See Complaint ¶ 22. 37 Case 1:06-cv-00614-LFO-CKK-JWR Document 17 Filed 04/17/2006 Page 44 of 52 The segregated account CCL says it is “willing” to use would include funds raised outside the member class restrictions of 2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(4) and contribution limits of 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(C). CCL admits (Br.

The electioneering communication funding restriction permits Plaintiff to broadcast electioneering communications, provided that the funds are disbursed from Plaintiff’s separate segregated fund, or “PAC.” See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C). 43-44.

The electioneering communication funding restriction permits Plaintiff to broadcast electioneering communications, provided that the funds are disbursed from Plaintiff’s separate segregated fund, or “PAC.” See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C). 43-44.

15(c). Accordingly, “Questions” is exempt from the funding restriction of 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a),(b)(2), and plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the corporate funding restriction as to the ad is therefore moot. IV.

The narrow focus of WRTL II is apparent on the face of the decision. The first sentence of the controlling opinion announces that the Court is considering the constitutionality of the funding prohibition, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2), as applied to WRTL’s specific ads. The Court did not even mention the EC disclosure requirements, and did not discuss the definition of “electioneering communication” beyond setting forth the text of the definition in a footnote.

This “as applied” effort to exempt certain of their lectioneering communications from coverage of those provisions would undermine the efficacy of the law and impair the public interest served by the law. 3 In 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(6), Congress functionally overrode 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c)(2), a provision of BCRA that had exempted section 501(c)(4) corporations from the ban on spending their treasury funds for electioneering communications, subject to certain conditions. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 209-10 n.90.

The Court declares sections 201 (“Reporting Requirement”) and 311 (“Disclaimer Requirement”) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”), codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f) and 441d(a), unconstitutional as applied to communications that are not the “functional equivalent of express advocacy” under the appeal-to-vote test of FEC v. Wiscon- sin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2007) (“WRTL II”), which communications include Plaintiff’s three proposed ads and the documentary film Hillary: The Movie. The Court further declares BCRA § 203 (“Prohibition”), codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b, unconstitutional as applied to Hillary: The Movie because it is not the “functional equivalent of express advocacy” under WRTL II’s appeal-to-vote test. Counts 4 and 5 of Plaintiff’s amended complaint are dismissed without prejudice as moot.

McConnell, 540 U.S. at 199. McConnell reiterated the burden of proof that a plaintiff must meet to succeed in such a 4 McConnell had explained that “[b]ecause corporations can still fund electioneering communications with PAC money [raised in a separate segregated fund, 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)], it is ‘simply wrong’ to view the provision as a ‘complete ban’ on expression rather than a regulation.” 540 U.S. at 204 (citation omitted).

The fund comprises donations voluntarily made for political purposes by the corporation’s stockholders or members and employees, and the families of such individuals. 2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(4)(A)-(C). The money in this fund, can for example, be contributed directly to federal candidates or used to pay for independent expenditures to communicate to the general public the corporation’s views on candidates for federal office.

Count 3 Should Not Be Dismissed. CU did not challenge the electioneering communication prohibition, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b, as applied to Hillary: The Movie, when it filed its initial complaint because there were no plans to broadcast the documentary. However, as set out in the Amended Verified Complaint, CU got an offer to broadcast the documentary: 28.