onduct, have caused and are causing Plaintiffs great and incalculable damage.By continuing to provide unauthorized public performances of works in the BMI Repertoire at the Establishment, Defendants threaten to continue committing copyright infringement. Unless this Court restrains Defendants from further acts of copyright infringement, Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury, with no adequate remedy at law.WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally, for the following relief and damages:A. Defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, all persons acting under their permission and authority, and all persons who are in active concert or participation with any of the Defendants, be enjoined and restrained from infringing, in any manner, the copyrighted musical compositions licensed by BMI, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 502; B. Statutory damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c); C. Costs and reasonable attorneys' fees, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505; D. Statutory interest on damages, costs, and attorneys' fees;E. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.LEGAL COMPLIANCE TIPS FOR RESTAURANT, BAR, AND TAVERN OWNERSHere are some general tips if your establishment receives a letter from BMI or ASCAP (or any other agency alleging copyright infringement inside your establishment):Don't treat it as "SPAM" or a "SCAM." Many clients come to me and say, "I didn't take the letter seriously, as I thought it was a scam." If you are not sure if it is a scam or not, contact a copyright infringement lawyer to discuss.It is usually best to seek to settle these matters outside of court. This is for two reasons; (1) a federal lawsuit will end up costing you more, because their copyright attorneys have to get involved, and you will need to hire a lawyer as well (businesses cannot represent themselves in court), and (2) a federal court lawsuit becomes a matter of public record, and easily searchable on Google (i.e., not

randum (PPM) and an indenture of trust. UIRC did not create these documents from scratch but instead borrowed most of the language from the Idaho Housing and Finance Association. Nevertheless, UIRC secured copyright registrations by explicitly focusing on the “additional and revised text” it contributed, not the “standard legal language.”While aiding UIRC in transactions utilizing its copyrighted documents, William Blair concurrently assisted a third party in a similar transaction. During that transaction, William Blair used UIRC’s copyrighted PPM and indenture of trust documents. In response, UIRC filed a copyright infringement suit against William Blair. The district court granted William Blair’s summary judgment motion, finding that UIRC’s documents lacked valid copyright protection because of the trivial nature of the language added to the bond documents, such as “facts, short phrases, and functional elements.” The district court also awarded attorneys’ fees to William Blair under 17 U.S.C. § 505, finding that three of the four factors from the 1994 Supreme Court of the United States decision in Fogerty v. Fantasy favored an award. UIRC appealed.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stressing that UIRC was not the original author of the copyrighted works since it did not independently create the PPM and indenture of trust documents. The Court explained that copyright protection requires original works with a minimal degree of creativity, a criterion UIRC failed to meet because its contributions resembled facts, fragmented phrases or language driven by functional considerations.The Seventh Circuit heavily relied on the Supreme Court’s 1991 Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. decision, drawing parallels to emphasize that UIRC’s bond documents, being “incredibly similar” to the Idaho Housing and Finance Association documents, lacked the necessary creative expression for copyright protection. The Seventh Circuit deemed trivial additions made by UIRC, which the Court categorized as “facts, s

the passage of time, companies clearly should take the Court’s analysis into account when considering the use of copyrighted works in new technologies. Particularly, any such analysis should take into account whether the use of copyrighted material is for a same or different purpose than the original, whether the use is commercial, and whether there is any other justification for the use.The case will now return to the district court with the issue of fair use determined on summary judgment.[49] The district court, therefore, will have to consider whether AWF has any other defenses to copyright infringement.[50] Should it find in Goldsmith’s favor, the district court is likely to consider whether Goldsmith is entitled to her requested relief: permanent injunctive relief against AWF from further infringement and actual damages and profits earned by AWF’s infringement.[51] The district court may also award significant attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in the case, as permitted by 17 U.S.C. § 505.[52]As and after that claim finishes its journey through the courts, this opinion will live on—perhaps, as the majority suggests, continuing existing copyright law as “a powerful engine of creativity,”[53] or, as the dissent fears, “thwart[ing] the expression of new ideas and the attainment of new knowledge,”[54] but no doubt shaping the discussion of fair use for years to come.Footnotes[1] No. 21-869, 598 U.S. __, slip op. at 3 (May 18, 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). [2] Id. at 4–5. [3] Id. at 5. [4] Id. at 8–9. [5] Id. at 9. [6] Id. at 9–10. [7] Id. at 10. [8] 17 U.S.C. § 107. Other statutory factors not addressed by the Court are “the nature of the copyrighted work,” “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” and “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” Id. [9] Warhol Found. v. Goldsmith, 598 U.S. __, slip op. at 20–21. [10] Id. at 19–20. [11] Id. at 20 (quoting 17 U.S

