See id. Dismissal of the Indictment as to LORENZO is mandated pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 254d. 6 LORENZO was not “terminated.”

See, e.g., Gonzalez Paredes, 2007 WL 926885 at *2 (“If the Court concludes that defendants are immune, it must dismiss the action pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 254d.”); Abdulaziz v. Metropolitan Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328 (11th Cir. 1984) (affirming dismissal under 22 U.S.C. § 254d). Case 1:07-cv-00115-EGS Document 16 Filed 03/30/2007 Page 5 of 8 6 C. Defendants Are Immune from Service of Process The protections of the Vienna Convention also prevent Plaintiffs from effecting service on Defendants.

The Act provides, in relevant part: Any action or proceeding brought against an individual who is entitled to immunity with respect to such action or proceeding under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, under section 3(b) or 4 of this Act [22 USCS §§ 254b or 254c], or under any other laws extending diplomatic privileges and immunities, shall be dismissed. 22 U.S.C. 254d (2007). As Defendants contend, the Act requires dismissal of Plaintiffs’ suit if Defendants are entitled to immunity under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Case 1:07-cv-00115-EGS Document 50 Filed 07/31/2008 Page 3 of 7 4 or proceeding brought against an individual who is entitled to immunity with respect to such action or proceeding under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations . . . shall be dismissed.” 22 U.S.C. § 254d. Thus, U.S. law requires that this suit be dismissed.17 As Defendants also previously argued, they are immune from service of process.18 This Court has previously held that a defendant entitled to diplomatic immunity “is likewise shielded from service of process.”

Turki’s suggestion that when murders become terrorist acts, they cease to be torts would mean that his immunity, and the conditions under which it is abrogated, would depend on the uncertainty of how a particular event is characterized (and by whom) rather than on the certainty of the deaths or injuries at issue. 17 Case 1:03-md-01570-GBD -FM Document 155 Filed 05/14/04 Page 21 of 27 The scope of diplomatic immunity in the United States is defined in 22 U.S.C. § 254d, which provides in relevant part that “[a]ny action . . .brought against an individual who is entitled to immunity with respect to such action or proceeding under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, under section 254b or 254c of this title, or under any other laws extending diplomatic privileges and immunities, shall be dismissed.” Turki invokes no source of diplomatic immunity other than the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 1972 WL 122692 (U.S. Treaty), T.I.A.S. No. 7502.

Defs.’ Reply to Pl.’s Opp. to Mot. to Quash Process and/or to Dismiss Compl. (dkt. no. 32) (“Defs.’ Reply”) at 2 (emphasis added). Such an argument fails as an initial matter because it is Defendants, not Ms. Elat, that have the burden of proving their entitlement to immunity. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 254d (indicating that diplomatic immunity “may be established upon motion or suggestion by or on behalf of the individual” asserting immunity); Jungquist v. Nahyan, 940 F. Supp. 312, 321–22 (D.D.C. 1996), rev’d in part on other grounds, 115 F.3d 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of diplomatic immunity for lack of evidence); Mazengo v. Mzengi, 542 F. Supp. 2d 96, 100–01 (D.D.C. 2008) (denying motion to vacate default judgment where the defendant failed to establish that he was entitled to diplomatic immunity). Placing this burden on the party asserting immunity is proper given that plaintiffs cannot be presumed to know whether a defendant is entitled to immunity and many plaintiffs may not know the precise ages and educational status of the individuals they are suing.