Many of the rioters have been charged with (and convicted of) violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2): “[w]hoever corruptly . . . obstructs influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . .” The theory is that the January 6 rioters sought to obstruct Congress’s certification of the 2020 election results. The federal courts in D.C. have spent the last two years adjudicating defendants’ challenges to various elements of this statute. Among the issues courts have had to face are defendant arguments that they did not act with the requisite “corrupt” mens rea and that “corruptly” is unconstitutionally vague. And litigation around the meaning of “corruptly” shows no signs of letting up: in Count Three of his January 6-related federal indictment, Donald Trump stands charged with corruptly obstructing the electoral vote certification in violation of § 1512(c)(2). Indictment, United States v. Donald J. Trump, No. 23-cr-00257 (D.D.C. Aug.1, 2023). As discussed below, January 6 cases have exposed a significant lack of clarity around

Any endeavor done with the requisite intent violates the statute. U.S. v. Mitchell, 877 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1989).IV. OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM AND WITNESS PROTECTION ACT UNDER 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1512.Lawyers who are interviewing and preparing witnesses during internal corporate investigations must thoroughly understand the breadth of 18 U.S.C. § 1512. This statute was enacted in 1982 as part of the Victim and Witness Protection Act and represents a congressional intent to criminalize any tampering with potential witnesses in official proceedings.A. No Need to Show That a Judicial Proceeding is Pending.

837 (1984), courts generally deferred to federal agencies’ “permissible” interpretations of ambiguous federal statutes that the agency administered. In the decades since its announcement, the Chevron doctrine has been clarified, modified, and narrowed by subsequent cases. Both Loper Bright and Relentless asked the Court to consider directly whether Chevron should be overruled. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court expressly overruled Chevron, holding that Article III and the Administrative Procedure Act require federal courts to exercise independent judgment to decide whether an agency’s actions are allowed under a statute. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch each authored concurring opinions. Justice Kagan dissented and was joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson (only for Relentless; Justice Jackson did not participate in Loper Bright).View the Court's decisions.Fischer v. United States, No. 23-5572: This case concerns the scope of the residual “otherwise” clause in 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), which imposes criminal liability on anyone who “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so.” Joseph Fischer was charged under Section 1512(c)(2) for his activities in the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. Fischer moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that Section 1512(c)(2) is limited in scope by Section 1512(c)(1), which requires the defendant to “have taken some action with respect to a document, record, or other object.” The district court granted the motion in relevant part, and a divided D.C. Circuit panel reversed. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court vacated the D.C. Circuit’s judgment, holding that to prove a violation of Section 1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant “impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or … other things used in the proceeding, or attempted to do so.” Considering the “otherwise” clause’s link to the

Update: United States v. RobertsonThe previous post noted that many of the January 6 rioters have been charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), which states: “[w]hoever corruptly . . . obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . .” The theory is that the January 6 rioters sought to obstruct Congress’s certification of the 2020 election results.Former President Donald Trump has also been charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), and, since the original post, has moved to dismiss on the ground that he did not act “corruptly.” Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 114, United States v. Trump, No. 23-cr-00257 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2023). As the previous posted noted, courts’ interpretations of the term “corruptly” will have relevance for white collar defendants in other contexts. Not only does § 1512(c)(2) itself often serve as a basis for more routine white collar prosecutions, there are also plenty of other white collar criminal statutes that employ the “corruptly” mens rea, such as statutes criminalizing corruptly obstructing a regulatory examination of a

Arthur Andersen was one of the many casualties of the collapse of Enron Corporation. In 2002, a jury found the once well respected firm guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(2)(A) and (B). These sections make it a crime to “knowingly use intimidation or physical force, threaten, or corruptly persuade another person . . . with intent to . . . cause” that person to “withhold” documents from, or “alter” documents for use in, an “official proceeding.”

