The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari thereby affirming the reasoning and holding in Bach.32 Therefore, the defendant’s claim that the definitional section of 18 USC § 2256(8)(C) is unconstitutional has been specifically addressed and decided adversely to him. Even if 18 USC § 2256(8)(C) were unconstitutional, Plaintiffs still can civilly recover under 18 USC § 2252A(f) and 18 USC § 2255 for a violation of 18 USC § 2252A(a) which is neither premised upon nor uses the definition of child pornography contained in 18 USC §2256(8)(C). It is irrelevant that Bach took the face of an actual minor and placed it on existing child pornography33 while the defendant took the images of real and identifiable minors and placed them upon adult pornographic subjects that he altered to appear younger.

The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari thereby affirming the reasoning and holding in Bach.30 Therefore, the defendant’s claim that the definitional section of 18 USC § 2256(8)(C) is unconstitutional has been specifically addressed and decided adversely to him. Even if 18 USC § 2256(8)(C) were unconstitutional, Plaintiffs still can civilly recover under 18 USC § 2252A(f) and 18 USC § 2255 for a violation of 18 USC § 2252A(a) which is 28 Ohio Rev. Code § 2741.07 provides: (A)(1) A person who violates section 2741.

Accordingly, we affirm. On December 20, 2007, Hotaling was charged in a one-count indictment with possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2256(8)(A) and (C). Hotaling admitted to creating and possessing sexually explicit images of six minor females (Jane Does # 1–6) that had been digitally altered by a process known as "morphing."

PageID #: 961 7 Second and Sixth Causes of Action Premised Upon 18 USC § 2255 Pursuant to 18 USC § 2255,14 Plaintiffs Jane Doe and Jane Roe are entitled to civil relief as specifically set forth therein including actual damages deemed to not be less than $150,000.00, costs, and attorney’s fees because they are minors who are victims of a violation of 18 USC § 2252A and who suffered personal injury. Since the Defendant has admitted to violating 18 USC § 2252(A) (a) (5)(B) in his pre- trial diversion agreement and admitted to committing actions which violate violating 18 USC § 2252A (a) and (b) in his discovery responses, then Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability on the Second and Sixth Causes of Action because there is no legitimate question of fact. Additionally the damages are deemed to be at least $150,000.00, costs of the suit, and reasonable attorney’s fees by this statute.

PageID #: 1462 -5- III. LAW AND ANALYSIS A. Federal Claims First and Fifth Causes of Action (18 U.S.C. § 2252A(f) Claim) Second and Sixth Causes of Action (18 U.S.C. § 2255 Claim) Plaintiffs’ argument is simple and straight forward. Plaintiffs contend that they are persons injured by Boland’s conduct which is prohibited under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) or (b), for which they are entitled to damages under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(f) and 2255. Since Boland has admitted violating § 2252A(a)(5)(B), they are entitled to damages under §§ 2252A(f) and 2255.

The United States does not object to the Court’s deciding any non-constitutional issues before August 30, 2011 (e.g., whether the minor plaintiffs are “person[s] aggrieved” under section 2252A(f), or whether they suffered “personal injury” as required under section 2255). Nor does the United States object to the Court’s deciding to uphold the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2256(8)(C), 2252A(f) and 2255 before the same date. The United States appreciates the Court’s consideration in this matter.

PageID #: 718 -3- presenting the exhibits at trial. He further claims that law enforcement officers illegally obtained the evidence used to prosecute him and possessed and transported that evidence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. After reviewing the Third Party Complaint, the Court issued a Show Cause Order advising Boland that his Third Party Complaint may be subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Federal Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) for reasons explained therein.

5 See In the Matter of Wolff(D.C. 1985) 490 A.2d 1118, 1119, vacated 494 A.2d 932, aff'd. (en banc) 511 A.2d 1047 (distribution of child pornography “notperse [crime] of moral turpitude”); Matter ofDisciplinary Proceedings Against Bruckner (Wis. 1991) 467 N.W.2d 780 (based on'facts and circumstances, importation and trading of child pornography involved moral turpitude); compare United States v. Santacruz (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 894, 897 (for purposes of immigration, possession of child pomographyin violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) involves moral turpitude). Shortly after his sentencing, Grant twice violated the sex offender termsofhis probation.

“ 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). 318 U.S.C. § 2252A(f) provides that “[a]ny person aggrieved by reason of the conduct prohibited under subsection (a) or (b) may commence a civil action” for compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and reasonable attorney fees and costs. -4- a notice of intervention and a brief in defense of the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2255, 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2256(8)(c) and 2252A(f).

The Magistrate in Doe recommended that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed under Section 230; the district court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The district court specifically found that plaintiff's federal claim under 18 U.S.C. §2252A "did not fit within any exception" to Section 230's immunity from civil liability. The fact that plaintiff relied on a statute that also included criminal penalties did not change the Section 230 analysis.