The prosecutor moves the Court to remand the individual into custody pending sentencing. The government contends 18 U.S.C. § 3143(2) requires such detention as such possession is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A). You recall something about felon in possession [18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)] being a crime of violence, but you can’t remember anything about an addict in possession meeting that definition. You are correct. It hasn’t been found to be a crime of violence in the Circuit.

District courts appear to employ the categorical approach at trial either by instructing the jury that a particular crime is, as a matter of law, a crime of violence, or by instructing the jury that they must return a conviction on a § 924(c) count if they find a defendant guilty of one of the other charged crimes. In either scenario, district court judges are engaging in a categorical analysis and treating the “crime of violence” question as a question of law rather than a question of fact for the jury.If § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague, it may also affect certain pre-trial detention decisions under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(B). Section 3142(e)(3)(B) provides that defendants will be detained pending trial, rather than released on bail, in certain circumstances, including if a judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed a crime under § 924(c).

See Cleveland.com, “Cuyahoga County officials will hold mass plea, bond hearings to reduce jail population over coronavirus concerns” (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.cleveland.com/court-justice/2020/03/cuyahoga-county-officials-will-hold-mass-plea-hearings-to-reduce-jail-population-over-coronavirus-concerns.html. 18 U.S.C. §3142(g)(3)(A) (factors to be considered for release of a defendant pending trial). 18 U.S.C. §§3142(d)(2), 3143(a)(1), (b)(1)(A).

On a bail application, if the district court determines that a defendant is a flight risk, the district court weighs a series of factors, including the circumstances of the charged offense; the weight of the evidence against the defendant; the defendant’s history and characteristics; and the potential danger posed by the defendant’s release. See 18 U.S.C. §3142(g).The Circuit previously recognized that a defendant may be released subject to a condition of home confinement where the defendant pays for private armed security guards.

[18] Additionally, the Attorney General noted, “[P]rosecutors should consider the pandemic as a factor, especially in cases where the defendant presents little risk of flight or harm to the community, or in cases where the defendant is particularly susceptible to COVID-19.”[19] Federal judges can also unilaterally act in this context under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i). Pursuant to this section of the United States Code, a judge can temporarily release an individual prior to trial, if the judge determines that it is necessary for preparation for the persons defense or for another compelling reason.

The Bail Reform Act authorizes judicial officers to order temporary release for a “compelling reason.” 18 U.S.C. §3142(i). Nothing could be more compelling than this public health crisis.

We’re marking the occasion with some posts highlighting issues in pretrial release litigation, and will start by discussing the presumption.As you know, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) creates a presumption of detention in certain cases. When the presumption of detention applies, “the burden of production shifts to the defendant.

The district court detained Mr. Ailon-Ailon based on a risk of flight. That is, the court determined that removal by immigration posed "a serious risk that such person will flee," a determinative factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2).The Tenth Circuit reversed.

Summary: United States v. Arzberger, 592 F.Supp.2d 590 (S.D.N.Y.) (Dec. 31, 2008). In a prosecution for possessing and receiving child pornography, the U.S. Government moved to modify the defendant's bail by adding conditions required by the Adam Walsh Amendments to the Bail Reform Act (18 U.S.C. § 3142). One of these conditions was a prohibition of possession of firearms.

Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which concluded that the district court's decision was supported by the evidence. The first factor of 18 USC 3142(g)(1), the nature of the offense charged, involved both a crime of violence and a minor victim. The weight of the evidence favored detention, as Mr. Begay had made various statements about causing the abuse and the medical evidence was that the injuries were consistent with child abuse.