rovide reasonable assurances that ... access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's general or specific authorization.” Id. at *49. That language, the court explained, plainly applies to a company’s internal accounting control, not controls more generally. Id. The court also found that the history and purpose of the statute were consistent with this narrow definition of accounting principles. Id. at *51.The court’s analysis thus emphasized that in construing the reach of the statute, the context about the harm that the statute was seeking to address was important. This is similar to the Supreme Court’s approach in June when they addressed the scope of the statute enacted following the destruction of records during the government’s investigation into the Enron accounting scandal in the wake of Enron that criminalized the obstruction of a “official proceeding.” In Fischer v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2176 (June 28, 2024), the court ruled that to violate the statute (18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2)), the government had to show that a defendant impaired the availability or integrity of documents or records, and the government could not use it to prosecute the January 6 Capitol rioters whose violence obstructed a congressional proceeding. Id. at 2190. Taken together, these two decisions should serve to restrain white-collar government enforcers’ aggressive attempts to expand internal controls and similar statutes into novel areas that were not contemplated when the statutes and rules were enacted.Disclosure Controls. The SolarWinds court found that the SEC failed to plead that SolarWinds’ disclosure controls violated Exchange Act Rule 13a-15(a), which requires companies to “maintain disclosure controls and procedures.” The SEC’s allegations admitted that SolarWinds had a sufficient system of disclosure controls in place to ensure that material cybersecurity information was communicated to executives responsible for public disclosures. However, SEC brought a disclosure control clai

ls; (5) DOJ’s interpretation would interfere with the right of state and local governments to regulate the acceptance of gratuities by their officials; and (6) DOJ’s interpretation would not provide state and local officials clear notice in advance of the application of Section 666 to situations involving gratuities. Justice Kavanaugh rejected DOJ’s assurances that prosecutors could be trusted not to enforce the statute against small-time violators.In dissenting, Justices Ketanji Brown, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan wrote that the plain text of the statute clearly applies to gratuities paid to state and local officials after they have acted. Justice Ketanji Brown claimed the law can only apply to those officials who “corruptly” receive gratuities for after taking various acts.Fischer v. United States: ObstructionIn another 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court threw out a criminal charge against a January 6, 2021 rioter for obstruction of an official proceeding and ruled that the statute, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2) only applies to evidence tampering, such as destruction of records or documents, in official proceedings. DOJ had used the statute, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2), to apply to all forms of corrupt obstruction of an official proceeding, in this case, Congress’ certification of the electoral votes.Section 1512(c)(2) makes it a crime to “otherwise obstruct[], influence[], or impede[] any official proceeding.” Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, ruled that the narrow interpretation of 1512(c)(2) was mandated in view of the language of the preceding subparagraph in Section 1512(c)(1) which provides several specific examples of evidence tampering that the law prohibits – such as altering a record and concealing a document. When subsection (c)(2) immediately follows those examples, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned, “the most sensible inference” is that the scope of (c)(2) is limited by the examples in (c)(1). Indeed, he noted, if subsection (c)(2) swept as broadly as DOJ suggested Congress

ry trial “in suits at common law” because the antifraud provision being enforced replicated common law fraud, which would require a jury trial. The Supreme Court also examined whether the “public rights” exception applied, which would allow Congress to grant agencies the power to adjudicate certain issues without a jury trial. The Court held the exception does not apply in this case because the action brought was akin to common law fraud and, therefore, involves matters of private, and not public rights. The Opinion emphasized that civil penalties, being punitive in nature and replicative of common law actions, must be decided by a jury, thus upholding the Seventh Amendment rights of the accused.Moreover, in two other criminal appeals, the Supreme Court severely limited circumstances in which the government may bring bribery and obstruction of justice charges. First, in Snyder v. United States, the Supreme Court held that criminal charges for obstruction of justice brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) only applies to defendants who intended to or actually tampered with physical documents or records used in an official proceeding. The case was one of the hundreds of criminal cases brought by the federal government stemming from the events of January 6, 2021, where the government alleged that some defendants obstructed the official proceeding of certifying election results. However, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of conduct that would violate the law and limited the statue’s “catchall provision” to more closely track the intent of Congress, which was to avoid another Enron-type scandal. Thus, prosecutors must now show that those charged under the statute at least had a motivation to tamper with documents or records related to an official proceeding.Finally, in James E. Snyder v. United States, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split as to whether 18 U.S.C. § 666, which criminalizes the act of bribery by state and local officials, also criminalizes state and local officials a

tance of their criminal laws.” While Justice Thomas, concurring, contends that Robinson itself was wrongly decided, Justice Sotomayor, for the dissenters, writes that the Court is indeed authorizing the punishment of the homeless based upon their involuntary status.Fischer v. United States will surprise some observers, who will find it anomalous that liberal Justice Jackson joined with the conservative majority while conservative Justice Barrett joined with the two remaining liberals in dissent. As for me, I regret that the Court did not accept the view of the amici group, of which I was a member.The case concerns the January 6, 2021, riot at the U.S. Capitol. Fischer was convicted of violating a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that imposes criminal liability on anyone who corruptly “alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.” 18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(1). The next subsection, (c)(2), extends that prohibition to anyone who “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so.” The Court’s majority, per the Chief Justice, applies a rigid textual analysis that leads it to conclude that the “otherwise” clause limits proof of the offense that requires the defendant to “have taken some action with respect to a document, record, or other object.” The defendant, who engaged in a variety of riotous acts, didn’t “impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding.” Considering both surrounding words and overall context, the Court’s majority engages in a lengthy and detailed textual and grammatical analysis, concluding that Fischer’s conduct, which wasn’t literally any of the acts stated, nor consistent with similar acts closely enough to be synonymous with them, failed to satisfy the definition of “otherwise.”Justice Barrett, applying similar

