In the short term, federal courts must now decide whether other federal laws that use the categorical approach are also void for vagueness. Those laws include: 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), as well as several Federal Sentencing Guidelines. (For an interesting argument that Johnson also render’s California’s second degree felony murder rule unconstitutional, see http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2674747)Johnson and Other Federal StatutesThere are several federal statutes that include language that is similar, but not identical to, the ACCA residual clause.

Merely accepting payment in the form of cocaine is not the same as sharing a purpose with the dealer to distribute cocaine. Reversible error.United States v. James, 468 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 2006) When the government files a motion pursuant to USSG 5K1.1 and 18 USC § 3553(e), the mandatory minimum sentence of 18 USC § 924(c) is eliminated.United States v. Ruiz, 462 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2006) The evidence was insufficient to link the defendant to any of the firearms found throughout the house where methamphetamine was being manufactured.

BackgroundIn October 1997, a federal jury in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York convicted Collier of attempted federal bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§2113, as well as several related counts. The jury also found Collier guilty of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1), which prohibits using or carrying a firearm during the commission of a “crime of violence.” Collier had been carrying a firearm with an obliterated serial number at the time of his arrest, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §922(k), which occurred while he was in his car on the way to the target bank.In May 2018, the district court sentenced Collier to 270 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised release.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is a federal criminal statute which prohibits either the use or carrying of a firearm “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.”Firearms are often seen as a necessary tool in the illegal drug business because drug deals frequently go bad. That was the case with Justus C. Rosemond.

In United States v. Barrett, No. 14-2541 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2019) (Winter, Raggi, Droney), the Second Circuit vacated a defendant’s conviction for using a firearm in connection with a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent decision striking down the residual clause of that statute in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). To understand the Second Circuit’s decision, a brief discussion of Section 924(c) and Davis is warranted.

The length of the sentence—which is to be imposed consecutively to the sentence imposed on the underlying crime—depends on whether the firearm was possessed (five years), brandished (seven years), or discharged (ten years). 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A).The McCoy panel was not the first to reach some of the Hobbs Act robbery questions.

U.S. v. Rentz, 2015 WL 430918 (2/3/2015) (en banc) (UT)(published) (slip opinion here): After Rentz fired a single gunshot that wounded one victim and killed another, he was charged with two crimes of violence—assault and murder—and two counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Rentz moved to dismiss the second § 924(c) count.

We often receive queries from the general public about the federal law governing these offenses, what constitutes the offense, and the penalties upon conviction. Federal statute 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (A) essentially prohibits the use of a firearm or any dangerous weapon during any crime of violence or drug trafficking offense. To support a conviction for the offense, the Government must prove that a defendant (1) committed a crime of violence or a drug trafficking offense; (2) knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) possessed the firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence or a drug trafficking offense.

set or afterward” and also held “that in handling such a motion, district courts should apply the rule generally governing voluntary dismissal of suits: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a).” Justice Thomas filed a solo dissent, noting, among other things, “substantial arguments that thequi tamdevice is inconsistent with Article II and that private relators may not represent the interests of the United States in litigation.” Justice Kavanaugh filed a very short concurrence (joined by Justice Barrett), joining the Court’s opinion in full but noting agreement with Justice Thomas that there are “substantial arguments that thequi tamdevice is inconsistent with Article II.”View the Court'sdecision.Lora v. United States, No. 22-49: This case addressed the extent of trial court judges’ discretion in imposing consecutive or concurrent prison sentences under federal criminal sentencing laws. Typically, judges have discretion on whether multiple prison sentences can be served concurrently, but 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) creates an exception that mandates consecutive prison terms for offenses under that statute. In this case, the trial court judge sentenced an offender to consecutive sentences after determining that offenses under § 924(j) are also governed by the § 924(c) exception. Today, in a 9-0 decision authored by Justice Jackson, the Court disagreed and vacated the consecutive sentences. The Court held that neither the text nor structure of the law incorporated § 924(c) into § 924(j), and accordingly federal trial courts retain discretion on whether to allow concurrent sentences under § 924(j).View the Court'sdecision.

In March 2016, U.S. District Court Judge Reed C. O’Connor sentenced Glover to 50 years and Davis to 41 years in federal prison. These stiff sentences were imposed under the provisions of Subsection (c) of 18 U. S. C. § 924, which increased the penalty above the statutory maximum punishment. In the wake of the Supreme Court ruling, the two men will be resentenced and are likely to receive significantly reduced sentences.