United States v. Williams, 128 S.Ct. 1830 (2008)The Supreme Court upheld the child pornography pandering provision that had earlier been held unconstitutional by the Eleventh Circuit. The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) makes it a crime to solicit, or to offer to sell or distribute material that is purported to be child pornography. The Court rejected the defendant’s claim that it violates the First Amendment to make it a crime to offer to sell or distribute material as child pornography, if, in fact, the material being offered for sale is not, in fact, child pornography.

cement and regulatory agency for antitrust and consumer protection issues—typically headed by commissioners who are antitrust lawyers—that has considerable experience in children’s online consumer privacy, advertising, and similar matters, but no meaningful experience with CSAM issues. Yet the bill would vest the FTC with significant authority over online providers and complainants with limited judicial review. What is more, while the Board would ostensibly be independent, it would be subject to the supervision of the FTC chair, a political appointee and designee of the president. In addition, the FTC chair or the full commission may assign the child protection officers duties beyond those laid out in the bill, potentially injecting broader components of the FTC into the Board’s work.Updates to 18 USC § 2258A: Increased Mandatory Reporting Obligations and Voluntary Reporting ThresholdsSTOP CSAM ActMandates reporting of apparent, planned, or imminent violations of 18 USC §§ 2251, 2252, 2252A, 2252B, or 2260, in addition to apparent CSAM. Reporting planned or imminent violations is currently optional under existing law.Requires online providers to submit CyberTipline reports to NCMEC as soon as reasonably possible, but no later than 60 days after obtaining actual knowledge of the information that triggers a reporting obligation.Creates a new voluntary standard for reporting by permitting providers to submit a CyberTipline report where they have a “reasonable belief” that facts or circumstances indicating an apparent, planned, or imminent violation of §§ 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2252B, or 2260 exist.EARN IT ActAdds 18 USC § 1591 (minor sex trafficking) and 18 USC § 2422(b) (persuading a minor to engage in prostitution or “any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense”) to the list of enumerated statutes triggering a reporting obligation.Expressly permits online providers to submit CyberTipline reports when they obtain knowledge of any fact

Helton alleged that he had been sexually abused as a juvenile, and admitted he had sexually abused another minor while a minor himself, and that he had a history of viewing child pornography, for which he had sought unsuccessful treatment. A federal grand jury indicted Helton for two counts of knowing receipt and possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2), (a)(5)(B), and § 2252A(b)(1)-(2). Helton pled guilty to one count of knowing possession of child pornography under U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and § 2252A(b)(2).

Second, SORNA's registration requirements are a limited and rational extension of congressional power, as permitted by the Necessary and Proper Clause. (2) 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), which prohibits possessing, or accessing with intent to view, materials containing child porn images, is not facially unconstitutionally overbroad. The 10th concedes an imprecise law that criminalizes access to Lolita or Woody Allen's Manhattan would be unconstitutional.

See: Blockburger, supra, 284 U.S. at 304. Applying this test, the Ninth Circuit concluded:”We begin by examining whether receipt of material involving sexual exploitation of minors requires proof of an additional fact which possession of material involving sexual exploitation of minors does not … we recently held that convictions for both receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) and possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C § 2252A((a)(5)(B) violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because the offense of possessing child pornography is a lesser-included offense of the receipt of child pornography. We see no reason to conclude otherwise when it comes to receiving material involving the sexual exploitation of minors in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (2) and possessing material involving the sexual exploitation of minors in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (4) (B).”The Supreme Court has recognized that comparing statutes to determine whether one set of elements is a subset of another requires a purely textual comparison … A comparison of the texts of the receipt offense, § 2252(a)(2), and the possession offense, § 2252(a)(4)(B), reveals that possession is a lesser-included offense of receipt … Thus, while the government can indict a defendant for both receipt and possession of sexually explicit material, entering judgment against him is multiplicitous a

Review granted on the following issue:WHETHER THE SENTENCE MUST BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE THE MILITARY JUDGE DETERMINED THE SENTENCE BASED ON THE INCORRECT MAXIMUM PUNISHMENT.Briefs will be filed under Rule 25.Note the accused was sentenced to confinement for 10 months, a bad conduct discharge, and RIR to E-1 for possession of child pornography.Before AFCCA the appellant:On appeal the appellant challenges the military judge’s determination of the maximum punishment, arguing that the language of the specification precludes application of the analogous federal law maximum of ten years under the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2252A. Finding no error prejudicial to the substantial rights of the appellant, we affirm.

00-795Subject:Child Pornography Prevention Act, First Amendment, Free SpeechQuestion:The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, prohibits, inter alia, the shipment, distribution, receipt, reproduction, sale, or possession of any visual depiction that "appears to be[] of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 18 U.S.C. 2252A, 2256(8)(B) (Supp. IV 1998). It also contains a similar prohibition concerning any visual depiction that is "advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.

We conclude that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars such prosecutorial practices, Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907), and that the remedy here is dismissal of the two possession specifications that were tried at the successive prosecution. We then remand the single distribution specification for further review by the lower court.In May 2016, Appellant was convicted in the district court on both counts—possession of child pornography and receipt and distribution of the same in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2), (5). The Government used both the HP laptop and external hard drive to prove that Appellant possessed “material that contains” child pornography.

The panel agreed. The panel said the plain text of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) does not clearly define the appropriate unit of prosecution. Since it includes the ambiguous modifier ‘any’ before the enumerated list of storage materials, the statute creates sufficient ambiguity as to the correct unit of prosecution.

Last week at the Tenth Circuit:"Take prescribed medication as directed"This stock condition of supervised release got the axe last week from the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Malone:We consequently take this opportunity to make it clear that this condition, on its face, is an impermissible infringement into a defendant’s significant liberty interests without the justifying support of particularized findings.* * *Probation offices and courts in this circuit must be precise and discerning in their imposition of such conditions and may only include a broad mandate to ‘take prescribed medication as directed’ when it is accompanied by particularized findings that justify it.Multiplicity of child-pornography chargesIn United States v. Elliott, the Tenth Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (the child-pornography statute) precludes “distinct charges for each electronic device or medium simultaneously possessed.” In other words, five charges for possessing child pornography on five devices, in the same place, at the same time, violates the rule against multiplicity.