ls; (5) DOJ’s interpretation would interfere with the right of state and local governments to regulate the acceptance of gratuities by their officials; and (6) DOJ’s interpretation would not provide state and local officials clear notice in advance of the application of Section 666 to situations involving gratuities. Justice Kavanaugh rejected DOJ’s assurances that prosecutors could be trusted not to enforce the statute against small-time violators.In dissenting, Justices Ketanji Brown, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan wrote that the plain text of the statute clearly applies to gratuities paid to state and local officials after they have acted. Justice Ketanji Brown claimed the law can only apply to those officials who “corruptly” receive gratuities for after taking various acts.Fischer v. United States: ObstructionIn another 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court threw out a criminal charge against a January 6, 2021 rioter for obstruction of an official proceeding and ruled that the statute, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2) only applies to evidence tampering, such as destruction of records or documents, in official proceedings. DOJ had used the statute, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2), to apply to all forms of corrupt obstruction of an official proceeding, in this case, Congress’ certification of the electoral votes.Section 1512(c)(2) makes it a crime to “otherwise obstruct[], influence[], or impede[] any official proceeding.” Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, ruled that the narrow interpretation of 1512(c)(2) was mandated in view of the language of the preceding subparagraph in Section 1512(c)(1) which provides several specific examples of evidence tampering that the law prohibits – such as altering a record and concealing a document. When subsection (c)(2) immediately follows those examples, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned, “the most sensible inference” is that the scope of (c)(2) is limited by the examples in (c)(1). Indeed, he noted, if subsection (c)(2) swept as broadly as DOJ suggested Congress

(b). The question presented is: Whether the proceeds of a life-insurance policy taken out by a closely held corporation on a shareholder in order to facilitate the redemption of the shareholder’s stock should be considered a corporate asset when calculating the value of the shareholder’s shares for purposes of the federal estate tax.Snyder v. United States, No. 23-108: This case concerns the interpretation of a federal public corruption statute, 18 U.S.C. §666, which makes it a crime for state and local officials to corruptly solicit, demand, or accept anything of value in order to be “influenced or rewarded in connection with” government business “involving any thing of value of $5,000 or more.” The question presented is: Whether section 666 criminalizes gratuities, i.e., payments in recognition of actions the official has already taken or committed to take, without any quid pro quo agreement to take those actions.Fischer v. United States, No. 23-5572: This case involves the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1512, which generally prohibits witness and evidence tampering.One subdivision of this statute provides that a person commits a crime if the person “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). The federal government has charged many individuals involved in the January 6 incident with violating this provision. The question presented is: Whether Section 1512(c) prohibits obstruction of acts unrelated to investigations and evidence.Thornell v. Jones, No. 23-982: This is a death penalty case involving an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The district court denied habeas relief following an evidentiary hearing on Danny Lee Jones’s ineffective-assistance-of-sentencing-counsel claims. A Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court. The petitioner contends that the Ninth Circuit made its own findings without reviewing the district court’s findi

The proof at trial demonstrated a money-laundering scheme which had no connection whatsoever to the payment of any income taxes. Reversible error.United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706 (4th Cir. 1994)The defendant was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §1512(b)(1), witness tampering. In instructing the jury, however, the trial court included within its definition of §1512(b)(1), the offense described in §1512(b)(3), which describes an entirely separate offense of hindering or preventing another from reporting a federal offense.

While detained in Egypt, Pugh attempted to destroy or destroyed some of the electronic devices he had in his possession, which were later determined to contain information relating to ISIS. Pugh was ultimately convicted of attempting to support a foreign terrorist organization, see 18 U.S.C. §2339B(a)(1), and obstruction and attempted obstruction of an official proceeding, see 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) and (c)(2). He was sentenced to the maximum sentence on each count, to run consecutively, which amounted to a total effective sentence of 420 months.

This was reversible error, not subject to harmless error analysis.United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d 909 (3rd Cir. 1996)The defendant was charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. §1512(a)(1)(C), attempting to kill a witness to prevent him from communicating with a federal law enforcement officer about a federal offense, but the jury was instructed pursuant to §1512(b)(3): intimidating, or using physical force, to prevent a person from communicating with a federal law enforcement officer about a federal offense. This was not what the defendant was charged with, or tried for, and thus, the conviction was reversed.