Edwards, therefore, was not entitled to relief.Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor. The dissenters would have retained Teague’s “watershed rule” exception and held that it applied to Ramos because “[i]f the right to a unanimous jury is so fundamental—if a verdict rendered by a divided jury is ‘no verdict at all’—then Thedrick Edwards should not spend the rest of his life behind bars over two jurors’ opposition.”Terry v. United States, 593 U.S. __ (June 14, 2021)The Supreme Court in Terry v. United States addressed the application of the First Step Act of 2018 to crack offenders who were sentenced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) prior to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. Terry was the rare case where the United States and the defendant were on the same side of the issue—both arguing that the First Step Act applied to § 841(b)(1)(C) defendants like Terry.

On June 27, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an important decision for doctors who have been convicted of violating the federal Controlled Substances Act in connection with the nation’s opioid crisis. In Ruan v. United States, the Supreme Court overturned two doctors’ convictions under the Controlled Substances Act, ruling that the trial courts improperly applied lowered burdens of proof proposed by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).Supreme Court: DOJ Must Prove that Doctors Knowingly or Intentionally Dispensed Opioids Without Authorization in Criminal CasesSpecifically, the doctors were convicted under 21 U.S.C. Section 841. This law makes it a federal crime, “[e]xcept as authorized[,] . . . for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . [to] dispense . . . a controlled substance.”

For Gibbs, because the Guidelines suggested three to five years but the statute requires five years, the advisory Guideline range becomes five years, period. The issue in Gibbs concerned the correct guidelines range of supervised release in a prosecution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).Application to Federal Drug Cases Just as in SORNA prosecutions, certain defendants who are convicted of federal controlled substance offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) face a statutory minimum term of supervised release that is higher than the usual guidelines range.

ations did not support a terminal illness prognoses. The court considered the premise of the district court's holding — that a mere difference of opinion is insufficient to show FCA falsity — at odds with the meaning of "false" under the statute. The reliability and believability of expert testimony is for the jury to decide. The court decided that the relators were not required to show that the physicians' prognoses of terminal illness were objectively false to prevail on their FCA claims. According to the court, "By requiring 'factual evidence that Defendant's certifying doctor was making a knowingly false determination,' the District Court's 'objective' falsity standard conflates scienter and falsity."Penalty Enhancement for Controlled Substances Act Requires "But-For" CausationThomas StephensonIn U.S. v. Jeffries, 958 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2020), the court of appeals reversed a district court order granting the defendant a new trial, finding the district court incorrectly interpreted 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) to require proof of both proximate causation and but-for causation. At trial, the defendant was convicted of violating the Controlled Substances Act (Act), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), for possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute. Additionally, the defendant was convicted of violating the act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), for distributing fentanyl, the use of which resulted in death. § 841(b)(1)(C) significantly enhances the penalty for violating § 841(a)(1) if "death or injury results from the use of [emphasis added]" an unlawfully distributed controlled substance. At trial and on appeal, the defendant argued that "results from" requires the government to prove 1) the defendant's actions proximately caused death and 2) but-for the use of the distributed drug, death would not have occurred. In a question of first impression for the court of appeal, it held "results from" is unambiguous language requiring the government only show proof of but-for causation between the use of a controlled s

The government alleged that the offense involved more than 100 kilograms of marihuana, which would normally carry a 5-year mandatory minimum. Here, the government filed a prior felony information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§841(b)(1)(B) and 851, which has the effect of doubling the applicable mandatory minimum sentence. The prior felony information alerted the district court to Thompson’s 2002 conviction for the attempted sale of a controlled substance in the fifth degree, in violation of NYPL §220.31, which criminalizes the sale of any of the hundreds of controlled substances enumerated in N.Y. Pub. Health Law §3306.

The government now must show that the medical professional subjectively, knowingly, and intentionally prescribed a controlled substance with no legitimate medical purpose. While unlikely to materially impact the number of DOJ opioid prosecutions, the case will no doubt inform charging decisions in marginal cases and will support important defense arguments at trial.In Ruan v. United States, the Supreme Court overturned the convictions of two physicians for violating the CSA, holding that to convict a licensed doctor of illegal distribution of a controlled substance, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally prescribed a substance regulated by the Controlled Substances Act that was not for a legitimate medical purpose.Ruan involved the consolidated appeal of criminal convictions of medical doctors Ziulu Ruan and Shakeel Kahn, who were convicted for distributing drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and each sentenced to more than 20 years’ imprisonment. Section 841 makes it a crime to, “[e]xcept as authorized . . . knowingly and intentionally . . . distribute, or dispense . . . a controlled substance.”

Louis exited the vehicle and took flight.A search of the two sealed boxes in the vehicle discovered 111 bricks of cocaine.Louis was indicted on two counts: 1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846, and 2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine in violation 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).Evidence Clearly Fails to Demonstrate IntentIn a subsequent two-day trial, federal prosecutors presented evidence of the following:Surveillance photos and videos showing Louis near the Ana Cecilia;That Louis drove the vehicle containing the two boxes of cocaine; andThat Louis ran when confronted by the Customs agents.Defense counsel for Louis filed a motion for directed verdict of acquittal following the Government’s presentation of this flimsy evidence.

That’s the way Congress wanted it. One of the stiffest drug penalties is found in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) which requires a 20-year minimum sentence if the drug distribution results in death.Last year the U.S. Supreme Court, in Alleyne v. United States, held that the Government must prove before conviction that a death is actually caused by the drug distribution to trigger the 20-year mandatory minimum under § 841(b)(1)(B), (C).

The only exception to this rule is for possession with intent to distribute “small amount[s]” of marijuana, which is classified as a misdemeanor. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4).The Fifth Circuit was then left with the challenge of determining whether Moncrieffe’s conviction under Georgia law was for conduct that fell within the misdemeanor or felony provision of the federal CSA.

Last week the Supreme Court ("the Court") released a decision holding that the Federal Controlled Substance Act (the "Act") provision that criminalizes the dispensing of a controlled substance “except as authorized” includes a mens rea requirement. The Court held that once a defendant prescriber produces evidence that he or she was authorized to dispense a controlled substance by issuing a prescription, prosecutors must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prescriber knew that they were acting in an unauthorized manner or intended to do so.21 U.S.C. § 841(a) criminalizes the knowing or intentional distribution of a controlled substance, “except as authorized” by the subchapter. Per Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) regulation, a prescription is only “authorized” when a prescriber issues it “for a legitimate medical purpose” while acting in the usual course of their professional practice.