510(d)(2), which provide for judicial enforcement of a written agreement reached as a result of mediation or a resolution meeting, there is nothing in this part that would prevent the SEA from using other mechanisms to seek enforcement of that agreement, provided that use of those mechanisms is not mandatory and does not delay or deny a party the right to seek enforcement of the written agreement in a State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States. (Authority: 20 U.S.C. 1415(e)(2)(F), 1415(f)(1)(B)) §§ 300.538–300.

The Court's decision must be supported by the preponderance of the evidence. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).) The preponderance of the evidence standard “is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.”

105-95 (1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 78, 79-82, and the many procedural safeguards set forth in the IDEA are intended to enable parents to ensure the education of their children with disabilities in the 39 least restrictive environment appropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a); see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1988). Accordingly, as discussed above, the IDEA does not bestow upon school districts an enforceable “right to settle” parental due process complaints, even where doing so may spare the parties the expense of litigation.

The SRO’s reasoning is wrong and based on impermissible retrospective testimony. The IEP’s failure to define the nature of J.S.’s course of study prevented M.M. from making an informed decision about J.S.’s education, denying J.S. a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(II) (a procedural inadequacy may result in a denial of a FAPE if it “significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a [FAPE] to the parents’ child). A child’s IEP must amply articulate the recommended program so that a parent has “sufficient information about the IEP to make an informed decision as to its adequacy prior to making a placement decision.”

IDEA provides, in pertinent part, that the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees . . . to a prevailing . . . local educational agency . . . against the parent, if the parent’s complaint or subsequent cause of action was presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III). Case 2:17-cv-01922-NIQA Document 10-1 Filed 06/23/17 Page 10 of 12 11 As discussed above, the Complaint avers facts that undermine any claim of wrongdoing by CCA.

20 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(l)(C)(i). And though the IDEA contains detailed procedural requirements that school districts must observe in determining the appropriate educational setting for a child with special needs, 20 U.S.C. § 1415, and directions for the federal Secretary of Education to oversee States' monitoring efforts, 20 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(l)(A)(i), it contains no particular requirements that States must observe with regard to monitoring school districts. Instead, the IDEA broadly leaves that matter to the States.

See Hooker, 2010 WL 4025877, at *5 (“In Texas, a party making such a complaint is entitled to a due process hearing conducted by the TEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A); 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 89.1151(b) (2010) (implementing one-tier review system under IDEA).”).

14 The Equal Access to Justice Act waives sovereign immunity with respect to plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Case 1:07-cv-01583-RMU Document 15 Filed 01/30/2008 Page 42 of 49 - 36 - applies to any suit whether under the APA or not.”

The exhaustion requirement applies to persons who are bringing claims directly under the IDEA as well as to persons bringing claims under Section 1983, the Rehabilitation Act, and the due process clause, as plaintiffs do here. 20 U.S.C. 1415 (l). 17 exhaustion is required in individual IDEA challenges.7/ Nearly all of the cases cited by defendants involve garden variety challenges to the content of an IEP or to a particular educational placement, and do not present any of the three circumstances excusing exhaustion described above (pp. 2-16).

20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)(A). In conducting such review, the “preponderance of the evidence” standard of 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)(B)(iii) “is by no means an invitation to the court to substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.” Board of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). Stated differently, the court should not “reverse the hearing officer’s findings simply because [the court] disagree[s] with them.” Board of Educ. of Arlington Heights Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Illinois State Board of Educ., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6994, 12 (N.D. Ill. March 19, 2001). The party challenging the hearing officer’s determination bears the burden of persuading the court that the hearing officer was incorrect. Angevine v. Smith, 292 U.S. App. D.C. 346, 959 F.2d 292, 295 (1992); Kerkam v. McKenzie, 274 U.S. App. D.C. 139, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (1988); Lyons v. Smith, 829 F. Supp. 414, 417 (D.D.C. 1993). While the Court is authorized to make an Case 1:16-cv-02067-APM Document 12 Filed 04/07/17 Page 5 of 10 6 indepen