18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1). 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2), § 2702(2).Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ____, No. 16-402 (June 22, 2018) where the Court notes that it does not need to decide "whether there is a limited period for which the Government may obtain an individual's historical CSLI free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, and if so, how long that period might be."

[24] See, e.g., Gunning v. Doe, 2017 ME 78, ¶32 (“We should engage in our own assessment of whether to impose a ‘heightened burden’ in defamation claims against anonymous speakers asserting First Amendment protection.”).[25] 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a).[26] 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b); 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c).

The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), which is Title II of the ECPA, sets forth internet users’ statutory privacy rights against government surveillance by limiting the government’s ability to compel service providers to disclose users’ information and by restricting service providers from voluntarily disclosing such information to the government (18 USC §§ 2701-12). Specifically, it prohibits custodians from disclosing (1) contents of a communication in their electronic storage to anyone, and (2) non-content information to any governmental entities (18 USC § 2702 [a]). Voluntary disclosure of content information is permissible “with the lawful consent of the originator or an address or intended recipient of such communication” (18 USC § 2702 [a][3]).

to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 313-17 (3d Cir.). Because we conclude that exigent circumstances justified the officers’ pinging of Caraballo’s phone, we need not today resolve this important and complex Fourth Amendment question.The District Court also concluded that, even if the officers’ actions violated Caraballo’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, application of the exclusionary rule would be inappropriate because the officers relied in good faith on 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(4). See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 342 (1987) (finding exclusionary rule not applicable where “officers act in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches, but where the statute is ultimately found to violate the Fourth Amendment” (emphasis omitted)).

It is codified in sections 22580-22582 of the California Business and Professions Code. 9 For a description of some of those efforts, see this post at our FinTech blog: http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=10737418464#MobileApps.10See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b). 11 The text of the law, legislative history materials, and a comparison to prior law may be found here: http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SB467.

It is codified in sections 22580-22582 of the California Business and Professions Code. 9 For a description of some of those efforts, see this post at our FinTech blog: http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail.aspx?NewsPubId=10737418464#MobileApps.10See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b). 11 The text of the law, legislative history materials, and a comparison to prior law may be found here: http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SB467.

The SCA prevents ECS providers from divulging the contents of a communication while in “electronic storage” by that service, and prohibits RCS providers from divulging the contents of any communication “carried” or “maintained” on that service. See 18 U.S.C. §2702(a). A central issue in this case was whether Facebook, MySpace, or Media Temple met the definition of an ECS or RCS provider, and if so, whether the information requested constituted protected communications under the SCA.

A provider must raise such an objection first to the government that issued the order. If that objection does not resolve the issue, the provider may raise its objections with its own government. For example, if U.S. companies have objections, they should generally raise them first to the U.K. Home Office. Upon receipt of objections, the U.K. Home Office will respond. If the objections are not resolved, the U.S. company can raise such objections to OIA.As a result of the agreement and these new objection procedures, covered providers in the United States will need to understand whether legal process from the United Kingdom is valid and whether the companies can lawfully comply with such process under U.S. federal law, such as the SCA and the Wiretap Act. And, as part of that analysis, companies will need to make sure that orders are consistent with the agreement itself. For example, the SCA permits a provider to disclose content only “pursuant to an order subject to [the Agreement].” 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(9). And Article 4.5 of the agreement states that “Orders subject to this Agreement must be targeted at specific Accounts and shall identify as the object of the Order a specific person, account, address, or personal device, or any other specific identifier.” Thus, if a provider receives an order that does not target a specific person or account, the provider will need to consider whether complying with the order could run afoul of U.S. law. Similarly, Article 4.3 states that “Orders subject to this Agreement may not intentionally target a Receiving-Party Person,” which means that an order from the United Kingdom may not target a U.S. person, and vice versa. So, if a U.S.-based provider receives an order that targets a user who the provider determines is a U.S. person, the provider will need to consider how to proceed in a manner consistent with the agreement and U.S. law.That said, some safeguards are incorporated into the agreement. For example, if authorities in the United Kingdom rece

14 OPO Act, s. 1(1) and (7).15 OPO Act, s.7.16 18 U.S.C. § 2713.17 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(9).18 Agreement, art. 1, cl. 8.

[4]Id.[5] 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1). which prohibits entities like Google from “knowingly divulg[ing] to any person or entity the contents of a communication while in electronic storage by that service,”[6]See Frank v. Gaos, 586 U.S. ___ (2019) (slip op.