C. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Plead Predicate Acts Upon Which RICO Claims Can Be Based 1. Plaintiffs’ Reliance on An Allegation of Obstruction of Justice Under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 to Support Their RICO Claims Fails Plaintiffs’ allegation that Defendants obstructed justice and therefore violated 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (section 1503) by influencing the outcome of Assembly and Senate hearings and by committing “perjury” of their oaths of office, cannot stand as a basis for claims under RICO under the facts alleged by Plaintiffs. In referring to “obstruction of justice,” section 1503 is not, as Plaintiffs appear to believe, tied to their concept of “justice.”

E.g. Intersimone v. Bell, 1980 WL 2237, *9 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (“Plaintiff also cites 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 245(b), 1503 and 1504 but these are criminal statutes, none of which creates a private civil cause of action.”); Shaw v. Neece, 727 F.2d 947, 949 (10th Cir.1984) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1503 does not create a private cause of action under § 1983); Burke v. Patchen WL 2783490, *1 -2 (D.Conn. 2008) (“Here, there is no evidence that Congress intended there to be a private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 . . . Therefore, Mr. Burke’s § 1983 claim, insofar as it is based on a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, must fail.”).

These misrepresentations furthered the fraudulent scheme by hiding the fact that the testimony on which it was based was purchased, and prevented Drummond from being able to uncover the evidence it needed to dispel the false allegations of Enterprise’s paid witnesses. These misrepresentations therefore constitute mail and wire fraud (in addition to obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503). Defendants’ matter-of-fact contention that “acts of concealment” cannot “be considered ‘predicate acts’ under Eleventh Circuit law” is simply wrong.

Plaintiffsdo not allege, because they cannot, that Defendant Pickard interfered in any way with ajudicial proceeding pending in any federal court. Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendant Pickardviolated Section 1503(a) fails. 4. Plaintiffs do not allege any bribery of a federal official in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201.Finally

The rule of lenity therefore requires that any ambiguity concerning the meaning of “proceeding” must be resolved in the defendant’s favor. United States v. Millis, 621 F.3d 914, 916-17 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he rule of lenity requires 16 In Reeves, the Fifth Circuit distinguished between obstruction statutes that protect grand juries and courts (such as 18 U.S.C. § 1503), where any obstruction is “per se unlawful and is tantamount to doing the act corruptly” (id. at 999), and those that protect broader processes such as administration of the tax laws, where an impeding action may be “bad” or “improper” in a general sense, but may not be “corrupt” in the sense of interfering with the fair collection of taxes (id.

United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 78-79 (3d Cir. 2008). Ultimately, there is simply no legal authority for the proposition that “truthful but evasive” statements constitute obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503. D.

1. Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002); and • Plaintiff’s sixteenth claim for fraudulent concealment is subject to a three-year statute of limitations, as provided by California Code of Civil Procedure § 338(d).5 Plaintiff’s seventh claim for “obstruction of due administration of justice” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1503 does not have a civil statute of limitations because § 5 Plaintiff has not named any of the Ameriprise Defendants as parties to the fourteenth claim for Professional Legal Malpractice: Fraud or the fifteenth claim for Under Color of Authority. No twelfth claim is asserted in the body of the FAC.

15–16. b. Obstruction of Justice, Witness Intimidation, and Witness Tampering Kimberlin attempts unsuccessfully to resuscitate his allegations of obstruction (18 U.S.C. § 1503(a)), intimidation (18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)), and retaliation (18 U.S.C. § 1513(b) and (e)) in 5 Kimberlin incorrectly argues that the alleged data on the disk included information about him. Pl.

at 28–29.] The only predicate act allegations that Mr. Kimberlin tries to rehabilitate are his allegations of obstruction (18 U.S.C. § 1503(a)), intimidation (18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)), and retaliation (18 U.S.C. § 1513(b)) against him due to his purported involvement in a criminal case against Donald Blankenship, the former CEO of Massey Energy Company. Inconsistently, Mr. Kimberlin claims both that the Chamber “deter[red] him from cooperating with a federal grand jury” and then “retaliated against him for cooperating with a federal grand jury and investigation.”

This means that 4 lawyers successfully endeavored to corruptly influence Judge Jeremy Fogel, and 5 lawyers are currently endeavoring to corruptly influence the Honorable Lucy H. Koh, by the knowingly false claim that the late Irene Rupert was the Successor Trustee of the Samuel Rupert Trust, after he died. These corrupt endeavors to influence the proceedings before United States District Court Judges amount to the Obstruction of Justice, under the RICO statutes, pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 1503 and/or 18 U.S.C. § 1505, it is submitted, by 4 culpable California lawyers 9 (defendant Zusman, and current non-parties Kevin K. Eng, Jessica MacGregor and Kate G. 9 The Plaintiff does not yet consider California lawyer Daniel Krieg to be as culpable as the other 4 California lawyers, considering his late entry into this litigation, so he is only listed as a non-party co-conspirator in the SA&SC. Permission to add him as an additional RICO Defendant is not sought, based upon information presently known by Plaintiff.