The conspiracy count is based upon four substantive offenses...” To convict of conspiracy, the government has to establish: (1) the defendant's agreement with another person to violate the law; (2) his knowledge of the essential objective of the conspiracy; (3) his knowing and voluntary involvement; and (4) interdependence among the alleged coconspirators. See United States v. Edwards, 69 F.3d 419, 430 (10th Cir. 1995); 18 U.S.C. § 371 U.S. v. Rahseparian, 231 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir. 2000) To the contrary, "defraud" has a wider meaning than an individual act of fraud. U.S. v. Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1566 (10th Cir. 1995) “We agree with Caldwell's requirement that .....

014, Florida Statute 817.034, 18 U.S.C. § 371, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and/or 18 U.S.C. § 1349, conspired or endeavored to violate Florida Statute 772.103(1)-(3) as alleged above, all in violation of Florida Statute 772.

The opening paragraph of the 2011 Warrants (identical in each document) described the items to be seized. It directed that: The items to be seized are evidence, contraband, fruits, and/or instrumentalities of violations of the following offenses occurring between March 2001 and the present: (a) theft of Dept. of Defense checks in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 1031, 1341 and 1343; (b) destruction of documents and computer files in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1512(b)(2)(B), 1512(c)(l) and 1519; (c) a scheme to defraud the Department of Defense and other customers in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 641, 1031, 1341, 1343 and 1349; Case 2:14-cr-00574-PBT Document 109 Filed 12/08/15 Page 20 of 83 9 (d) a scheme to convert funds diverted from clients . . . in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 641, 1031, 1341, 1343 and 1349; (e) a scheme to defraud pharmaceutical manufacturers in violation of and other customers [sic] 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 641, 1031, 1341, 1343 and 1349. . . . including [listing, as examples, broad categories of items] (Grover Decl.

11. Count Eleven: Conspiracy to Supply Goods and Services to the Taliban Count Eleven charges Mr. Mostafa under 18 U.S.C. §371 with conspiring to violate 50 U.S.C. §1705(b), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (hereinafter “IEEPA”), which proscribes transactions, including the provision of funds, goods, and services, with entities (or persons) – in this instance, the Taliban – whose property and interest(s) in property has been blocked pursuant to the regulations embodied in 31 C.F.R. §545.201.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in Part B.4, supra, the defendants may be liable for conspiring to facilitate the Internet pharmacies’ unlawful conduct even if the defendants would be exempt from prosecution if they engaged in this conduct themselves. For all of these reasons, Section 373(a) does not exempt the defendants from criminal liability for conspiring to distribute misbranded drugs with the intent to defraud, and Counts 11 and 16 properly state offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 371. The Court should therefore deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss these counts.

Plaintiff appears to be improperly alleging criminal conduct as the basis for his Negligence claim. As with his other claims, under the “Fifth Claim for Relief: Negligence,” Plaintiff cites “18 U.S.C. § 2, 3, 4, 241, 371, 1001, 1016, 1018, 1341, 1346, 1349” apparently as the basis for his negligence claim. (ECF No. 1. At p. 27).

S.C. §§1343, 1346 (Counts 38-43); two counts of honest services mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1341, 1346 (Counts 44-45); three counts of Travel Act bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1952 (Counts 46-48); and seven counts of material false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1001 (Counts 49-55). Case 5:17-cr-00390-JS Document 49 Filed 12/07/17 Page 3 of 13 b. James Hickey with conspiracy to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, and honest services fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §371 (Count One); two counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341 (Counts 27 and 28); four counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1343 (Counts 34 through 37); four counts of honest services wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1343, 1346 (Counts 40 through 43); and two counts of honest services mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1341, 1346 (Counts 44 and 45). c. Scott Allinson with conspiracy to commit federal program bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 371 (Count One); and attempted federal program bribery-offering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 666(a)(2) (Count 19). 2. At trial in this matter, the government intends to offer into evidence: a. audio recordings of telephone conversations of the above defendants, captured during court-authorized Title III wiretaps from approximately November 2014 to June 2014. b. audio and video recordings of consensual telephone conversations and meetings between the defendants and cooperating government witnesses, made from approximately June 2014 to July 2015. 3. At the time the audio recordings are played aloud, the Government will move to distribute transcripts of the conversations to the jury, which can be admitted as an aid to the jury to be used at the time the recordings are played in court.

at 41 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558 (1875)). In Rosenblatt, the Second Circuit “reject[ed] the argument that the phrase ‘conspiracy to defraud the United States’” – as used in the general conspiracy statute, see 18 U.S.C. § 371 – is sufficient, without more, to define the ‘central’ nature of the conspiratorial plan” in an indictment. Id.

That is, if there was no wire or securities fraud to begin with, it cannot be a crime to conduct monetary transactions with the proceeds of such non-fraudulent activity. Count One charges Mr. Wey with conspiracy to commit securities and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Conspiracy requires proof of: (1) an agreement among the conspirators to commit an offense; (2) specific intent to achieve the objective of the conspiracy; and (3) an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy.

Cf. United States v. Jakeway, 783 F. Supp. 590, 595-96 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (granting a new trial after the government “repeatedly confused [the defendant’s] ethical shortcomings and possible regulatory violations with substantive prosc iptions of criminal law,” thereby “prejudice[ing] the defendants in the eyes of the jury.”); see also United States v. Minarik, 875 F.2d 1186, 1196 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding judgment of acquittal in part because “the prosecutors, either intentionally or unintentionally, used the defraud clause [in 18 U.S.C. § 371] in a way that created great confusion about the conduct claimed to be illegal”). Case 0:08-cr-60322-JIC Document 119 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/06/2014 Page 10 of 13 11 Permitting the Government to present such evidence would require repeated, extensive, and complicated instructions to the juryon tax rules whose scope and application even tax experts have difficulty articulating.