5) That Petitioner had time or opportunity to withdraw, and 6) That Petitioner possessed a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime. Additionally, the Petitioner would like to put before this Honorable Court that under 18 USC§3661 "no limitation can be placed on a sentencing court's power to consider the defendant's background, character, and conduct." Petitioner has stated she was always considered to be an outstanding citizen.

Moreover, for7 purposes of sentencing, the Court has extremely wide latitude to consider information relevant to the background, character and conduct of a defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the The United States is not arguing here that the family members represent the outer6 reaches of proximate causation under the CVRA, or that victims must be able to show a cognizable cause of action in tort to come within the scope of the statute. The United States is arguing here only that, in this case, because the family members can show a cause of action in tort, a sufficient basis exists to consider them “crime victims” under the CVRA.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582, imposition of a term of imprisonment is subject to the following limitation: in determining whether and to what extent imprisonment is appropriate based on the Section 3553(a) factors, the judge is required to “recogniz[e] that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation” (emphasis added). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3661, “no limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of [the defendant] which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence” (emphasis added). This statutory language certainly overrides the (now-advisory) policy statements in Part H of the sentencing guidelines, which list as “not ordinarily relevant” to sentencing a variety of factors such as the defendant’s age, educational and vocational skills, mental and emotional conditions, drug or alcohol dependence, and lack of guidance as a youth.

Gov’t Memo at 28-29. Consistent with the dictates of 18 U.S.C. § 3661, however, courts have granted sentences well below the recommended manual range in circumstances far less compelling than Mr. Safavian’s. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771, 776, 782 (E.D. Wisc. 2005) (reducing defendant’s sentence by half, even after a 15-level downward departure on other grounds – because he had been married several years supports his children, cares for his mother and obtained letters as to his good character from his pastor and others); United States v. Beamon, 373 F. Supp. 2d 878, 887 (E.D. Wisc. 2005) (“Defendant’s admirable service as a mentor to young men, his assistance to his ill father, and his positive influence on younger family members merited some consideration.”)

In other words, even under a mandatory Guidelines sentencing regime, a district court had virtually unlimited discretion as to the kind of information it could consider regarding a defendant’s background, character and conduct for the purposes of determining an appropriate sentence. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”); United States v. Gonzalez- Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 735 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (defendants, “even prior to Booker, had every reason to present mitigating sentencing factors to the district court”); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 (in determining sentence to impose within sentencing range or whether departure is warranted, “the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law”).