18 U.S.C. § 1862; West Hills Farms, LLC v. ClassicStar Farms, Inc., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 14518 (6th Cir. Ky. 2013).However, there is also a civil RICO component that permits private parties to sue other private businesses or individuals under a similar theory that the defendant has engaged in racketeering activity that has injured the private party. 18 U.S.C. § 1964. “Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter [18 USCS § 1962] may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).

y. It also leaves open the possibility of treble damages and recovery of litigation costs.Foreign plaintiffs may be able to increase their odds of having a “domestic injury” by confirming the relevant arbitration award in the United States and receiving a US judgment. However, other factors will also impact the inquiry, such as where the racketeering activity was directed from and targeted at, as well as the location of the defendant. Ultimately, whether there is a “domestic injury” for purposes of RICO will need to be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.Footnotes[1] Yegiazaryan v. Smagin, 599 U. S. ____, *14 (2023). [2] Smagin v. Yegiazaryan, No. 2:14-CV-09764, (C.D. Cal. Feb 04, 2015) (order granting stay of proceedings and preliminary injunction). [3] Smagin v. Yegiazaryan, 37 F.4th 562, 565 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. granted, 143 S. Ct. 645 (2023), and cert. granted sub nom. CMB Monaco v. Smagin, 214 L. Ed. 2d 382, 143 S. Ct. 646 (2023), and aff'd and remanded, 599 U. S. ____ (2023). [4] 18 U.S.C. §1964(c)[5] 18 U.S.C. §1962(c). [6] 18 U.S.C. §1962(d). [7] 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). [8] RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U.S. 325, 346 (2016). [9] Id. at 354. [10] Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 905 F.3d 694, 701, 707 (3d Cir. 2018). [11] Bascunan v. Elsaca, 927 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2019); see also Bascunan v. Elsaca, 874 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 2017). [12] Armada (Singapore) PTE Ltd. v. Amcol Int'l Corp., 885 F.3d 1090, 1093–95 (7th Cir. 2018), abrogated by Yegiazaryan v. Smagin, 599 U. S. ____ (2023). [13] Smagin v. Compagnie Monegasque De Banque, No. 220CV11236RGKPLA, 2021 WL 2124254, *4 (C.D. Cal. 2021), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Smagin v. Yegiazaryan, 37 F.4th 562 (9th Cir. 2022), cert. granted, 143 S. Ct. 645 (2023), and cert. granted sub nom. CMB Monaco v. Smagin, 214 L. Ed. 2d 382, 143 S. Ct. 646 (2023), and aff'd and remanded, 599 U. S. ____ (2023). [14] Smagin v. Yegiazaryan, 37 F.4th 562, 567 (9th Cir. 2022), aff'd and remanded, 599 U. S. ____ (2023). [15] Id. at 568. [16]

ght to enforce federal law—typically the purview of federal prosecutors—against any retail pharmacy that mails abortion-producing medications within, to, or from jurisdictions that are less restrictive with respect to abortions.18 U.S.C. § 1461 (mailing obscene or crime-inciting matter), the proverbial hammer cited in the two warning letters, criminalizes using the mail to send any medicine, among other things, for the purposes of “producing” an abortion. Perhaps acknowledging the atypical nature of a state Attorney General attempting to invoke a federal criminal statute, the twenty state Attorneys General here cross-reference a federal anti-racketeering statute, known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. Section 1461 is among the statutes listed in the definition of “racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Therefore, the warning letters highlight that a violation of § 1461 could give rise to civil liability under RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). In turn, the state Attorneys General contend that they, along with other private parties, have proper standing to assert a claim in federal court nationwide to enforce § 1461.Like many risk-oriented issues raised in our post-Dobbs world, these warning letters pose novel legal questions. More than 650 cases have cited to § 1461 since the first published opinion in the 1870s. Yet, we are aware of no case that has sought to couple the concept of abortion and the federal racketeering statute. The dearth of guidance leads practitioners (healthcare and law practitioners, alike) to many significant questions and considerations:Even if using the mail to facilitate abortions may be considered “racketeering activity” under the definition set forth in RICO, that definition does not itself create liability. RICO criminalizes, and by extension creates civil penalties, only against certain patterns of racketeering activity enumerated in the RICO statute. 18 U.S.C. §1962 (a)-(d). The warning letter

Under this predictable and easy-to-apply rule, the extraterritorial reach of criminal RICO liability simply piggybacks on the extraterritoriality jurisprudence that courts continue to develop around the predicate statutes underlying a RICO violation. The Court applied an entirely different test to RICO’s private right of action, explaining that the remedy, found in 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), is available only to a plaintiff “injured in his business or property” within the United States. Plaintiffs who have been injured abroad – such as the European Community in its suit against RJR Nabisco – therefore have no private civil remedy under RICO.

