And, the annual certifications themselves, which the United 32 See Comm’r v. Lundy, 516 U. S. 235, 250 (1996) (“The interrelationship and close proximity of these provisions of the statute „presents a classic case for application of the normal rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.‟” (quoting Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990))). Case 1:12-cv-07527-JMF Document 31 Filed 02/22/13 Page 23 of 26 18 States also references as “statements” for § 1014 purposes (Opp. at 55), are barred by the U.S. Release. As such, this FIRREA theory fails.

Nevertheless, the parties at Mandanici's trial and Judge Zampano apparently believed that materiality was an element under § 1014, and Judge Zampano charged the jury to that effect with respect to count four. In 1997, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split on this issue, holding that materiality is not an element under § 1014. See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 484, 137 L. Ed. 2d 107, 117 S. Ct. 921 (1997)

Case 3:13-cv-00446-MOC-DSC Document 29 Filed 12/23/13 Page 17 of 35 10 statute unnecessary. 266 F.3d at 580 (“[W]e determine that had Congress intended 18 U.S.C. § 1014 to only apply to applications seeking to establish a debtor/creditor relationship it would have used such terms and not used the word ‘any’ in the statute.”).13 Although the Fourth Circuit has not addressed the question directly, in United States v. Smith, 29 F.3d 914, 917 (4th Cir. 1994), it held that § 1014 should be read literally because “we can add nothing that will assist in understanding the meaning of the statute.”

That in advancing, furthering, or carrying out the scheme, the defendant transmitted any writing, signal, or sound by means of a wire, radio, or television communication in interstate commerce or caused the transmission of any writing, signal, or sound of some kind by means of a wire, radio, or television communication in interstate commerce. Counts Three and Four - 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (false statement to a bank) 1. The defendant knowingly made or caused to be made a false statement or report to a bank; 2.

The United States cannot predicate a FIRREA claim against Wells Fargo based on ―Paragraph Four‖ of § 1005. B. The AC-1 Fails to State a FIRREA Claim Based on 18 U.S.C. § 1014 The United States next alleges that Wells Fargo violated § 1014, which penalizes ―[w]hoever makes any false statement or report … for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of the Federal Housing Administration ….‖ In its initial Motion to Dismiss, Wells Fargo pointed out two defects in the United States‘ § 1014 claim: (1) the statute only applies to alleged false statements made after July 30, 2008; and (2) the United States failed to plead any such statements.

....................................................................................................................51 12 U.S.C. § 1708(c)(3)(E)(v).......................................................................................31, 38 12 U.S.C. § 1717z-21(c)(1) (2006)..............................................................................31, 38 12 U.S.C. § 1833a...................................................................................................... passim 15 U.S.C. § 645(a) .............................................................................................................60 18 U.S.C. § 1001..........................................................................................................50, 55 18 U.S.C. § 1005..............................................................................................50, 51, 52, 53 18 U.S.C. § 1007..........................................................................................................53, 60 18 U.S.C. § 1014..............................................................................................50, 54, 55, 60 18 U.S.C. § 1341....................................................................................................50, 53, 55 Case 1:12-cv-07527-JMF Document 30 Filed 02/13/13 Page 9 of 79 ix 18 U.S.C. § 1343....................................................................................................50, 53, 55 18 U.S.C. § 1344..........................................................................................................53, 61 18 U.S.C. § 3287..........................................................................................................46, 47 18 U.S.C. § 3293........................................................................................53, 56, 57, 59, 61 28 U.S.C. § 2415................................................................................................................65 28 U.S.C. § 2416....................................

Courts examining the same issue under similar statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (false statements) or 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (fraudulent loan transactions) have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Crisci, 273 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting a charge of duplicity where a Section 1001 count included seven charged statements); United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[T]he making of a number of false statements to a lending institutions in a single documents constitutes only one criminal violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1014.”); United States v. Sue, 586 F.2d 70, 71 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Czichray, 2002 WL 1763998 (D. Minn. Jul. 26, 2002) (JRT/FLN) (following Sue and stating, “If the relevant statute creates a single offense which can be committed in a variety of ways, the charge can be laid in a single count.”)

A warrant for King’s arrest was issued on November 27, 2006, and King was arrested on that warrant on January 10, 2007.2 On January 30, 2007, King was charged by Information with (count 1) theft of government property, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641; (count 2) loan fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014; (count 3) false representation of a social security number, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B); and (count 4) federal student financial aid fraud, in violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1097(a).3 Following King’s arrest, a new Plea Agreement was negotiated by the parties and that new Plea Agreement was first submitted to the Court on January 10, 2007, and was subsequently resubmitted to the Court (at the court’s direction) on February 6, 2007. The new Plea Agreement was a Rule 11(c)(1)(C), Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure agreement, meaning that, if accepted by the Court, its provisions would be binding on the court with respect to any sentence imposed upon King.

According to a mortgage fraud notice prepared jointly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Mortgage Bankers Association, submitting false mortgage assignments and forging signatures violates potentially eight federal criminal statutes. Specifically: (1) 18 U.S.C. §1001 - Statements or entries generally; (2) 18 U.S.C. §1010 - HUD and Federal Housing Administration transactions; (3) 18 U.S.C. §1014 - Loan and credit applications generally; (4) 18 U.S.C. § 1028 - Fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents; (5) 18 U.S.C. § 1341 - Frauds and swindles by mail; (6) 18 U.S.C. § 1342 - Fictitious name or address; (7) 18 U.S.C. § 1343- Fraud by wire; and (8) 18 U.S.C. § 1344 - Bank Fraud.

Williams v. U.S., 458 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1982). In Williams, the defendant was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1014, a statute which makes it a crime to knowingly make any false statement for the purpose of influencing the action of certain financial institutions. The conviction was obtained based on the fact that defendant had deposited checks that were not supported by sufficient funds.