The SCA defines “electronic storage” as(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for the purposes of backup protection of such communication.18 U.S.C. § 2510 (17).The lower court held that the e-mails were in “electronic storage” because they were stored for backup protection pursuant to subsection (B) of Section 2510 (17). On appeal, Broome argued that the plaintiff needed to establish that the e-mail met both subsections (A) and (B) to constitute electronic storage.

The statute identifies two categories of communications service providers covered under the SCA: 1) electronic communication service providers (“ECS providers”), defined as “any service which provides to [its] users . . . the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications,” and 2) remote computing service providers (“RCS providers”), defined as the provision of “computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system.” Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510(15), §2711(2). The SCA prevents ECS providers from divulging the contents of a communication while in “electronic storage” by that service, and prohibits RCS providers from divulging the contents of any communication “carried” or “maintained” on that service.

Conspicuously absent from the Act are any definitions of the terms “monitor,” “intercept,” “transmission,” and “photoelectronic or photo-optical systems.” Certain definitions for some of these terms are included in other statutes—e.g., the Federal Wiretap Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510‐2522), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2523), and the Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712). Nonetheless, there are open questions concerning how the statutory terms might be applied in the particular context of the Act.

The SCA defines electronic storage as “(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17). Some courts have interpreted subsection (A) as applying only to “unopened” communications, reasoning that the “temporary, intermediate” language contemplates the interception of a communication before it reaches its intended recipient.

The SCA defines “electronic storage” as “(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.” (See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)). And the files must be stored in “a facility through which an electronic communication service is provided,” not just any computer system.

An “aggrieved person” under Title III includes not just “a party” to an intercepted communication, but also anyone “against whom the interception was directed.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11). So, for a start, Title III must accord standing to people other than those who were parties to unlawfully intercepted communications, lest Section 2510(11)’s second clause do no work.

Here, Microsoft acted as both an electronic communication service and a provider of remote computing services.Under section 2703, governmental entities must use a warrant to obtain certain types of electronic communications, but they can access others using only a trial subpoena.An electronic communication service is "any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15); 18 U.S.C. § 2711(1) (making the Wiretap Act's definitions applicable to the Stored Communications Act). A provider of remote computing services provides "to the public . . . computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system."

After the supervisor discovered the forwarding, the employee was charged with violations of the Wiretap Act, which prohibits the intentional interception of the contents “of any wire, electronic or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). The employee was subsequently convicted in federal district court in the Eastern District of Wisconsin.Szymuszkiewicz’s AppealSzymuszkiewicz appealed on grounds that his forwarding was “a mistake” and that he did not know how to set up auto-forwarding rules.

If you do not know what a pixel is, you may have a problem and should read on. This article will explain the recent trend of “pixel litigation” and suggest some ways to help companies avoid liability and avoid becoming entangled in the web of class action litigation.While it takes various forms in each case, plaintiffs are generally complaining about the use of plug-ins to track individual users’ internet activity. Most of these actions are filed in California federal courts pursuant to California state criminal law on eavesdropping, but some are filed based on other states’ similar laws. The prevalent claim in these types of cases is based on violations of California’s criminal Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Pen. Code §§631 & 632 (CIPA). Various related claims en vogue include California’s Computer Data Access and Fraud Act, Cal. Pen. Code §502 (CDAFA), the U.S. Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2510, et seq., as well as Illinois, Maryland, and Pennsylvania wiretapping and eavesdropping statutes and related state law claims of invasion of privacy, breach of contract, and the like.Generally speaking, a “pixel” is used for tracking user behavior and collecting data about the users’ interactions with website content. A “plug-in” is a computer program that extends the functionality of an existing program, such as an internet browser. A related term with which many readers likely are familiar is a “cookie,” which is a small amount of data created by the website a user visits and saved by the user’s web browser.Some alleged violations of California’s eavesdropping statute, CIPA, are based on plug-ins that send users’ personal data – such as name, address, browsing history, web server used, and other details (depending on the type of website the user visited) – not only to the website that the user chose to visit, but also, and unbeknownst to the user, to another third party website. Tha

ds a federal law (18 USC § 2258A) requiring interactive service providers[1] to report child sexual abuse material (also referred to as CSAM) to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children’s CyberTipline once a provider knows about the material.Affected online service providers should adjust their reporting processes and preservation mechanisms.Orrick is tracking proposed legislation related to children’s online safety and will report developments. See also:Youth Online Safety: Four Bills to Watch in CongressYouth Online Safety Laws: U.S. State Law TrackerThis article was originally published Jan. 26, 2024. It was updated May 7, 2024, and May 8, 2024.[1] Under 18 USC § 2258E(6), a “provider” within the scope of these CSAM reporting requirements is defined as any electronic communication service or remote computing service. An “electronic communication service” means any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications (18 USC § 2510(15)); a “remote computing service” means the provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system (18 USC § 2711(2)).