The statute provides: Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the courts, in exercising their remedial powers, to order the construction of prisons or the raising of taxes, or to repeal or detract from otherwise applicable limitations on the remedial powers of the courts. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(C) (emphasis added). Nothing in the plain language of this statute prohibits courts from ordering prison construction where necessary to correct violations of federal law; rather, it merely provides that nothing in section 3626 shall be construed to authorize such construction.

If implemented, each of these inmates would be released as a result of this measure for purposes of the PLRA. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4). 4.

Defendants request that a structured review-and-approval process be established to ensure that all of the Receiver's actions strictly comply with state and federal law, including the PLRA, during the transition period. Defendants further request that a special master be appointed under 18 U.S.C § 3626(f). Finally, Defendants request that the Receiver's Construction Plan, as detailed in his Turnaround Plan of Action and Facility Program Statements, be terminated.

The PLRA requires that the injunctive relief extend no further than necessary to correct a violation of the rights of “particular plaintiffs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Here, there would be no reason to enjoin anyone other than the Plaintiffs’ wardens from violating their equal protection rights because CDCR’s protocols already comply with the Equal Protection Clause.

Third, the Assembly Republican Intervenors seeking to join their legislator colleagues are “freshmen” legislators, who did not have an opportunity to join the proceedings at the outset because the legislators acquired standing to do so well after their election in November 2008. Further, this motion is timely even though it is filed after the Three-Judge Court considered and issued a prisoner release order because Congress specifically granted standing for legislators not only to “oppose imposition” of such prison release orders, but also to challenge the ongoing efficacy of such an order and eventually to “seek termination of such relief. . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2)(F). Finally, even if there were some issue regarding the timeliness of this intervention (and there is not), the matters before the Three-Judge Court raise “matters of broad social significance,” which, under the circumstances, militate in favor of a finding of timeliness.

1 be “narrowly drawn, extend[] no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and [be] the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). The PLRA further requires the remedy to be “tailored to the actual injuries suffered by class members.”

In making that assessment, “[t]he court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a). Here, the parties vigorously negotiated the Consent Judgment, and agreed upon all of its terms.

Under this standard, any preliminary injunctive relief must be “narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). Norsworthy’s sole argument is that the PLRA purportedly did not “substantially change” the standards for granting injunctive relief.

“ Id. Section 802 of the PLRA amended 18 U.S.C. § 3626 to further restrict the power of federal courts to manage prison conditions through injunctive orders and consent decrees. This statute “limits remedies to those Case 2:75-cv-04111-DDP Document 243 Filed 11/08/10 Page 14 of 27 Page ID #:3131 8 RUTHERFORD\Opp 2 Mtn for Injunctive Relief Order re R tal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 necessary to remedy the proven violation of federal rights.”

The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief. 18 U.S.C. §3626(a)(1)(A). After detailed analysis of the facts and applicable law, this Court found and concluded “that the establishment of a Receivership, along with those actions necessary to effectuate its establishment, are narrowly drawn to remedy the constitutional violations at issue, extend no further than necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a federal right, and are the least intrusive means necessary to correct these violations.”