On March 21, 2023, the Supreme Court decided Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, No. 21-887, holding that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s (IDEA) exhaustion requirement, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l), does not preclude an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) lawsuit where the relief sought (i.e., compensatory damages) is not something IDEA can provide.Miguel Luna Perez, who is deaf, filed an administrative complaint with the Michigan Department of Education alleging (among other things) that Michigan’s Sturgis Public School District, where he attended schools from ages 9 through 20, failed to provide him a free and appropriate public education as required by IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415. The parties reached a settlement in which Sturgis promised to provide the forward-looking relief Perez sought. Perez then sued in federal district court under the ADA seeking compensatory damages. The District Court dismissed the suit, finding that 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) barred Perez from bringing his ADA claim because it requires a plaintiff “seeking relief that is also available under” IDEA to first exhaust IDEA’s administrative procedures. Bound by circuit precedent already addressing the question, the

Public School District in Michigan from age 9 to 20. To access instruction, Perez required sign language interpretation. The Perez family alleged that Sturgis either provided interpreters who were unqualified (including one teaching herself sign language on the job) or not provided at all. The family also alleged that Sturgis misrepresented Miguel’s progress, saying he would graduate on time form high school but then shortly before graduation saying he would not receive a diploma.The Perez family filed a due process complaint and entered into a settlement whereby Sturgis would provide all the forward looking equitable relief they sought. They then filed an ADA lawsuit seeking backward looking relief. Sturgis moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust because of the settlement agreement, which the District Court granted and the Sixth Circuit upheld. Because of a split among the circuits, the Supreme Court took up the matter.ANALYSISThe focus of the Court’s review is a portion of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. 1415(l), which states:Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, theAmericans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of theRehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter.The Perez family argued that this section meant that exhaustion was required only if the family filed suit under another federal law for remedies available under the IDEA. As the Perez’s ADA claim sought compensatory damages – which both parties agreed was not available under the IDEA – the family said exhaustion requirements did not apply to their ADA claim.The school system countered that exhaustion was r

I.R. appealed.20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(II) provides that if a parent refuses to consent to services under clause (i)(II), before a district provides special education and related services to a child, a local educational agency shall not provide the services by utilizing the procedures described in 20 U.S.C. § 1415. Section 1415, in turn, grants school districts the power to initiate a due process hearing.

The United States Supreme Court issued a decision inPerez v. Sturgis Public Schools, No. 21-887, opening the door for future claims against schools for compensatory monetary damages. In its unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that the “exhaustion” requirement laid out in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l), does not preclude a person from also seeking relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) where the relief sought (i.e., compensatory damages) is beyond the scopeof what the IDEA can provide.Former student Miguel Luna Perez, who is deaf, filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Education (“MDE”), alleging that the Sturgis Public School District failed to provide him a free and appropriate public education as required by the IDEA. Before MDE could conclude on the IDEA allegations, Perez and the district reached a forward-looking settlement in which the district agreed to pay for Perez to attend the Michigan School for the Deaf.Following this settlement, Perez sued the school district, alleging that it had violated the ADA and seeking compensatory damages. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that Perez was barred from bringing an ADA claim because the exhaustion requirement of the IDEA mandates that a plaintiff “seeking relief that is also available unde

In Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, the Court unanimously ruled that parents of students with disabilities seeking compensatory damages (i.e., monetary damages) from public school districts may initiate legal proceedings in court without first exhausting their administrative remedies, which in New York requires participating in the impartial hearing process and, if necessary, perfecting an appeal with the Office of State Review. The Court’s decision was based on its interpretation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s (”IDEA”) exhaustion requirement for parents of students with disabilities seeking relief from public school districts. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).The Supreme Court most recently addressed the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement in 2017 when it issued Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools, 580 U.S. 154 (2017). In Fry, the Court considered whether the parent of a student with a disability may bring a discrimination claim directly to court without first exhausting all available administrative remedies, including the initiation of an impartial due process hearing. The Court ruled a parent may indeed bring a claim directly to federal court, but only if the claim does not allege the denial of a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”) or does not involve the adequacy of the student’s program or services.As a result, under Fry, parents have been able to bring non-FAPE-related claims, such as discrimination claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, directly to court without exhausting their administrative remedies.The Perez decision further expanded the range of claims exempt fr

rgis Public Schools, No. 21-887: This case considered whether a federal education law’s administrative exhaustion requirements precluded a civil lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Miguel Perez, a deaf student, claimed a Michigan public school district failed to provide him with qualified sign language interpreters and misrepresented his academic progress for years. When, months before his planned graduation, the school district revealed it would not award Perez a diploma, Perez and his family filed an administrative complaint under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). That complaint settled and provided forward-looking relief to allow Perez to receive additional schooling. Perez then filed a civil lawsuit against the district under the ADA, seeking compensatory damages. The district court dismissed the suit, finding the ADA claim was barred by the IDEA’s prohibition on other lawsuits “seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA].” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). In a 9-0 decision authored by Justice Gorsuch, the Court held that the IDEA’s administrative exhaustion requirement did not apply to this suit because the compensatory damages sought were not available remedies under the IDEA.

But as we explain below, the new matrix departs from the statutory requirement that reasonable fees be tethered to “rates prevailing in the community” for the “kind and quality of services furnished.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). We therefore vacate the award and remand for the district court to recalculate the hourly rate based on evidence that focuses on fees for attorneys practicing complex federal litigation in the District of Columbia.

“Stay put” is a unique aspect of the IDEA which requires that “during the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section … the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child.” 20 U.S.C. §1415(j). In other words, this section requires a school district to continue funding the last agreed-upon IEP during the pendency of any administrative or judicial proceeding, regardless of how long those proceedings may drag on.

By way of background, the IDEA includes a provision permitting parents to file a suit in court against school districts under laws, aside from the IDEA, that also protect students with disabilities, but that parents must first pursue those claims through the IDEA due process system if the parents “seek relief that is also available” under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. §1415(l). In the Fry decision, the Supreme Court unanimously held, 8-0, that the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement applies only to claims by parents under laws other than the IDEA where the “gravamen” of the complaint relates to an alleged denial of a student’s right to a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”).

The Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986 adds a carefully defined exhaustion provision that requires a plaintiff bringing suit under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or similar laws “seeking relief that is also available under [the IDEA]” to first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures. 20 U.S.C. §1415(l). Fry’s daughter E.F. has a severe form of cerebral palsy, and her trained service dog assists her with various daily life activities.