18 APPENDIX U.S.C. § 46
As amended Apr. 9, 1956, eff. July 8, 1956; Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966; Apr. 24, 1972, eff. Oct. 1, 1972; Pub. L. 98-473, title II, §209(d), Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1987; Mar. 9, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 30, 1991, eff. Dec. 1, 1991; Apr. 22, 1993, eff. Dec. 1, 1993; Pub. L. 103-322, title XXXIII, §330003(h), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2141; Apr. 29, 2002, eff. Dec. 1, 2002.
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES-1944 Note to Subdivision (a)(1). This rule is substantially a restatement of existing law, 18 U.S.C., [now 3141].Note to Subdivision (a)(2). This rule is substantially a restatement of Rule 6 of Criminal Appeals Rules, with the addition of a reference to bail pending certiorari. This rule does not supersede 18 U.S.C. 682 [now 3731] (Appeals; on behalf of the United States; rules of practice and procedure), which provides for the admission of the defendant to bail on his own recognizance pending an appeal taken by the Government.Note to Subdivision (b). This rule is substantially a restatement of existing law, 28 U.S.C. [former] 657.Note to Subdivision (d). This rule is a restatement of existing practice, and is based in part on [now 31 U.S.C. ] (Bonds or notes of United States in lieu of recognizance, stipulation, bond, guaranty, or undertaking; place of deposit; return to depositor; contractors' bonds).Note to Subdivision (e). This rule is similar to Sec. 79 of A.L.I. Code of Criminal Procedure introducing, however, an element of flexibility. Corporate sureties are regulated by 6 U.S.C. 6-14 [now 31 U.S.C. 9304-9308 ].Note to Subdivision (f). 1. With the exception hereafter noted, this rule is substantially a restatement of existing law in somewhat greater detail than contained in 18 U.S.C. [former] 601 (Remission of penalty of recognizance).2. Subdivision (f)(2) changes existing law in that it increases the discretion of the court to set aside a forfeiture. The present power of the court is limited to cases in which the defendant's default had not been willful.3. The second sentence of paragraph (3) is similar to Rule 73(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [28 U.S.C., Appendix]. This paragraph also substitutes simple motion procedure for enforcing forfeited bail bonds for the procedure by scire facias, which was abolished by Rule 81(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.Note to Subdivision (g). This rule is a restatement of existing law and practice. It is based in part on 18 U.S.C. [now 3142] (Surrender by bail).
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES-1966 AMENDMENTSubdivision (c).-The more inclusive word "terms" is substituted for "amount" in view of the amendment to subdivision (d) authorizing releases without security on such conditions as are necessary to insure the appearance of the defendant. The phrase added at the end of this subdivision is designed to encourage commissioners and judges to set the terms of bail so as to eliminate unnecessary detention. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); Bandy v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 197 (1960); Bandy v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 11 (1961); Carbo v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 662 (1962); review den. 369 U.S. 868 (1962).Subdivision (d).-The amendments are designed to make possible (and to encourage) the release on bail of a greater percentage of indigent defendants than now are released. To the extent that other considerations make it reasonably likely that the defendant will appear it is both good practice and good economics to release him on bail even though he cannot arrange for cash or bonds in even small amounts. In fact it has been suggested that it may be a denial of constitutional rights to hold indigent prisoners in custody for no other reason than their inability to raise the money for a bond. Bandy v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 197 (1960). The first change authorizes the acceptance as security of a deposit of cash or government securities in an amount less than the face amount of the bond. Since a defendant typically purchases a bail bond for a cash payment of a certain percentage of the face of the bond, a direct deposit with the court of that amount (returnable to the defendant upon his appearance) will often be equally adequate as a deterrent to flight. Cf. Ill.CodeCrim.Proc. §110-7 (1963).The second change authorizes the release of the defendant without financial security on his written agreement to appear when other deterrents appear reasonably adequate. See the discussion of such deterrents in Bandy v. United States, 81 S.Ct. 197 (1960). It also permits the imposition of nonfinancial conditions as the price of dispensing with security for the bond. Such conditions are commonly used in England. Devin, The Criminal Prosecution in England, 89 (1958). See the suggestion in Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 Yale L.J. 966, 975 (1961) that such conditions "* * * might include release in custody of a third party, such as the accused's employer, minister, attorney, or a private organization; release subject to a duty to report periodically to the court or other public official; or even release subject to a duty to return to jail each night." Willful failure to appear after forfeiture of bail is a separate criminal offense and hence an added deterrent to flight. 18 U.S.C. §.For full discussion and general approval of the changes made here see Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Criminal Justice 58-89 (1963).Subdivision (h).-The purpose of this new subdivision is to place upon the court in each district the responsibility for supervising the detention of defendants and witnesses and for eliminating all unnecessary detention. The device of the report by the attorney for the government is used because in many districts defendants will be held in custody in places where the court sits only at infrequent intervals and hence they cannot be brought personally before the court without substantial delay. The magnitude of the problem is suggested by the facts that during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1960, there were 23,811 instances in which persons were held in custody pending trial and that the average length of detention prior to disposition (i.e., dismissal, acquittal, probation, sentence to imprisonment, or any other method of removing the case from the court docket) was 25.3 days. Federal Prisons 1960, table 22, p. 60. Since 27,645 of the 38,855 defendants whose cases were terminated during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1960, pleaded guilty (United States Attorneys Statistical Report, October 1960, p. 1 and table 2), it would appear that the greater part of the detention reported occurs prior to the initial appearance of the defendant before the court.
