22 Separate and apart from § 1964(a)’s explicit authorization of private injunctive relief, such a remedy is permitted by the courts’ inherent authority to enter injunctions in a civil action within their jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1651; Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291 (1960). Nowhere does RICO “in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference,” Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946), strip the federal courts of such authority, and “‘[a]bsent an expressed prohibition the inherent power remains.’” Sheehan v. Purolator Courier Corp., 676 F.2d 877, 884 n.11 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting Culpepper v. Reynolds, 421 F.2d 888, 894 (5th Cir. 1970)). “Congress must speak clearly’ of its intent to interfere with the historic equitable powers of the courts; otherwise, no diminution in the courts’ remedial powers

. We thus conclude that Plaintiffs do not have standing to sue under § 1964(c). Accordingly we grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss both RICO claims.

To prevail on their conspiracy claim, the Subscriber Plaintiffs must prove the very same elements of injury, causation, and scienter that splinter into millions of individualized issues under their substantive RICO claim. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 507 (2000). Individualized issues do not become any less individualized simply because they are accompanied by a conspiracy allegation.

That fact demonstrates that Plaintiffs’ allegations “would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). See, e.g., Bald Eagle, 189 F.3d at 328 (after comparing similarities between an SEC securities fraud action and a RICO claim, court concludes that the “same . . . scheme is at the heart of this RICO action”).13 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ RICO claim is barred by the PSLRA and should be dismissed.

Of the six alleged unlawful acts enumerated in the Complaint, three are not RICO predicate acts under § 1961(1), and therefore cannot support a RICO claim. See Vega v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 2:14-cv-04408- ODW(PLAx), 2015 WL 1383241, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2015) (dismissing RICO claim because conduct alleged was “not a recognized RICO predicate act”). Similarly, conduct that would be actionable as securities fraud cannot form the basis of a RICO claim under § 1964(c). See Howard, 208 F.3d at 749. The only two potentially cognizable RICO predicate acts the Complaint identifies—mail and wire fraud—fail because the Complaint’s allegations do not satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b).

Plaintiffs’ argument is completely untenable. In stating that “[t]he exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply in an action against any person that is criminally convicted in connection with the fraud,” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (emphasis added), the proviso directs attention to the basis of the conviction. To the extent that an action concerning conduct actionable under the securities law is based on allegedly fraudulent conduct for which the person was not convicted, the action exceeds the authorization granted by Congress.

As such, Yellow Brick Road respectfully requests punitive damages in the sum of $1,000,000. Yellow Brick Road is further entitled to an award of its attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), the terms of the Escrow Instructions, and/or A.R.S. §§ 12-341.01 and 12-341. III. YELLOW BRICK ROAD IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE BUSCH PARTIES’ CLAIMS.

Ingram, No. CIV S082490FCDDADPS, 2009 WL 2941463, citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.1980). Here, Plaintiff only makes one mention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in all of his FAC, stating on the caption page, “18 U.S.C. 1961, 1964 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. 1962, 1963 et seq.; (Civil RICO Remedies); and, 5th and 14th Amendment Civil Rights Due Process Violations (enacted by Congress with Specific Reservations) in pari materia with the Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Constitution: also under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code.

See Paul, 2011 WL 2713649, at *4 (dismissing RICO conspiracy claim because “a RICO conspiracy claim must fail if there is no underlying RICO claim to support the conspiracy”). E. Plaintiffs’ Requested Equitable Relief Is Not Permitted in a Civil RICO Suit Plaintiffs invoke the federal RICO statute’s equitable jurisdictional grant under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) to request extravagant forms of relief, including “disgorgement of LG Korea and LG USA’s gross proceeds from the sales of the Defective Products” and “[d]ivesting LG Korea of ownership in any entity that conducts business in the United States.” (Compl.

Plaintiffs Fail To Satisfy Section 1964(c) RICO affords a cause of action to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation” of RICO. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). As explained above, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the causation requirements of Section 1964(c).