preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining Defendant FEC from enforcing 2 U.S.C. §§ 432, 433 and 434, as well as any applicable rules and regulations regarding those provisions, against SpeechNow.org and David Keating, its president and treasurer; 9. preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining Defendant FEC from enforcing 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(4) and 431(8), as well as any applicable rules and regulations regarding those provisions, to require SpeechNow.org to register as a political committee before it has made any expenditures or broadcast any advertisement; 10. an award of nominal damages of $1 for the violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; 11.

The statutory provisions challenged by plaintiffs have been on the books for more then thirty years. Indeed, the requirements for registration and reporting by political committees in 2 U.S.C. §§ 432, 433 and 434, and the definition of political committee in 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) 24 In addition, a preliminary injunction against enforcement by the Commission in this case would do nothing to prevent the Attorney General of the United States from exercising his independent authority to bring a criminal prosecution for knowing and willful violations of the Act. United States v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 701, 638 F.2d 1161, 1163-68 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Tonry, 433 F.Supp. 620, 622 (E.D. La. 1977); see 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d) (criminal penalties for violating FECA); 2 U.S.C § 437c(b)(1) (“The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement [of the Act.]”)

5. Whether 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(4) and 431(8) violate the First Amendment by requiring David Keating, SpeechNow.org’s president and treasurer, to register SpeechNow.org as a political committee and comply with the organizational and continuous reporting requirements for political committees before SpeechNow.org has made any expenditures or broadcast any advertisements? SO ORDERED this ____ day of ________________, 2008.

5. In 2007, Craig was a candidate for the United States Senate in the 2008 election, and he authorized defendant Craig for U.S. Senate (“Craig Committee”) as his principal campaign committee under 2 U.S.C. § 431(5)-(6). (Compl.

See also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 78 (upholding the constitutionality of the definition of “contribution” for disclosure purposes). Therefore, once it receives more than $1,000 in contributions in a calendar year, SpeechNow will become a political committee under 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A). The Court in Buckley found “no constitutional infirmities in the recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure provisions of the Act.”

11. The reporting requirements at issue in this case provide that any “person” (defined to include any corporation, labor organization, or other group, 2 U.S.C. § 431(11)) expending over $10,000 to produce or air an EC must file a statement with the Commission. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)-(2).

11. The reporting requirements at issue in this case provide that any “person” (defined to include any corporation, labor organization, or other group, 2 U.S.C. § 431(11)) expending over $10,000 to produce or air an EC must file a statement with the Commission. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)-(2).

11.1 The reporting requirements at issue in this case provide that any “person” (defined to include any corporation, labor organization, or other group, 2 U.S.C. § 431(11)) expending over $10,000 to produce or air an EC must file a statement with the Commission. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(2).

Furthermore, comprehensive disclosure of electioneering communications is also crucial to the FEC’s ability to make determinations of political committee status. This determination rests on the FEC’s assessment of whether a group meets the statutory definition of “political committee,” see 2 U.S.C. § 431(4), and whether its “major purpose” is campaign related. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.

See 479 U.S. at 252-53 (“person that during a year makes independent expenditures”; “unincorporated organizations whose major purpose is not campaign advocacy, but who occasionally make independent expenditures” (emphasis added)). An “independent ex- Case 1:07-cv-02240-RCL-RWR Document 52 Filed 05/16/2008 Page 18 of 64 SJ Memo 12 penditure” is an expenditure “expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate . . . .” 2 U.S.C. § 431(17). This definition is consistent with the express advocacy con- struction that Buckley imposed on disclosure restrictions in the process of implementing the unambiguously-campaign-related requirement.