There are a wide range of potentially applicable statutory provisions. Part One broadly discusses criminal copyright infringement, focusing on 17 U.S.C. Section 506 and 18 U.S.C. Section 2319. Part Two explores the Trademark Copyright Act, as well as its relation to its civil law counterpart, the Lanham Act, and its evolution since 1984.

Office of Legal Educ., supra note 2, at 11.Id.at 16. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1). 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1). Office of Legal Educ., supra note 2, at 60 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A), 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(3)).Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(B), 18 U.S.C. 2319(c)(3)).Id.[View source.]

Table of Contents United States v. Liu In re AutoHop Litigation 16 Casa Duse, LLC v. MerkinUnited States v. Liu, USCA, Ninth Circuit, October 1, 2013Click here to download a PDF of the full decision. Ninth Circuit panel vacates defendant’s convictions for criminal copyright infringement and trafficking in counterfeit labels, holding that district court failed to properly instruct jury that, under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a), defendant needed to know he was committing an unlawful act, and that, under 18 U.S.C. § 2318(a)(1), defendant needed to know that trafficked labels were counterfeit. Defendant Liu founded and was the CEO of a DVD-manufacturing company called Super DVD.

However, only the unauthorized reproduction or distribution of certain works under specific circumstances was punishable as a felony-level offense. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1); see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319(a)-(d). With the PLSA, illegal online streaming activities are now punishable in the same manner.

Further, where a published work is published under a pseudonym, “the Copyright Office does not investigate whether there is a provable connection between the claimant and the pseudonymous author.”Section 506 (Criminal Offenses) of the Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 506) is perhaps best known for criminalizing copyright infringement that is done “willfully” in certain circumstances. Clause (e) of Section 506 also states, though, that: “Any person who knowingly makes a false representation of a material fact in the application for copyright registration provided for bysection 409, or in any written statement filed in connection with the application, shall be fined not more than $2,500.”

An important part of In re Floor Liner is CORB’s statement that its opinion was dependent on the applicant’s “representation that this pattern services a purely aesthetic purpose.” In a footnote, CORB explains that this representation, if it turns out not to be true, could subject the applicant to criminal penalties pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 506(e). So let’s say, hypothetically, that an applicant makes a false statement about function to the Copyright Office.

Copyright infringement can also be the subject of an investigation of the United States International Trade Commission (“ITC”) and criminal action in district court. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a); 17 U.S.C. § 506(a). ITC investigations and criminal actions related to copyright infringement are beyond the scope of this article.

The conviction resulted in a two-year prison sentence, which was upheld on appeal. Jack Frison Sr., the defendant in the case, asserted that the criminal laws under which he was convicted, imposing penalties for conspiracy, for aiding and abetting copyright infringement in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(a)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1) and (2), and for aiding and abetting the trafficking in counterfeit goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2329(a), (b)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, were unconstitutionally vague, claiming that he did not have notice that his behavior was criminal. The facts belied that assertion, however.

United States v. Liu, 731 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2013) In a criminal copyright prosecution, 17 U.S.C. § 506(a), the term “willfully” requires proof that the defendant intended to violate a criminal law, not just that he or she intended to make a copy of a copyrighted work. In a case involving counterfeit labels, the term “knowingly” requires proof that the defendant knew that the labels were counterfeit, not just that he knew that he was trafficking in labels that happened to turn out to be counterfeit.

The Eighth Circuit concluded that the defendant must, indeed, have known that the victim lacked the capacity to consent and the failure to instruct the jury on this point was plain error.United States v. Liu, 731 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2013)In a criminal copyright prosecution, 17 U.S.C. § 506(a), the term “willfully” requires proof that the defendant intended to violate a criminal law, not just that he or she intended to make a copy of a copyrighted work. In a case involving counterfeit labels, the term “knowingly” requires proof that the defendant knew that the labels were counterfeit, not just that he knew that he was trafficking in labels that happen to turn out to be counterfeit.