Giridhar C. Sekhar v. United States, USSC No. 12-357, 6/26/13United States Supreme Court decision, reversing U.S. v. Sekhar, 683 F.3d 436 (2nd Cir. 2012)Attempting to compel a person to recommend that his employer approve an investment does not constitute “the obtaining of property from another” for purposes of a prosecution under the Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. §1951(a).Investments for the New York government employees pension fund are chosen by the State Comptroller. After the Comptroller’s general counsel recommended against investing in a fund managed by Sekhar, the general counsel received anonymous e-mails demanding that he recommend the investment and threatening, if he did not, to disclose to others information about the general counsel’s alleged extramarital affair.

The Hobbs Act, codified at 18 U.S.C § 1951, is a federal law that was enacted in 1946. It was originally used to curtail racketeering in labor disputes, which was a common phenomenon at that time.Today, the Hobbs Act is commonly used by federal prosecutors to target public corruption, street gangs, commercial disputes, and union corruption.

Taylor v. United States, USSC No. 14-6166, 2016 WL 3369420, 579 U.S. ___ (June 20, 2016), affirmingUnited States v. Taylor, 754 F.3d 217 (4th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)In a decision that invalidates Seventh Circuit precedent, the Supreme Court holds that to obtain a conviction under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, for the robbery or attempted robbery of a drug dealer, the Government need not show that the drugs that a defendant stole or attempted to steal either traveled or were destined for transport across state lines; instead, it is enough that a defendant knowingly stole or attempted to steal drugs or drug proceeds because, as a matter of law, the market for illegal drugs is “commerce over which the UnitedStates has jurisdiction” for purposes of the Hobbs Act.In defending against charges of attempting to rob marijuana dealers of their drugs and drug money, Taylor argued that robbing drug dealers of marijuana or proceeds of marijuana grown in the state where the robbery occurred didn’t satisfy the interstate commerce element.

United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95 (5th Cir. 1994)The defendant stole the victim’s car and cellular phone while he was fleeing from the police after he robbed a restaurant. This latter robbery was not shown to have had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. §1951(a). The only effect on interstate commerce was the individual’s employment with a company whose business affected interstate commerce.

The Court had no problem with the Government’s evidence overall and affirmed 13 of the total 18 counts of conviction. But the Court vacated Blagojevich’s convictions for attempted extortion under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 1952, the corrupt solicitation of funds under 18 U.S.C. §§371 (conspiracy) and 666(a)(1)(B), and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346. The Court found a problem with the jury instructions as to these counts because it concluded that the jury could have convicted the Governor on these counts solely because he proposed trading “one public act for another.”

Question presented:Does a conspiracy to commit extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2), require that the conspirators agree to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy?Lower court decision: United States v. Ocasio, 750 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2014)DocketScotusblog pageThis case will be of interest to federal practitioners who defend prosecutions under the Hobbs Act.

December 22, 2023, President Biden signed into law the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act (FEPA) as part of the fiscal year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act. FEPA criminalizes demand-side bribery by foreign officials — the demand or acceptance of a bribe from a U.S. citizen, company or issuer, or anyone located within the territory of the U.S., when made to obtain or retain business. Specifically, the law’s prohibitions extend to any of the following conduct by a foreign official: “to corruptly demand, seek, receive, accept, or agree to receive or accept, directly or indirectly, anything of value personally or for any other person or nongovernmental entity, by making use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce … ”Prior to FEPA, neither the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) nor the U.S. domestic bribery regime penalized corrupt demands by foreign officials upon U.S. persons, instead criminalizing offers of bribes to foreign officials. The Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951) — which prohibits payments induced “under color of official right” that affect foreign commerce — theoretically offers a potential vehicle for penalizing demand-side bribery by foreign officials. However, DOJ has not traditionally applied the Hobbs Act to the conduct of foreign officials.The newly enacted law modifies domestic bribery statutes codified under 18 U.S.C. § 201 and, as such, does not modify or infringe upon the ambit of the FCPA. FEPA explicitly states that it does not criminalize conduct that would violate Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Sections 104 or 104A of the FCPA, “whether pursuant to a theory of direct liability, conspiracy, complicity, or otherwise.” Still, FEPA mimics some key elements of the FCPA’s prohibitions against foreign corruption:FEPA’s jurisdictional scope is, like the FCPA’s, broad: FEPA criminalizes corrupt demands by foreign officials if made of a U.S. issuer, a U.S. domestic concern or any person in the territory of the Unit

uld damage Nike’s market capitalization if he went public with the scandal. Specifically, he asked Nike’s counsel (presumably rhetorically): “Have you ever held the balls of the client in your hand where you can take 5, 6 billion dollars in market cap off of ‘em?”During these negotiations, Avenatti tweeted a mysterious reference to a separate youth basketball scandal involving Adidas. Seeing this, Franklin suspected it did not augur well for the outcome of negotiations. Nor was he relieved a few days later when FBI agents arrived at his house. Franklin called Avenatti, who began arranging to go public about the scandal and tweeted that the next day he would hold a press conference to disclose a major Nike scandal. That same day, Avenatti was arrested.Following a three-week trial in the Southern District, Avenatti was convicted on all counts: transmitting extortionate communications in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(d), attempted Hobbs Act extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and honest-services wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346. He was ordered to serve 30 months in prison and to pay restitution to Nike.On appeal, Avenatti challenged (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each count of conviction, (2) the trial court’s failure to issue his requested jury instruction on honest-services fraud, and (3) the legality of the restitution order. The panel rejected all three arguments.Sufficiency of the EvidenceAvenatti argued that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find him guilty. In particular, he claimed that the government had failed to prove the “wrongfulness” element of his extortion crimes and the mens rea and bribery elements of his honest-services fraud crimes. Sufficiency claims face a demanding legal standard—the evidence is sufficient if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the claim. Here, the panel concluded that this standard was met.Wrongfulness Element of Extortion.To succeed

Justice Breyer invoked the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause to negate Washington State’s enactment of a workers’ compensation law that applied only to certain workers at the otherwise well-known Hanford federal nuclear reactor facility in the state who were engaged in the performance of work, either directly or indirectly, for the United States. In holding that the state law violated the Supremacy Clause, the Court relied upon the fact itfacially discriminates against the federal government and its contractors because it does not clearly and unambiguously waive the federal government’s immunity from discriminatory state workers’ compensation laws.United States v. Tayloris a case in which a participant in an unsuccessful robbery was convicted of violating the Hobbs Act, 18 U. S. C. §1951(a), which makes it a federal crime to commit, attempt to commit, or conspire to commit a robbery with an interstate component. Holding for the defendant, the Court opined that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the statute because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force.

Section 1961(1) defines the phrase to include any crime listed in subdivisions A, B, C, D, E, F, or G of section 1961(1).Among other things, “racketeering activities” include “any act which is indictable under” a list of federal criminal statutes. The list covers an expansive range of violations, for example, violations of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (extortion); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (mail fraud) and 1343 (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (economic espionage); 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (theft of trade secrets); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Travel Act); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (money laundering); and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2318-2320 (copyright infringement).Mail and wire fraud are the most common predicate acts.Notably, there must be some nexus to interstate or foreign commerce—it is a jurisdictional element of a civil RICO claim. Thus, predicate acts will often occur in several States.Who is a RICO “Person”?A RICO person “includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property.”