at 2559 (noting Johnson was the Court’s fifth residual clause case); see also Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2287 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating the Court’s repeated failure in addressing ACCA is “[w]hat sets ACCA apart” and “confirms” its vagueness). In contrast, § 924(c)(3)(B) and the textually similar residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) have not produced such “hopeless indeterminacy.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558; see also Taylor, 814 F.3d at 378 (“By contrast, the Supreme Court has not unsuccessfully attempted on multiple occasions to articulate the standard applicable to the § 924(c)(3)(B) analysis.”)

Shuti v. Lynch, 2016 U.S. App. 12500, at *17-18. That court opined that the lack of an enumerated crimes clause in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), which is identical to the 924(c) residual clause, and which is incorporated into the Immigration and Naturalization Act at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), “[A]ctually makes its residual clause a ‘broad[er]’ provision, as it Case 1:16-cv-00235-PB Document 8 Filed 07/15/16 Page 14 of 1872 7 15 ‘cover[s] every offense that involved a substantial risk of the use of 'physical force against the person or property of another.'" Id., citing Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144 (2008).

See United States v. Fuertes, 805 F.3d 485, 500 n.6 (4th Cir. 2015) (applying ordinary case analysis in § 924(c) context). Courts regularly apply it with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), which is identi- cal in its language to § 924(c). See Avila, 770 F.3d at 1107 (applying ordinary case analysis in § 16(b) context).

Also, in a later case, the court cited to Vivas-Ceja in an opinion dismissing the government’s argument that Johnson did not invalidate the residual 15 Case 1:16-cv-00675-MCA-KBM Document 1 Filed 06/24/16 Page 15 of 33 clause of § 924(c)(3). The court authorized a successive § 2255 petition for a defendant convicted of § 924(c) violations because the residual clause of § 924(c)(3) “is identical to 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), which we held is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson.” Ruiz v. United States, No. 16-1193 (7th Cir. Feb. 19, 2016) (unpublished order).

Here, the crimes of First Degree Murder, Voluntary Manslaughter, and Attempt to Commit Manslaughter are “crimes of violence,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (providing that a “crime of violence” means “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person . . .”) with 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 and 1112 (setting forth statutory language of offenses and elements). In addition, each of the First Degree Murder, Voluntary Manslaughter, and Attempt to Commit Manslaughter counts on which the defendants were convicted relates to an identifiable victim who suffered death or physical injury, and many such victims suffered pecuniary loss as well.

Here, the crimes of First Degree Murder, Voluntary Manslaughter, and Attempt to Commit Manslaughter are “crimes of violence,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (providing that a “crime of violence” means “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person . . .”) with 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111 and 1112 (setting forth statutory language of offenses and elements). In addition, each of the First Degree Murder, Voluntary Manslaughter, and Attempt to Commit Manslaughter counts on which the defendants were convicted relates to an identifiable victim who suffered death or physical injury, and many such victims also suffered pecuniary loss as well.