requirements of 26 U.S.C. § 7609 by mailing notice of the summonses via certified mail within three days of issuing the summonses as required by 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a)(2). (Lopez Decl.

The Petition Should Be Denied Because the IRS Is Entitled To Obtain Bank Records From Mountain West Bank If the Court reaches the merits of the Petition, it should deny it, because it states no valid reason to quash the summons. To be enforceable, a third party summons issued by the IRS under 26 U.S.C. §§ 7602 & 7609 must meet the standards set forth by the Supreme Court; the IRS Commissioner must show “that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner’s possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code Case 2:14-cv-00443-REB Document 10 Filed 11/20/14 Page 5 of 11 United States Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss or Deny Petition to Quash (Case No. 2:14-cv-443) 3 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Tax Division, Western Region P.O. Box 683 Washington, D.C. 20044 Telephone: 202-616-3395 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 have been followed.” United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964).

The IRS was not required to provide anyone notice under I.R.C. § 7609(a) because it issued the summons in the aid of the collection of Curcio’s tax liability. See I.R.C. § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i). “[I]f a person is not entitled to notice under § 7609(a), he or she has no standing to initiate an action to quash the summons.”

See 26 U.S.C. §7609(b)(2)(A). In such a case, the United States has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that the following requirements have been met: (1) the investigation has a legitimate purpose; (2) the summonsed materials are relevant to that purpose; (3) the information sought is not already within the IRS’ possession; and, (4) the IRS followed the administrative steps required by the Internal Revenue Code. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964); see also United States v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 318 (1978). This showing can be made through the affidavit or sworn declaration of the IRS agent or officer who caused the summons to be issued.

2.) Second, the DOJ produced records to the Korean MOJ that the DOJ obtained in violation of Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights in the United States by failing to provide Mr. Chang or DKI any notice as legally required pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a)(1). (Id., ¶ 12 at fn.