Section 666(a)(2) requires not only that the Defendants have offered something of value to influence an agent of a government entity or agency that receives $10,000 in federal funds; it also requires that the offer be “in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 more.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2). Even assuming that deciding private civil cases can be categorized as a “business” or “transaction,” it is certainly not the “business” or “transaction” of either the Administrative Office of Courts or of Lafayette County.

Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 4-5. The Complaint further alleges that, despite being warned repeatedly, Karron “willfully violated the terms of the Grant, misapplying nearly half a million dollars towards unauthorized expenses and then lying about it,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666. Id.

Tr. 2792; see 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). At trial, the Government presented evidence of the value of the extender legislation, see Tr.

See McDonnell, 2016 WL 3461561, at *9, *12-17. The Second Circuit previously suggested that the § 201 definition of “official act” may not apply to the Hobbs Act or § 666. See Skelos, 2015 WL 6159326, at *4.

18 U.S.C. §§1341, 1346 (Counts 44-45); three counts of Travel Act bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1952 (Counts 46-48); and seven counts of material false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1001 (Counts 49-55). Case 5:17-cr-00390-JS Document 49 Filed 12/07/17 Page 3 of 13 b. James Hickey with conspiracy to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, and honest services fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §371 (Count One); two counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341 (Counts 27 and 28); four counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1343 (Counts 34 through 37); four counts of honest services wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1343, 1346 (Counts 40 through 43); and two counts of honest services mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1341, 1346 (Counts 44 and 45). c. Scott Allinson with conspiracy to commit federal program bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 371 (Count One); and attempted federal program bribery-offering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 666(a)(2) (Count 19). 2. At trial in this matter, the government intends to offer into evidence: a. audio recordings of telephone conversations of the above defendants, captured during court-authorized Title III wiretaps from approximately November 2014 to June 2014. b. audio and video recordings of consensual telephone conversations and meetings between the defendants and cooperating government witnesses, made from approximately June 2014 to July 2015. 3. At the time the audio recordings are played aloud, the Government will move to distribute transcripts of the conversations to the jury, which can be admitted as an aid to the jury to be used at the time the recordings are played in court.

The government arrested Mr. Ng on an obvious “placeholder” charge that he had falsely declared the purpose of the hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash that he regularly brought into the country and that he regularly declared to Customs. Later, having caused his incarceration, the government took its time to bring the real charges (abandoning the false declaration charges that they knew or should have known to be baseless), and claimed illegal bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666. While the unprecedented criminal prosecution is fundamentally unsound, regardless of the outcome of this case, the mere arrest and incarceration of Mr. Ng has had one concrete result: the utter derailment of any plans for a permanent conference center in Macau.

In addition, petitioner annexed to this letter: (i) a copy of a Certificate of Relief from Disabilities, dated March 16, 2009, and (ii) a notice from the New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services (“DCAS”), dated December 8, 2010, qualifying petitioner for consideration for employment as a Stationary Engineer (91-94). In response to DOB’s March 15, 2011 letter requesting additional information, petitioner, on or about March 29, 2011, submitted copies of: (i) the Information relating to the criminal proceeding commenced against him in the United States District Court of the Eastern District of New York; (ii) a letter dated October 7, 2008 from petitioner’s probation officer stating that on June 8, 2006, petitioner was sentenced to three years probation following petitioner’s plea of guilty to “Theft From An Agency Receiving Federal Funds,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A), a Class C Felony and was compliant with the conditions of probation; and (iii) the Court Judgment and 4 outline of the Probation terms (98-103).

Case 3:13-cr-00019-JCH Document 53 Filed 07/29/13 Page 27 of 42 23 Congress certainly knows how to use broader language when it wishes to extend the reach of a criminal proscription. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 666 (proscribing thefts, fraud and bribery by agents of any organization receiving in excess of $10,000 of federal assistance in one year); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud schemes “affecting a fin ncial institution”); 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (defining criminally derived property to include “any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense”); 42 U.S.C § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (“Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration (i cluding any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind”) (emphasis added). Congress clearly could have reached subsequent bond purchase transactions in which a portion of the purchasing funds originated with TARP.

Id., at 2933 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Nor does that construction create a risk of arbitrary prosecutions, the Court reasoned, because § 1346’s “prohibition on bribes and kickbacks draws content not only from the pre-McNally case law, but also from federal statutes proscribing – and defining – similar crimes,” including 18 U.S.C. § 666. Id.

........................................................... 47 Wesbrook v. Ulrich, 90 F. Supp. 3d 803 (W.D. Wis. 2015) ......... 45 Willow Creek Ranch, L.L.C. v. Town of Shelby, 235 Wis. 2d 409, 456–57 (2000) ....................................................................................... 42 Wolf v. F&M Banks, 193 Wis.2d 439, 534 N.W.2d 877 (Wis. App., 1995) .............................................................................................. 46 Wolnak v. Cardiovascular & Thoracic Surgeons of Cent. Wisconsin, S.C., 287 Wis. 2d 560 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005) ... 47, 48 Yellow Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 3 F.Supp.2d 919, 921 (N.D. Ill., 1998) ......................................................................................................... 10 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) ................................................ 50 Case: 3:16-cv-00346-bbc Document #: 30 Filed: 10/05/16 Page 7 of 52 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss—County 8 Statutes 18 USC § 666................................................................................................ 35 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e ..................................................................................... 30 Wis. Stat. § 108.04 ..................................................................................... 28 Wis. Stat. § 59.18 ........................................................................................ 43 Wis. Stat. § 59.56 ........................................................................................ 15 Wis. Stat. § 66.0501 .................................................................................. 43 Wis. Stat. § 893.80 ............................................................................. 40, 44 Wis. Stat. §§ 230.80-85 ............................................................................ 37 Other Authorities Atty. Gen. Op. OAG-01-11 (Oct. 27, 2011) ........................................ 44 Expanding Access & Inclusion, Ci