Charles v. Seinfeld, 410 F. Supp. 3d 656, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169543, 2019 WL 4805684 (S.D.N.Y., Sept. 30, 2019). It is enough for my purposes to hear Judge Nathan’s later summary of the case in her April 29, 2022 order ruling on defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs under 17 U.S.C. § 505.“Plaintiff Christian Charles, an award-winning writer, director, and producer, alleged copyright claims against Jerry Seinfeld and several related Defendants related to the show Comedians in Cars Getting Coffee. The Court ultimately dismissed the second amended complaint on statute-of-limitations grounds, explaining [*2] that Charles was on notice of his claims since at least 2012 but did not file suit until 2018, far outside the three-year statute of limitations for such claims.

The district court subsequently granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that Batiste had failed to submit sufficient evidence of Macklemore and Lewis’s alleged access to Batiste’s work or of probative similarity between Macklemore and Lewis’s works and Batiste’s. The district court then awarded fees to Macklemore and Lewis under the Copyright Act (17 USC § 505) and made Batiste’s attorney (Hayes) jointly and severally liable for the fees award as a sanction under 28 USC § 1987. Batiste appealed.Addressing the district court’s summary judgment of no infringement, the Fifth Circuit considered Batiste’s proofs as to access and similarity.

In finding this a suitable case for attorneys’ fees, the Court cited defendants’ complete success on their fair use defense, Tresóna’s “objectively unreasonable” arguments in the face of settled case law and Tresóna’s overzealous and aggressive litigation strategy against a public school teacher and parent volunteers. The Court, therefore, affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants and reversed the denial of attorneys’ fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505.[View source.]

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT – COSTS AND DAMAGESJodi BenassiIn 2019, the courts also clarified the costs and damages available under the Copyright Act.The US Supreme Court also interpreted the meaning of “full costs” as used in 17 U.S.C § 505. The Court determined that Section 505 has no special, expansive meaning, but is limited to the costs specified in the general costs statutes codified at 28 USC §§ 1821 and 1920.

8 million in litigation expenses such as expert witnesses, e-discovery and jury consulting. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.Under the statute at issue in Rimini Street, 17 U.S.C. § 505, a district court “in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party” and “may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” When deciding to affirm the District Court’s award, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the litigation expenses were beyond the scope of the six categories of costs that may be awarded against a losing party under §§ 1821 and 1920 but held that it was permitted because it reasoned that § 505’s “full costs” were not confined to the six categories.Interpretation with a Little Redundancy In a 9-0 decision on March 4, 2019, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the Court, held that the term “full” did not expand the categories or kinds of expenses that may be awarded as costs under §§ 1821 and 1920, including the phrase in § 505.

8 million in litigation expenses such as expert witnesses, e-discovery and jury consulting. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.Under the statute at issue in Rimini Street, 17U.S.C.§505, a district court “in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party” and “may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.” When deciding to affirm the District Court’s award, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the litigation expenses were beyond the scope of the six categories of costs that may be awarded against a losing party under §§1821 and 1920 but held that it was permitted because it reasoned that §505’s “full costs” were not confined to the six categories.Interpretation with a Little Redundancy In a 9-0 decision on March 4, 2019, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings.Justice Kavanaugh, writing for the Court, held that the term “full” did not expand the categories or kinds of expenses that may be awarded as costs under §§1821 and 1920, including the phrase in §505.

In March 2019 the U.S. Supreme Court issued decisions in two copyright cases, both of which concern narrow issues of statutory interpretation and are examples of matters that the Court addresses to ensure uniformity in the decisions of the lower courts. Following is an account and analysis of the cases.Rimini Street In the first case, Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 586 U.S._, 139 S. Ct. 873, 203 L.Ed. 2d 180, 129 U.S.P.Q.2d 1459 (2019), the Supreme Court overturned a ruling of the Ninth Circuit, which awarded Oracle more than $12 million in nontaxable litigation costs under 17 U.S.C. §505 in a suit against Rimini Street, a technical support service that offered software updates to the customers of Oracle’s enterprise software. Oracle claimed copyright ownership in various aspects of the software programs that Oracle markets.