orn Muldrow, claims her employer transferred her from one job to another because she is a woman. She filed a Title VII suit, alleging that she suffered sex discrimination with respect to the “terms [or] conditions” of her employment. 42 U.S.C. §2000e–2(a)(1). The lower courts rejected Muldrow’s claim because the transfer did not cause her a “significant” employment disadvantage. Today, in an opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the Court reversed and “disapprove[d]” of the “significant” employment disadvantage standard for addressing Title VII suits arising from job transfers. As the Court explained, “[a]lthough an employee must show some harm from a forced transfer to prevail in a Title VII suit, she need not show that the injury satisfies a significance test.” Three justices—Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh—filed separate opinions concurring in the judgment.View the Court's decision.McIntosh v. United States, No. 22-7386: This case involves the procedural requirements for criminal forfeiture. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B) generally requires that a preliminary order of forfeiture be entered prior to sentencing to provide an opportunity to revise the order before it is finalized. In this case, the government’s indictment included a demand for forfeiture of the defendant’s car and $75,000, but there was no preliminary forfeiture order prior to the court imposing forfeiture at the post-conviction sentencing hearing. The government supplemented the record on appeal with a written order of forfeiture, but the defendant argued that the failure to comply with Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) barred any final forfeiture order. Today, in a unanimous decision authored by Justice Sotomayor, the Court held that Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) is a “time-related directive” rather than a “mandatory claim-processing rule.” Accordingly, the failure to meet the Rule’s requirements can be excused subject to harmless-error review. The defendant’s failure to show prejudice in this case allowed the forfeiture to proceed.View the Court's decision.

as, Alito, and Kavanaugh agreed with Justice Kagan as to the outcome but suggested that the Court had done nothing new or exceptional and that cases, including this one, merely should involve evidentiary considerations that were being applied in all of the courts of appeals. The grant of certiorari itself casts doubt on that assertion, but given the Court’s clear holding, it hardly matters.That should prove to be the case when the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, on remand, addresses the evidentiary questions that the Supreme Court did not resolve.As for theMuldrowcase itself, nothing could be clearer. The entire Supreme Court has held that “‘[d]iscriminate against’ means treat worse, here based on sex.’” Employers and those of us who represent them must be prepared to act and defend on this basis.A unanimous Court, per Justice Sotomayor, held inMcIntosh v. United Statesthat the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York’s failure to comply with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)(B)’s requirement to enter a preliminary order before sentencing does not bar the court from ordering forfeiture at sentencing subject to harmless-error principles. Notwithstanding its failure to have entered such an order at a preliminary sentencing hearing, the district court retained its power to order forfeiture. Reciting well-established precedent, the Court noted that it has identified three types of time limits: (i) jurisdictional deadlines, (ii) mandatory claim-processing rules, and (iii) time-related directives.See Dolan v. United States, 560 U. S. 605, 610–611 (2010).Here, the Court concluded that that deadline was a time-related directive that,if missed, does not deprive the official of “the power to take the action to which the deadline applies.” Id., at 611. As noted, noncompliance with a time-related directive is subject to harmless-error principles on appellate review,SeeFed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(a).Yet another peaceful day among the Justices. However, as the U.S. Weather Se

case involves application of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause to certain expert testimony. The question presented is: Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment permits the prosecution in a criminal trial to present testimony by a substitute expert conveying the testimonial statements of a nontestifying forensic analyst, on the grounds that (a) the testifying expert offers some independent opinion and the analyst’s statements are offered not for their truth but to explain the expert’s opinion, and (b) the defendant did not independently seek to subpoena the analyst.McIntosh v. United States,No. 22-7386: This criminal procedure case addresses a circuit court split about whether a final criminal forfeiture order is valid if the government previously failed to comply with procedural rules and time limits governing criminal forfeiture. The question presented is: Whether a district court may enter a criminal forfeiture order outside the time limitations set forth in Rule 32.2 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.