On June22, 2023, a 6-3 Opinion issued in Yegiazaryanv. Smagin, No.22-381, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a plaintiff—whether located in the United States or abroad—may use the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) to enforce a foreign arbitral award in the United States, provided that the plaintiff can demonstrate that it suffered a “domestic injury” in the United States. Known more frequently for criminal prosecutions, RICO also provides civil litigants a powerful tool to remedy injury to business or property caused by a “pattern of racketeering activity” perpetrated by an “enterprise” of at least two distinct persons or entities. See 18 U.S.C. §§1961–1968. Prevailing plaintiffs under RICO are statutorily entitled to recover “threefold the damages” actually sustained—known as treble damages—and reasonable attorneys’ fees. 18 U.S.C. §1964(c).Before last week’s Opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court had limited a private party’s ability to pursue a RICO suit based on extraterritorial conduct. In RJR Nabisco, Inc.v. European Community, 579 U.S. 325, 346 (2016), the Supreme Court concluded that RICO violations under 18 U.S.C. §1962 may be based on foreign predicate acts where the statutes underlying those acts apply extraterritorially, but that the private right of action under 18 U.S.C. §1964(c) permits an extraterritorial civil RICO suit only where the plaintiff suffered a “domestic injury to business or property” (i.e., an injury in the United States).A conflict arose among the circuit courts, however, as to what exactly constitutes a “domestic injury” for purposes of civil RICO. Some U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal examined the analysis based on a totality-of-the-circumstances, fact-based inquiry; other Circuits, by contrast, had adopted a rigid, bright-line rule that looked at the plaintiff’s residence. See Slip op. at 2. Resolv

avajo Nation case, with Justice Gorsuch joining Justice Sotomayor along with Justice Kagan. Justice Jackson concurred with the majority opinion of the Court, which affirmed a judgment of the Fourth Circuit and reversed a judgment of the Ninth Circuit.The Roberts/Kavanaugh alliance that we saw last week in the voting rights case again was present in yesterday's decision inYegiazaryan v. Smagin, in which, along with Justice Barrett, they joined Justice Sotomayor, who wrote the Court’s majority opinion, which also was joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch dissented in whole or part.The decision itself is an important one in its expansion of a plaintiff’s right to bring a civil suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Respondent Smagin had filed a civil suit under RICO, which provides a private right of action to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of” RICO’s substantive provisions. 18 U. S. C. §1964(c). He alleged that the petitioner and others had worked together to frustrate Smagin’s collection on a California judgment (confirming a foreign arbitration award) through a pattern of wire fraud and other RICO predicate racketeering acts, including witness tampering and obstruction of justice. The majority held that a plaintiff sufficiently alleges a domestic injury, albeit to intangible property (a court judgment) for purposes of §1964(c) when the circumstances surrounding the injury indicate that it arose in the United States. Here, a great deal of the racketeering conduct occurred outside of the United States, but the effects of the vast majority of the injurious acts, directed at frustrating a California judgment, were manifested in the United States. Thus, looking to context, the majority sees no problem posed by any presumption against extraterritoriality or international comity. The dissenters argue that an injury to intangible property does not qualify as a “domestic injury” un

now poised to weigh in. Not surprisingly, so is the business community.In an amicus brief filed by business community advocates, they urged the Supreme Court to take up this case arguing that if the highest court did not weigh in, there would be forum shopping with “[a]n influx of filings in the Second and Ninth Circuits of routine product liability injury cases couched as civil RICO claims asking for trebling of wage losses”. Litigants have been trying to push the boundaries of the RICO statute for years, and should the Supreme Court affirm the Second Circuit and not give businesses a pass, this would be a game changer for personal injury litigants. Brief for Petitioners, Medical Marijuana, Inc.; Dixie Holdings, LLC, AKA Dixie Elixirs; Red Dice Holdings, LLC, Petitioners, v. Douglas J. Horn, Respondent, In the Supreme Court of the United States, On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The case is scheduled for argument on October 15, 2024. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).Horn v. Medical Marijuana, Inc., Case No. 15-CV-701 (W.D.N.Y.).Horn v. Medical Marijuana, Inc., 2021 WL 4173195 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2021).Horn v. Medical Marijuana, Inc., 80 F.4th 130 (2d Cir. 2023).Diaz v. Gates, 420 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).See, e.g., Jackson v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 731 F.3d 556, 565 (6th Cir. 2013); Evans v. City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 916, 925-27 (7th Cir. 2006); Magnum v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 253 F. App’x 224, 227 (ed Cir. 2007); Hughes v. Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278 F.3d 417,422 (5th Cir. 2001). Brief of Atlantic Legal Foundation & DRI Center for Law and Public Policy as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, In the Supreme Court of the United States, On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

