76 Accordingly, the alleged termination of Glass could not have occurred in retaliation for his contacting investigators. To remedy this chronological defect, Plaintiffs allege that 18 U.S.C. § 1513 is otherwise satisfied because, “[i]n direct response to Mr. Glass’s cooperation with federal authorities, Defendants conspired to prevent Mr. Glass from obtaining employment in the oil & gas industry by blackballing and disparaging Mr. Greene to other potential employers in the Gulf of Mexico.” 77 Yet, no facts are alleged to support this conclusory allegation, and it fails.

ECF 1, ¶¶ 140-142; 137-139; 142.  Plaintiff fails to state a claim for retaliation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513 because Plaintiff alleges no facts as to what injury was allegedly caused to each of the scientists and experts who testified in official proceedings regarding carbon dioxide by defendants, when the injuries allegedly occurred, the official proceedings the individuals allegedly testified in, or how the alleged retaliation was linked to the defendants. ECF 1, ¶¶ 91-97; Ezike v. Mittal, No. 08-cv-1867, 2009 WL 506867, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27 2009) (predicate acts of retaliation could not support RICO claim where “there [was] no factual connection between the [defendant] and [the] retaliation).

15–16. b. Obstruction of Justice, Witness Intimidation, and Witness Tampering Kimberlin attempts unsuccessfully to resuscitate his allegations of obstruction (18 U.S.C. § 1503(a)), intimidation (18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)), and retaliation (18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) and (e)) in 5 Kimberlin incorrectly argues that the alleged data on the disk included information about him. Pl.

Indeed, there is a federal statute that explicitly criminalizes retaliation against victims and witnesses. While 18 USC § 1512 has criminalized tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant much as New 19 | P a g e York has done, 18 USC § 1513 has explicitly criminalized retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant who has already testified. In amicus’ view, the very real possibility of retaliation even after a case has concluded makes apparent the reasons why FOIL should not and cannot apply to prosecution files in the possession of the district attorney.

at 28–29.] The only predicate act allegations that Mr. Kimberlin tries to rehabilitate are his allegations of obstruction (18 U.S.C. § 1503(a)), intimidation (18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)), and retaliation (18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)) against him due to his purported involvement in a criminal case against Donald Blankenship, the former CEO of Massey Energy Company. Inconsistently, Mr. Kimberlin claims both that the Chamber “deter[red] him from cooperating with a federal grand jury” and then “retaliated against him for cooperating with a federal grand jury and investigation.”

In any event, these are not properly pled as predicate acts in the RICO count, but, even if they had been, they also do not apply to extraterritorial conduct under the circumstances alleged here. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f) (money laundering applies to extraterritorial conduct by U.S. citizen involving more than $10,000; no money laundering of any amount alleged); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512, 1513 (reaching extraterritorial conduct if the matters involve a U.S. court or agency; no involvement of a U.S. court or agency alleged). Case 1:14-cv-07349-AJN Document 65 Filed 03/31/15 Page 30 of 49 23 Petroleos Mexicanos v. SK Engineering & Construction Co., 572 F. App’x 60, 61 (2d Cir. 2014) is instructive. In that case, the plaintiff alleged that defendants bribed Mexican officials and that the bribes constituted wire and mail fraud predicate acts under RICO.

For example, Section 1107 of the Act which provides for criminal penalties for retaliating against a person who provides truthful information to a law enforcement officer, explicitly states that “[t]here is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section.” 18 U.S.C. §1513(d) (2005) (emphasis added). This explicit mandate for extraterritorial jurisdiction is in sharp contrast with the silence of Section 806.

Neither the text of ECPA nor its legislative history gives any indication that Congress intended the statute to apply extraterritorially. ECPA contains no extraterritorial provision, cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(d) (statute prohibiting retaliating against a witnesses: “There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section.”), and ECPA’s legislative history explicitly states the Act’s definition of “wire communication,” applicable under both § 2702 and § 2511, “is not meant to suggest that the Electronic Communications Privacy Act applies to interceptions made outside the territorial United States.”

.’” Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 673 (7th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Nemariam v. (2013) (taxation of federal credit unions); 12 U.S.C. § 2290(a) (2013)(taxation of Federal Financing Bank); 15 U.S.C. § 78kkk(e) (2013)(taxation of SIPC); 15 U.S.C. § 381(a)(1) (2013)(property subject to income tax); 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (2013)(defining consumer product); 15 U.S.C. § 6611(a)(2) (2013)(relating to tort damages in Y2K actions); 18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) (2013)(criminalizing causing damage or threatening damage to “tangible property of another person” for the purpose of preventing testimony of a witness at an “official proceeding”); 19 U.S.C. § 81o(e) (2013)(relating to ad valorem taxation); 22 U.S.C. § 2697(d) (2013)(relating to acceptance of gifts on behalf of the United States); 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(5)(D) (2013)(relating to energy tax credit); 26 U.S.C. § 48C(c)(2) (2013)(relating to energy project tax credit); 26 U.S.C. § 110(c)(3) (2013)(relating to construction allowances); 26 U.S.C. § 144(a)(12)(C) (2013)(relating to tax exemption for qualified bonds); 26 U.S.C. § 168 (2013)(relating to depreciation of property); 26 U.S.C. § 170(a)(3) (2013)(relating to charitable deductions); 26 U.S.C. § 199(c)(5) (2013)(relating to calculation of income); 26 U.S.C. § 263A(b)(1) (2013)(relating to capitalization of certain expenses); 26 U.S.C. § 274(j)(3) (2013)(relating to employee achievement awards); 26 U.S.C. § 408(m)(2)(F) (2013)(

S § 1084] (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 [18 USCS § 1341] (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 [18 USCS § 1343] (relating to wire fraud), section 1344 [18 USCS § 1344] (relating to financial institution fraud), section 1425 [18 USCS § 1425] (relating to the procurement of citizenship or nationalization unlawfully), section 1426 [18 USCS § 1426] (relating to the reproduction of naturalization or citizenship papers), section 1427 [18 USCS § 1427] (relating to the sale of naturalization or citizenship papers), sections 1461-1465 [18 USCS §§ 1461 through 1465] (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 [18 USCS § 1503] (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 [18 USCS § 1510] (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 [18 USCS § 1511] (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1512 [18 USCS § 1512] (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1513 [18 USCS § 1513] (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1542 [18 USCS § 1542] (relating to false statement in application and use of passport), section 1543 [18 USCS § 1543] (relating to forgery or false use of passport), section 1544 [18 USCS § 1544] (relating to misuse of passport), section 1546 [18 USCS § 1546] (relating to fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents), sections 1581-1592 [18 USCS §§ 1581-1592] (relating to peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons)[.], section 1951 [18 USCS § 1951] (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 [18 USCS § 1952] (relating to racketeering), section 1953 [18 USCS § 1953] (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 [18 USCS § 1954] (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 [18 USCS § 1955] (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section 1956 [18 USCS § 1956] (relating to the launderin