837 (1984), courts generally deferred to federal agencies’ “permissible” interpretations of ambiguous federal statutes that the agency administered. In the decades since its announcement, the Chevron doctrine has been clarified, modified, and narrowed by subsequent cases. Both Loper Bright and Relentless asked the Court to consider directly whether Chevron should be overruled. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court expressly overruled Chevron, holding that Article III and the Administrative Procedure Act require federal courts to exercise independent judgment to decide whether an agency’s actions are allowed under a statute. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch each authored concurring opinions. Justice Kagan dissented and was joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson (only for Relentless; Justice Jackson did not participate in Loper Bright).View the Court's decisions.Fischer v. United States, No. 23-5572: This case concerns the scope of the residual “otherwise” clause in 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), which imposes criminal liability on anyone who “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so.” Joseph Fischer was charged under Section 1512(c)(2) for his activities in the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Fischer moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that Section 1512(c)(2) is limited in scope by Section 1512(c)(1), which requires the defendant to “have taken some action with respect to a document, record, or other object.” The district court granted the motion in relevant part, and a divided D.C. Circuit panel reversed. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court vacated the D.C. Circuit’s judgment, holding that to prove a violation of Section 1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant “impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or … other things used in the proceeding, or attempted to do so.” Considering the “otherwise” clause’s link to the

Update: United States v. RobertsonThe previous post noted that many of the January 6 rioters have been charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), which states: “[w]hoever corruptly . . . obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . .” The theory is that the January 6 rioters sought to obstruct Congress’s certification of the 2020 election results.Former President Donald Trump has also been charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), and, since the original post, has moved to dismiss on the ground that he did not act “corruptly.” Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 114, United States v. Trump, No. 23-cr-00257 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2023). As the previous posted noted, courts’ interpretations of the term “corruptly” will have relevance for white collar defendants in other contexts. Not only does § 1512(c)(2) itself often serve as a basis for more routine white collar prosecutions, there are also plenty of other white collar criminal statutes that employ the “corruptly” mens rea, such as statutes criminalizing corruptly obstructing a regulatory examination of a

(b). The question presented is: Whether the proceeds of a life-insurance policy taken out by a closely held corporation on a shareholder in order to facilitate the redemption of the shareholder’s stock should be considered a corporate asset when calculating the value of the shareholder’s shares for purposes of the federal estate tax.Snyder v. United States, No. 23-108: This case concerns the interpretation of a federal public corruption statute, 18 U.S.C. §666, which makes it a crime for state and local officials to corruptly solicit, demand, or accept anything of value in order to be “influenced or rewarded in connection with” government business “involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more.” The question presented is: Whether section 666 criminalizes gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions the official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions.Fischer v. United States, No. 23-5572: This case involves the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1512, which generally prohibits witness and evidence tampering.One subdivision of this statute provides that a person commits a crime if the person “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). The federal government has charged many individuals involved in the January 6 incident with violating this provision. The question presented is: Whether Section 1512(c) prohibits obstruction of acts unrelated to investigations and evidence.Thornell v. Jones, No. 23-982: This is a death penalty case involving an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The district court denied habeas relief following an evidentiary hearing on Danny Lee Jones’s ineffective-assistance-of-sentencing-counsel claims. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court. The petitioner contends that the Ninth Circuit made its own findings without reviewing the district court’s findi

Many of the rioters have been charged with (and convicted of) violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2): “[w]hoever corruptly . . . obstructs influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . .” The theory is that the January 6 rioters sought to obstruct Congress’s certification of the 2020 election results. The federal courts in D.C. have spent the last two years adjudicating defendants’ challenges to various elements of this statute. Among the issues courts have had to face are defendant arguments that they did not act with the requisite “corrupt” mens rea and that “corruptly” is unconstitutionally vague. And litigation around the meaning of “corruptly” shows no signs of letting up: in Count Three of his January 6-related federal indictment, Donald Trump stands charged with corruptly obstructing the electoral vote certification in violation of § 1512(c)(2). Indictment, United States v. Donald J. Trump, No. 23-cr-00257 (D.D.C. Aug.1, 2023). As discussed below, January 6 cases have exposed a significant lack of clarity around

First – let’s start with some background definitions. Witness tampering is attempting to improperly influence, intimidate, or impede a witness’s testimony or cooperation in criminal proceedings codified in US Federal law at 18 USC § 1512, with every state carrying corresponding laws on the books. In short, the law says you are guilty of the crime of witness tampering if you:1. Kill or attempt to kill another person with the intent to prevent their testimony. 2. Use intimidation, threats, or corrupt persuasion, to hinder, delay, or prevent testimony. 3. Engage in misleading conduct toward another person with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent testimony.Witness tampering is so bad, not merely for the act itself, but the effect that allowing this behavior would have on our entire judicial system. The Pennsylvania Benchbook for Judges (Third Edition) has a particularly poignant quote from Judge Renee Cardwell Hughes, who wrote:“Justice requires a search for truth in an environment that respects the rights of all parties to the system. Truth cannot be spoken in fear. Witness intimidation strikes at the very heart of our system of criminal justice, crippling our ability to function fairly, decently and with integrity…

It refers back to prior Information To Be Disclosed by the Provider Section II, and states.All information described above in Section II.10.a. that constitutes evidence, contraband, fruits, or instrumentalities of violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act , 22 U.S.C. 611, et seq., restrictions on former officers of the Executive Branch, 18 U.S.C. 207(f), obstruction of justice , 18 U.S.C. 1512(c), aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. 2(a), and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, namely:i. Information relating to who created, accessed, or used the SUBJECT ACCOUNT, including records about their identities and whereabouts.ii.