WSG makes the same argument. (ECF 36:10) But the Curb court forged no such link: it explicitly stated that “domestic violation of the authorization right is an infringement,” 898 F. Supp. at 595, and that authorization is an “equally sanctionable” act of infringement under § 106. Id. at 596. In sum, the Copyright Act makes authorization of infringement an independent act of infringement, and it does so regardless of whether the authorized infringement occurs within or without the United States.

at 574-575 (“It is uncontested here that 2 Live Crew's song would be an infringement of Acuff-Rose’s rights in ‘Oh, Pretty Woman,’ under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U. S. C. § 106 but for a finding of fair use through parody.

By publishing the Image and the Profile Photo to fourteen (14) different Twitter URLs, Mr. Marcus infringed Ms. Stockwell’s exclusive right to distribute the Image and the Profile Photo. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3); Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., 5 F. Supp.2d 823, 830-31 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (distributing copyrighted videotape on the Internet “would conflict with the plaintiffs’ exclusive rights to distribute copies of the tape to the public.”).

See Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs, 648 F.3d at 991. Under Iqbal and Twombly, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Universal authorized the creation of an infringing work in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). Universal misapplies the relevant law in arguing that the Screenplay is not actionable because it is merely an intermediary work.

VHT cannot prove that any distribution of its images resulted from volitional acts of infringement by Zillow. VHT claims that Zillow has infringed its distribution rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) by “sending out promotional emails for the Listing Site that include VHT images when the properties depicted are no longer on the market; by including VHT images in blog posts, when the properties depicted are no longer on the market; and by sending out promotional emails for the Digs Site that include VHT images.” Crosby Dec.

Fox asserts both direct and secondary theories of copyright liability against Hopper Transfers, invoking the reproduction right. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). This copyright theory runs up against the same wall that halts its PTAT claims—DISH is not a direct infringer because it does not make the Hopper Transfer copies and DISH is not secondarily liable because subscriber copies are fair uses under Sony.

Google is not permitted to make copies of copyrighted works or to authorize the libraries to make additional copies. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (copyright holder has exclusive right “to do and to authorize” the reproduction of their copyright protected works) (emphasis added). C. Google’s Infringing Conduct Cannot Be Justified As a “Fair Use” of Plaintiffs’ Books Google bears the burden of proof on its fair use defense.

None of these alleged uses is “actionable” for purposes of the right of publicity. First, with respect to the “display” of the photographs on the website, this is simply an exercise of Corbis’ display right as enumerated under Section 106, as stated above. Moreover, even if the display right itself were ignored, and the posting on the website were framed as some form of promotion in furtherance of the sale of the copyrighted work, the display would still be a permitted “incidental” use.

Plaintiff applied for a copyright of her editing in May 2013 but had never sought permission from the Defendants to use the footage from Caveat, the underlying work. As Plaintiff Case 1:14-cv-00272-JEJ-MCC Document 144-2 Filed 12/06/16 Page 4 of 9 had no ownership or licensing agreement of the underlying raw footage that was used in her copyright, her copyright is invalid, as no derivative work can be based upon a copyrighted work without permission of the copyright owner (17 U.S. Code§ 106 "The owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize.... derivative works based upon the copyrighted work").

Neilson lent McDonald the registration key and the latter installed the Program on his computer. This is proof of violation of the Copyright Act by Neilson at 17 U.S.C. §106(3) (right of distribution) and the EULA for sharing and exceeding license counts. Neilson is therefore a contributory copyright infringer in that he materially assisted in the infringing activity.