However, if the predicate conviction was from a state court, then the defendant may defend on the basis that, under that state’s law, he has had his civil rights restored, unless such restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not possess firearms. 18 U.S.C. §921(a)(20). In this case, the defendant’s right to possess firearms had been partially restored: he was allowed to possess rifles, but not handguns.

How?The Gun Control Act of 1968 (“GCA”) is a federal law that regulates the firearms industry and firearms owners. See 18 U.S.C. § 921, et seq. In creating the Maxim 50, SilencerCo relies on two seemingly nondescript (and oft overlooked) provisions of the GCA.

Matter of Mendez-Orellana, 25 I&N Dec. at 254-55. Section 237(a)(2)(C) explicitly relies on the definition of “firearm” located at 18 U.S.C. § 921(a). In turn, § 921(a)(3) states that the term “firearm” “does not include an antique firearm.”

That phrase is defined to include any misdemeanor committed against a domestic relation that necessarily involves the “use … of physical force.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). Resolving a question that United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1414 n.8 (2014), left unanswered, the Court, by a 5-to-2 vote, holds that misdemeanor assault convictions for reckless conduct (as contrasted to knowing or intentional conduct) trigger the statutory firearms ban.The Court relies on both the statutory text and the history of the statute to reach its conclusion.

Question presented:Does a misdemeanor crime with the mens rea of recklessness qualify as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” as defined under 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922(g)(9)?Lower court opinion: United States v. Voisine, 778 F.3d 176 (1st Cir. 2015); Docket; Scotusblog pageUnder 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922(g)(9), a person convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” is prohibited from possessing firearms. The question in this case is whether a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence may be a crime defined with a mental state of recklessness rather than intent.

Robert W. Evans, Jr., v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Justice, 2014 WI App 31; case activityA conviction for disorderly conduct under § 947.01 may qualify as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A), thus depriving the defendant of the right to possess a firearm.Evans’s application for a permit to carry a concealed weapon was denied after DOJ concluded his 2002 disorderly conduct conviction qualified as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”

The Supreme Court has resolved a issue relating to qualifying convictions for firearm possession prohibitions post-conviction. The federal Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. §921 et seq., has long prohibited possession of a firearm by any person convicted of a felony. In 1996, Congress extended the prohibition to include persons convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”

[10] This excludes crimes related to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).[11] This may happen when law enforcement brings an individual to a mental institution, or when a doctor petitions a court to keep a person in a mental institution against the wishes of that person.

tion brought under Section 1346(b) dismissing the claim on the ground that relief is precluded by one of the FTCA's exceptions to liability bars a subsequent action by the claimant against the federal employees whose acts gave rise to the claim.Husky Electronics v. Ritz (15-145), which asks whether the ‘actual fraud' bar to discharge under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code applies only when the debtor has made a false representation, or whether the bar also applies when the debtor has deliberately obtained money through a fraudulent-transfer scheme that was actually intended to cheat a creditor.Nichols v. United States (15-5238), which asks whether 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) requires a sex offender who resides in a foreign country to update his registration in the jurisdiction where he formerly resided.Voisine v. United States (14-10154), which asks (1) When a misdemeanor crime with the mens rea of recklessness qualifies as a ‘misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,' as defined by 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922 (g)(9); and (2) whether 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922(g)(9) are unconstitutional under the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution.Hughes v. PPL Energyplus (14-614) which asks: (1) Whether, when a seller offers to build and sell wholesale power on a fixed-rate contract basis, the FPA field-preempts a state order directing retail utilities to enter into the contract; and (2) whether FERC's acceptance of an annual regional capacity auction preempts states from requiring retail utilities to contract at fixed rates with sellers who are willing to commit to sell into the auction on a long-term basis.CPV Maryland v. PPL Energyplus (14-623) (consolidated with Hughes), which asks: (1) Where, as a result of a state-directed procurement, the contract price to build and operate a power plant is the developer's bid price, and may result in payments beyond what the developer earns selling the plant's capacity in the FERC-supervised auc

During a consensual search of Rodney Vinson’s residence, police officers found a rifle and ammunition. After determining that Vinson had a prior North Carolina misdemeanor conviction of domestic violence under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A), the government charged Vinson with possession of a firearm by a prohibited person under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Possession of firearms by persons convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” is prohibited.