After many unsuccessful Congressional attempts to enact enforceable death penalty procedures during the 1970s and 1980s, the first modern statute became effective on November 18, 1988. Commonly referred to as the "drug king-pin" statute, the passage of 21 U.S.C. § 848 (e)-(r) -- the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 -- ushered in the modern federal death penalty era. The reach of this statute was only to so-called "drug king-pin" murders and to drug-related murders of law enforcement officials.Six years later, Congress enacted the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 as a part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L.No.

Prior to 1988, courts had discretion to appoint counsel in federal habeas proceedings under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. In 1988, Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848(q), which, among other things, established a federal death penalty for some drug-related convictions. Shortly before the final vote on the bill, a section was added to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act permitting courts to appoint counsel for death-sentenced indigents in § 2255 (habeas corpus petitions by federal prisoners) and § 2254 (habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners) cases.

Prior to 1988, courts had discretion to appoint counsel in federal habeas proceedings under the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. In 1988, Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 21 U.S.C. § 848(q), which, among other things, established a federal death penalty for some drug-related convictions. Shortly before the final vote on the bill, a section was added to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act permitting courts to appoint counsel for death-sentenced indigents in § 2255 (habeas corpus petitions by federal prisoners) and § 2254 (habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners) cases.Section 848(q)(4)(B) of Title 21, United States Code, entitles an indigent petitioner seeking to set aside a death sentence in a § 2254 or § 2255 proceeding to the appointment of one or more attorneys.

Ex parte Hearn, No. 50,116-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2004). Later that day, Hearn moved the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas for appointment of counsel pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B), and for a stay of execution under 28 U.S.C. § 2251. The district court sua sponte transferred the motions to this Court, and Hearn filed a separate notice of appeal--asking us to reverse the transfer order, appoint counsel, and enter a stay of execution.

Benjamin Barry Kramer v. United States, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-3049, 8/17/15Sticking with its decision in Suggs v. United States, 705 F.3d 279 (7th Cir. 2013), the Seventh Circuit holds that Kramer’s most recent habeas petition challenging a conviction that was not affected by his three previous petitions is a second or successive petition and Kramer therefore needed authorization to file the petition from the Court of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).The complicated history of Kramer’s case, and the ultimate result here, well illustrate how even meritorious claims can get trapped in the morass of habeas procedural rules. Kramer was convicted in 1988 of conspiring to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and engaging in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (“CCE”) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(b). Kramer’s § 846 conviction and sentence were vacated in 1998 after he filed a habeas petition based on Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (1996), which held that § 846 offenses are lesser-included offenses of § 848 CCE offenses.

isch, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 1658 (7th Cir. 1/24/2006) The Seventh Circuit holds that identical facts are not necessary for cases to be "materially indistinguishable" for relief to be granted under the AEDPA all that matters is whether the legal implications of the cases are the sameYoung v. Runnels, 03-16859 (9th Cir. 1/23/2006) The Ninth Circuit examines just how truly bad the Supreme Court's precedent on guilt phase ineffective assistance of counsel has become.Selected excerpts from this Edition's CaseHain v. Mullin, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 1584 (10th Cir 1/23/2006) En banc (8-3) holding that counsel "appointed under 848(q)(4)(B) to represent state death row inmates in 28 U.S.C. 2254 proceedings are authorized by the statute to represent these clients in state clemency proceedings and are entitled to compensation for clemency representation.Ignoring the statute's plain meaning, the government urges this court to follow the Eleventh Circuit in concluding that, because § 848(q) is part of 21 U.S.C. § 848, which focuses primarily on punishments for violations of federal drug laws, "the language contained in the sections preceding and following [§ 848(q)(4)(B)] relates more directly to federal criminal trial and appeals, than to habeas cases seeking relief from state court sentences." King v. Moore, 312 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 2002).

Finally, it is anything but clear that a divorce from one of the Commonwealth's witnesses would predispose a juror toward the Commonwealth's case. For all of these reasons, the district court properly denied Wil- liams' request for an evidentiary hearing.A.Williams next argues that the district court misinterpreted 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9). Section 848(q)(9) governs the granting of expert assistance to indigent prisoners in connection with their federal habeas proceedings, providing thatUpon a finding that investigative, expert, or other services are reasonably necessary for the representation of the defen- dant, whether in connection with issues relating to guilt or the sentence, the court may authorize the defendant's attor- neys to obtain such services on behalf of the defendant and, if so authorized, shall order the payment of fees and expenses therefor under paragraph (10).

We believe that this reliance is misplaced. In McFarland the Court held that a motion for the appointment of counsel constitutes a post conviction proceeding for the purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B). See McFarland, 512 U.S. at 856-57.

points from Chapter Four, Part A;(2) the defendant did not receive an adjustment under §3A1.4 (Terrorism);(3) the defendant did not use violence or credible threats of violence in connection with the offense;(4) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury;(5) the instant offense of conviction is not a sex offense;(6) the defendant did not personally cause substantial financial hardship;(7) the defendant did not possess, receive, transport, transfer, sell, or otherwise dispose of a firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in connection with the offense;(8) the instant offense is not covered by §2H1.1 (Offenses Involving Individual Rights);(9) the defendant did not receive an adjustment under §3A1.1 (Hate Crime Motivation or Vulnerable Victim) or §3A1.5 (Serious Human Rights Offense); and(10) the defendant did not receive an adjustment under §3B1.1 (Aggravating Role) and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848[.]Of these, highlighted above are the three provisions—Criteria 6, 9, and 10—that the DOJ is likely to focus upon in contesting the applicability of § 4C1.1 in white-collar cases.Turning first to Criterion 6: the term “substantial financial hardship” is defined elsewhere in the Guidelines, at application note 4(F) to § 2B1.1. Yet, the focus of that application note is whether “the offense” resulted in substantial financial hardship to the victim, directing a sentencing court to weigh a non-exhaustive list of factors, including whether “the offense” resulted in the victim becoming insolvent, filing for bankruptcy, or suffering substantial retirement losses, among other adverse outcomes. In § 4C1.1, however, the inquiry is whether the defendant “personally cause[d] substantial financial hardship,” a case-dependent question. For instance, in investment frauds or Ponzi schemes, the DOJ would have fair argument that the defendant, not just the offense in the abstract, “personally cause[d]

Article 11.071 Section 2(g), then in effect, required that habeas counsel file either a motion to be appointed federal habeas counsel or a motion to have a substitute appointed.If the court of criminal appeals denies an applicant relief under this article, an attorney appointed under this section to represent the applicant shall, not later than the 15th day after the date the court of criminal appeals denies relief or, if the case is filed and set for submission, the 15th day after the date the court of criminal appeals issues a mandate on the initial application for a writ of habeas corpus under this article, move to be appointed as counsel in federal habeas review under 21 U.S.C. Section 848(q) or equivalent provision or, if necessary, move for the appointment of other counsel under 21 U.S.C. Section 848(q) or equivalent provision. Act of June 7, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch.