On appeal, Hausa principally argued that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself. He also argued that his conviction for conspiring to murder U.S. nationals in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2332(b)(2) should be reversed because the government failed to prove that this conspiracy occurred within the United States. The Court readily disposed of both these arguments in a brief opinion.Background Hausa fought against U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan as a member of Al Qaeda and freely admitted to participating in attacks against U.S. soldiers in interviews with law enforcement that were recorded after Hausa had waived hisMirandarights.

With respect to Section 1962(c), the Court noted that some of the predicate acts listed in Section 1961 by their terms applied to non-US conduct. (For example, 18 USC. §2332, forbids killing a US national abroad.) Other offenses, however, are not by their terms clearly extraterritorial, such as the mail and wire fraud statutes.

While Waagner targeted clinics that provided abortions, he also mistakenly sent these "anthrax letters" to several pro-life organizations and some adoption agencies.In December 2001, Waagner was finally apprehended. On September 20, 2002, a federal grand jury returned an indictment, charging Waagner with violations of 18 U.S.C. 248 (Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act), 18 U.S.C. 2332 and 178 (threatening the use of a weapon of mass destruction), 18 U.S.C. 1951(e) (Hobbs Act Extortion- these charges were eventually dismissed), 18 U.S.C. 876 (mailing threatening communications), and 18 U.S.C. 875 (threatening interstate communications).On December 15, 2003, Waagner was convicted on 51 charges, including violations of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, threatening the use of a weapon of mass destruction, mailing threatening communications and interstate transmission of threatening communications.On July 7, 2005, Waagner was sentenced to 19 years in prison.

The Second Circuit held further that when a predicate act underlying a RICO claim applies extraterritorially, then any claim based upon that act would also. In support of this holding, the Second Circuit cited RICO predicate statutes that only apply to extraterritorial conduct, such as 18 U.S.C. §2332, which criminalizes killing and attempting to kill United States nationals outside of the United States. The Second Circuit found that these predicate statutes exhibited Congress’s intent that, in certain circumstances, RICO should apply extraterritorially.