s issue:Supreme Court to Resolve Availability of (“RICO”) Claims to Personal Injury PlaintiffsSupreme Court Confronts a Circuit Split on Post-Removal Complaint AmendmentsSupreme Court of California to Consider Duty to InnovatePerennial Plaintiffs’ Expert Excluded For “Methodological Shapeshifting”Hot TopicsSupreme Court to Resolve Availability of RICO Claims to Personal Injury PlaintiffsOn April 29, 2024, the Supreme Court granted certiorariin Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn, No. 23-365, 2024 WL 1839091 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2024), a case that could clarify the scope and applicability of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) claims to personal injury plaintiffs. The impetus for the Supreme Court’s intervention in the case is a widened circuit split over the statute’s application to economic harm from personal injuries.RICO’s civil cause of action permits a party to bring a claim for treble damages for racketeering activity but does not permit claims for personal injury. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Instead, RICO civil remedies are provided where a person is “injured in his business or property” through a violation of the statute. Id. Courts of appeal are divided as to whether damages arising from personal injuries, such as medical expenses and lost wages, are nevertheless recoverable if they can fairly be construed as also being “injury to business or property.” The Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits hold that RICO does not permit such damages claims, while the Second Circuit in Horn v. Medical Marijuana, Inc. aligned with the Ninth Circuit and found that such damages are recoverable under RICO. 80 F.4th 130, 136–37 (2d Cir. 2023).Horn involves a plaintiff who was fired from his job as a truck driver after testing positive for THC. The plaintiff alleges that he tested positive for THC after consuming defendants’ products, which he claims were falsely labeled as THC-free. The plaintiff brought claims alleging that the defendant product manufacturers were involved in a RICO co

Today, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in four cases:Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn, No. 23-365: This case involves interpretation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO permits a plaintiff “injured in his business or property by reason of” the defendant’s racketeering activity to sue for treble damages and attorneys’ fees. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The circuits are divided on whether economic damages arising from personal injuries—like lost wages—support civil RICO liability. The question presented is: Whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant’s acts for purposes of a civil treble-damages action under RICO.Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, No. 23-677: This case addresses the ability of a plaintiff, in an action removed to federal court on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, to compel a remand to state court by amending the complaint to omit federal questions. The questions presented are: (1) Whether a post-removal amendment of a complaint to omit federal questions defeats federal-question subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and (2) whether such a post-removal amendment of a complaint precludes a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s remaining state-l

n Ryan, et al., the well water, ground water and soil in the Westminster, Mass., region harbored PFAS concentrations that “significantly surpassed” the benchmarks set by the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection. The three corporate defendants—who are involved in the production of paper, fertilizer and various other products—are alleged to be the source of the contamination. Upon de novo review, the Court adopted the lower court’s report and recommendations regarding the RICO claims against Seaman Paper Company of Massachusetts, Inc., Otter Farm, Inc., and Massachusetts Natural Fertilizer Company, Inc., (MassNatural). (Plaintiff’s RICO claims against Defendants Greif, Inc., Caraustar Industries, Inc., and the Newark Group, Inc., were dismissed because they were deemed to not cross the plausibility threshold.) In denying the Motion to Dismiss, the Court held that the RICO statute provides a civil cause of action to those harmed by the activities alleged in the complaint (18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). Specifically, the complaint alleged that Seaman Paper operated a paper mill since the 1940s and has a history of using PFAS in the production of its paper products. In 2002, Seaman Paper acquired a plot of land, incorporated Otter Farm Inc., and conveyed the acquired land to Otter Farm Inc. Otter Farm then leased this land to MassNatural to use as a composting facility. MassNatural composts various materials, including paper fiber, and sells its compost, usually in the form of soil products, to the public. MassNatural has allegedly accepted waste material from Seaman Paper without testing it and fabricated its own compliance procedures to state authorities.According to the complaint, the alleged RICO enterprise took the form of an arrangement that allowed Seaman Paper a site to dump contaminated byproducts from its paper mill and avoid paying for expensive hazardous waste transporters or for proper disposal. Otter Farm, by providing a 100-year lease at below-market rent, had the lev