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES-1972 AMENDMENTThe amendments are intended primarily to bring rule 46 into general conformity with the Bail Reform Act of 1966 and to deal in the rule with some issues not now included within the rule. Subdivision (a) makes explicit that the Bail Reform Act of 1966 controls release on bail prior to trial.refers to release of a defendant. refers to release of a material witness.Subdivision (b) deals with an issue not dealt with by the Bail Reform Act of 1966 or explicitly in former rule 46, that is, the issue of bail during trial. The rule gives the trial judge discretion to continue the prior conditions of release or to impose such additional conditions as are adequate to insure presence at trial or to insure that his conduct will not obstruct the orderly and expeditious progress of the trial.Subdivision (c) provides for release during the period between a conviction and sentencing and for the giving of a notice of appeal or of the expiration of the time allowed for filing notice of appeal. There are situations in which defense counsel may informally indicate an intention to appeal but not actually give notice of appeal for several days. To deal with this situation the rule makes clear that the district court has authority to release under the terms of pending notice of appeal (e.g., during the ten days after entry of judgment; see rule 4(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure). After the filing of notice of appeal, release by the district court shall be in accordance with the provisions of rule 9(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. The burden of establishing that grounds for release exist is placed upon the defendant in the view that the fact of conviction justifies retention in custody in situations where doubt exists as to whether a defendant can be safely released pending either sentence or the giving of notice of appeal.Subdivisions (d), (e), (f), and (g) remain unchanged. They were formerly lettered (e), (f), (g), and (h).
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES-1987 AMENDMENTThe amendments are technical. No substantive change is intended.
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES-1991 AMENDMENTThe amendment is technical. No substantive change is intended.
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES-1993 AMENDMENTThe addition of subdivision (i) is one of a series of similar amendments to Rules 26.2, 32, 32.1, and Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Proceedings Underwhich extend Rule 26.2 to other proceedings and hearings. As pointed out in the Committee Note to the amendment to Rule 26.2, there is continuing and compelling need to assess the credibility and reliability of information relied upon by the court, whether the witness's testimony is being considered at a pretrial proceeding, at trial, or a post-trial proceeding. Production of a witness's prior statements directly furthers that goal.The need for reliable information is no less crucial in a proceeding to determine whether a defendant should be released from custody. The issues decided at pretrial detention hearings are important to both a defendant and the community. For example, a defendant charged with criminal acts may be incarcerated prior to an adjudication of guilt without bail on grounds of future dangerousness which is not subject to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the defendant clearly has an interest in remaining free prior to trial, the community has an equally compelling interest in being protected from potential criminal activity committed by persons awaiting trial.In upholding the constitutionality of pretrial detention based upon dangerousness, the Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1986), stressed the existence of procedural safeguards in the Bail Reform Act. The Act provides for the right to counsel and the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. See, e.g., (right of defendant to cross-examine adverse witness). Those safeguards, said the Court, are "specifically designed to further the accuracy of that determination." 481 U.S. at 751. The Committee believes that requiring the production of a witness's statement will further enhance the fact-finding process.The Committee recognized that pretrial detention hearings are often held very early in a prosecution, and that a particular witness's statement may not yet be on file, or even known about. Thus, the amendment recognizes that in a particular case, the court may decide that good cause exists for not applying the rule.
COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES-2002 AMENDMENT The language of Rule 46 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Criminal Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only, except as noted below. Although the general rule is that an appeal to a circuit court deprives the district court of jurisdiction, Rule 46(c) recognizes the apparent exception to that rule-that the district court retains jurisdiction to decide whether the defendant should be detained, even if a notice of appeal has been filed. See, e.g., United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1006 (1997) (initial decision of whether to release defendant pending appeal is to be made by district court); United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1985); Jago v. United States District Court, 570 F.2d 618 (6th Cir. 1978) (release of defendant pending appeal must first be sought in district court). See also Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 9(b) and the accompanying Committee Note.Revised Rule 46(h) deletes the requirement that the attorney for the government file bi-weekly reports with the court concerning the status of any defendants in pretrial detention. The Committee believed that the requirement was no longer necessary in light of the Speedy Trial Act provisions., et seq. On the other hand, the requirement that the attorney for the government file reports regarding detained material witnesses has been retained in the rule. Rule 46(i) addresses the ability of a court to order forfeiture of property where a defendant has failed to appear as required by the court. The language in the current rule, Rule 46(h), was originally included by Congress. The new language has been restyled with no change in substance or practice intended. Under this provision, the court may only forfeit property as permitted under and . The term "appropriate sentence" means a sentence that is consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines.
AMENDMENT BY PUBLIC LAW 1994-Subd. (i)(1). Pub. L. 103-322 substituted "3142" for "3144".1984-Subd. (a). Pub. L. 98-473, §209(d)(1), substituted "§§3142 and 3144" for "§3146, §3148, or §3149".Subd. (c). Pub. L. 98-473, §209(d)(2), substituted "3143" for "3148".Subd. (e)(2). Pub. L. 98-473, §209(d)(3), substituted "be set aside in whole or in part upon such conditions as the court may impose, if a person released upon execution of an appearance bond with a surety is subsequently surrendered by the surety into custody or if it otherwise appears that justice does not require the forfeiture" for "set aside, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if it appears that justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture".Subd. (h). Pub. L. 98-473, §209(d)(4), added subd. (h).
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1956 AMENDMENT Amendment by Order of April 9, 1956, became effective 90 days thereafter.