C. Reprosecution of This Case Would Adversely Affect the Administration of Justice The third factor that courts must consider in deciding whether to dismiss a case with prejudice is “the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of [the Act] and on the administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). Here, those considerations weigh in favor of dismissal with prejudice.

Whether a case should be dismissed with prejudice requires a court to consider “(1) the seriousness of the offenses; (2) the circumstances leading to the delay; (3) the impact reprosecution would have on the administration of justice and the enforcement of the Speedy Trial Act; and (4) any related miscellaneous factors, including whether the delay resulted in actual prejudice to the defendant.” Barnes, 159 F.3d at 16; 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). Here, the circumstances attendant to the now four-year delay weigh heavily in favor of dismissal with prejudice.

If there is a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, in determining whether to dismiss with or without prejudice, “the court shall consider, among others, each of the following 17 Case 2:12-cv-00719-CW Document 10 Filed 12/03/12 Page 17 of 41 factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). “[T]he application of the more severe sanction of dismissal with prejudice . . . should be reserved for more egregious violations.

The same reasoning applies here. The Speedy Trial Act only permits courts to dismiss an “information or indictment,” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2), and an order to show cause is not an information or indictment. See United States v. Eichhorst, 544 F.2d 6 Case: 1:10-cr-00886 Document #: 13 Filed: 06/21/11 Page 6 of 21 PageID #:170 1383, 1386 (7th Cir. 1976) (for a rule to show cause, “the particularity required of an indictment is not necessary”); United States v. Boskic, 545 F.3d 69, 82 n.13 (1st Cir. 2008) (“An information is explicitly a prosecutorial undertaking; it is defined as “[a] formal criminal charge made by a prosecutor without a grand-jury indictment.”)

The dismissal of this action should be with prejudice because the alleged offense is not serious within the meaning of the Speedy Trial Act, the delay is solely attributable to the government, and reprosecution would vitiate the purposes of the law and undermine the administration of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1); see also United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 1983). WHEREFORE, Mr. Trudeau respectfully requests that the Court grant his Motion for Dismissal Pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act.